fMRI evidence for the involvement of the procedural memory system in morphological processing of a second language

Behavioural evidence suggests that English regular past tense forms are automatically decomposed into their stem and affix (played  = play+ed) based on an implicit linguistic rule, which does not apply to the idiosyncratically formed irregular forms (kept). Additionally, regular, but not irregular inflections, are thought to be processed through the procedural memory system (left inferior frontal gyrus, basal ganglia, cerebellum). It has been suggested that this distinction does not to apply to second language (L2) learners of English; however, this has not been tested at the brain level. This fMRI study used a masked-priming task with regular and irregular prime-target pairs (played-play/kept-keep) to investigate morphological processing in native and highly proficient late L2 English speakers. No between-groups differences were revealed. Compared to irregular pairs, regular pairs activated the pars opercularis, bilateral caudate nucleus and the right cerebellum, which are part of the procedural memory network and have been connected with the processing of morphologically complex forms. Our study is the first to provide evidence for native-like involvement of the procedural memory system in processing of regular past tense by late L2 learners of English.

Computerized short-term memory treatment for older adults with aphasia

We report on a software prototype designed to deliver a novel term memory treatment for older adults with aphasia. We conducted a review of the prototype with 14 speech and language therapists, to elicit feedback on the potential usefulness of the ultimate application and, particularly, the prototype in terms of its main design features and use by older adults with aphasia. The clinicians’ feedback highlights a number of design considerations relating to the usability, training methods, and appeal of treatment software, which can help engage patients more fully in computerized treatments and improve treatment outcomes.

The effects of distraction on metacognition and metacognition on distraction: evidence from recognition memory

The effects of auditory distraction in memory tasks have been examined to date with procedures that minimize participants’ control over their own memory processes. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to metacognitive control factors which might affect memory performance. In this study, we investigate the effects of auditory distraction on metacognitive control of memory, examining the effects of auditory distraction in recognition tasks utilizing the metacognitive framework of Koriat and Goldsmith (1996), to determine whether strategic regulation of memory accuracy is impacted by auditory distraction. Results replicated previous findings in showing that auditory distraction impairs memory performance in tasks minimizing participants’ metacognitive control (forced-report test). However, the results revealed also that when metacognitive control is allowed (free-report tests), auditory distraction impacts upon a range of metacognitive indices. In the present study, auditory distraction undermined accuracy of metacognitive monitoring (resolution), reduced confidence in responses provided and, correspondingly, increased participants’ propensity to withhold responses in free-report recognition. Crucially, changes in metacognitive processes were related to impairment in free-report recognition performance, as the use of the ‘don’t know’ option under distraction led to a reduction in the number of correct responses volunteered in free-report tests. Overall, the present results show how auditory distraction exerts its influence on memory performance via both memory and metamemory processes.

Auditory distraction in memory tasks: Can it be controlled?

Irrelevant sound accompanying the processes of encoding and retrieval of verbal events impairs memory performance. However, the degree of impairment is highly dependent on a range of factors. Some of them lie outside rememberers’ control, like the semantic content of distracting sound or the nature of a test used to assess memory. Others, like a strategy used to encode memoranda, rest under control of the rememberer. In this paper the factors that modulate memory impairment are outlined and discussed in terms of multiple mechanisms contributing to memory impairment under auditory distraction. The mechanisms of a capture of attention by distraction, interference of automatic seriation of distraction and voluntary seriation of memoranda, semantic inhibition of distraction, and blocking of memoranda by semantically related distracters are described. Results that demonstrate how these mechanisms determine memory impairment under auditory distraction are also discussed. Particular attention is devoted to the possibility of voluntary control over the workings of these mechanisms and the conditions under which the negative impact of auditory distraction upon memory performance could be minimised.

Metacognitive control over memory processes under auditory distraction

Decades of research attest that memory processes suffer under conditions of auditory distraction. What is however less well understood is whether people are able to modify how their memory processes are deployed in order to compensate for disruptive effects of distraction. The metacognitive approach to memory describes a variety of ways people can exert control over their cognitive processes to optimize performance. Here we describe our recent investigations into how these control processes change under conditions of auditory distraction. We specifically looked at control of encoding in the form of decisions about how long to study a word when it is presented and control of memory reporting in the form of decisions whether to volunteer or withhold retrieved details. Regarding control of encoding, we expected that people would compensate for disruptive effects of distraction by extending study time under noise. Our results revealed, however, that when exposed to irrelevant speech, people curtail rather than extend study. Regarding control of memory reporting, we expected that people would compensate for the loss of access to memory records by volunteering responses held with lower confidence. Our results revealed, however, that people’s reporting strategies do not differ when memory task is performed in silence or under auditory distraction, although distraction seriously undermines people’s confidence in their own responses. Together, our studies reveal novel avenues for investigating the psychological effects of auditory distraction within a metacognitive framework.

Memory suppression can help people “unlearn” behavioral responses—but only for nonemotional memories

When encountering reminders of memories that we prefer not to think about, we often try to exclude those memories from awareness. Past studies have revealed that such suppression attempts can reduce the subsequent recollection of unwanted memories. In the present study, we examined whether the inhibitory effects extend even to associated behavioral responses. Participants learned cue–target pairs for emotional and nonemotional targets and were additionally trained in behavioral responses for each cue. Afterward, they were shown the cues and instructed either to think or to avoid thinking about the targets without performing any behaviors. In a final test phase, behavioral performance was tested for all of the cues. When the targets were neutral, participants’ attempts to avoid retrieval reduced accuracy and increased reaction times in generating behavioral responses associated with cues. By contrast, behavioral performance was not affected by suppression attempts when the targets were emotional. These results indicate that controlling unwanted recollection is powerful enough to inhibit associated behavioral responses—but only for nonemotional memories.

Mood and recall of autobiographical memory: the effect of focus of self-knowledge

Mood state facilitates recall of affectively congruent memories (i.e., mood-congruent recall). Mood state may also promote motivation to alleviate a negative affective state, leading to retrieval of affectively incongruent memories (i.e., mood incongruent recall). The present study demonstrates that the focus of self-knowledge influences the occurrence of both mood-congruent recall and mood-incongruent recall. Three experiments found that mood-congruent recall occurred when participants recalled their experiences from a self-aspect that was related to the elicitor of moods, whereas mood-incongruent recall occurred when they recalled their experiences from a self-aspect that was unrelated to the elicitor of moods. These results suggest that the nature of the self-aspect from which persons recall their experiences determines whether mood-congruent or mood-incongruent recall occurs.