The British state and the Irish rebellion of 1916: an intelligence failure or an failure of response

The teleological narrative that has dominated the handling of intelligence by the British state in the events that led up to the 1916 Irish Rebellion in Dublin has been characterised as a cocktail of incompetence and mendacity. Using new and existing archive material this article argues that both the cabinet in London and key members of the Irish Executive in Dublin were supplied with accurate and timely intelligence by the Admiralty's signals intelligence unit, the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police with respect to this event. Far from being a failure of intelligence here is evidence to show that there occurred a failure of response on behalf of key decision-makers. The warnings that were given by intelligence organisations were filtered through the existing policy preferences and assumptions. As a result of these factors accurate evaluations and sound judgement were not exercised by key officials, such as Sir Matthew Nathan, in Dublin Castle.

British railways and the challenge from road haulage: 1919-39

Interwar Britain witnessed the rapid rise of road transport as a serious competitor to the railways. This article examines road–rail competition for freight traffic. It demonstrates that, contrary to previous accounts—which have been highly critical of the railway companies—their failure to prevent rapid loss of traffic to the roads was the inevitable consequence of the regulatory framework under which the railways had been returned to private control in 1921. Given the constraints imposed by this framework, price competition with road hauliers would have further depressed railway company profits. Railway policy thus concentrated on pressing for a revision of the legislative framework governing road–rail competition.