Control without deception

Lying to participants offers an experimenter the enticing prospect of making “others' behaviour” a controlled variable, but is eschewed by experimental economists because it may pollute the pool of subjects. This paper proposes and implements a new experimental design, the Conditional Information Lottery, which offers all the benefits of deception without actually deceiving anyone. The design should be suitable for most economics experiments, and works by a modification of an already standard device, the Random Lottery incentive system. The deceptive scenarios of designs which use deceit are replaced with fictitious scenarios, each of which, from a subject's viewpoint, has a chance of being true. The design is implemented in a sequential play public good experiment prompted by Weimann's (1994) result, from a deceptive design, that subjects are more sensitive to freeriding than cooperation on the part of others. The experiment provides similar results to Weimann's, in that subjects are at least as cooperative when uninformed about others' behaviour as they are if reacting to high contributions. No deception is used and the data cohere well both internally and with other public goods experiments. In addition, simultaneous play is found to be more efficient than sequential play, and subjects contribute less at the end of a sequence than at the start. The results suggest pronounced elements of overconfidence, egoism and (biased) reciprocity in behaviour, which may explain decay in contributions in repeated play designs. The experiment shows there is a workable alternative to deception.

"Where am I?" Impact of display and content variables on spatial presence and comprehension in virtual environments

Forgetting immediate physical reality and having awareness of one�s location in the simulated world is critical to enjoyment and performance in virtual environments be it an interactive 3D game such as Quake or an online virtual 3d community space such as Second Life. Answer to the question "where am I?" at two levels, whether the locus is in the immediate real world as opposed to the virtual world and whether one is aware of the spatial co-ordinates of that locus, hold the key to any virtual 3D experience. While 3D environments, especially virtual environments and their impact on spatial comprehension has been studied in disciplines such as architecture, it is difficult to determine the relative contributions of specific attributes such as screen size or stereoscopy towards spatial comprehension since most of them treat the technology as monolith (box-centered). Using a variable-centered approach put forth by Nass and Mason (1990) which breaks down the technology into its component variables and their corresponding values as its theoretical basis, this paper looks at the contributions of five variables (Stereoscopy, screen size, field of view, level of realism and level of detail) common to most virtual environments on spatial comprehension and presence. The variable centered approach can be daunting as the increase in the number of variables can exponentially increase the number of conditions and resources required. We overcome this drawback posed by adoption of such a theoretical approach by the use of a fractional factorial design for the experiment. This study has completed the first wave of data collection and starting the next phase in January 2007 and expected to complete by February 2007. Theoretical and practical implications of the study are discussed.

Effect of Rht alleles on the tolerance of wheat grain set to high temperature and drought stress during booting and anthesis

Factorial pot experiments were conducted to compare the responses of GA-sensitive and GA-insensitive reduced height (Rht) alleles in wheat for susceptibility to heat and drought stress during booting and anthesis. Grain set (grains/spikelet) of near isogenic lines (NILs) was assessed following three day transfers to controlled environments imposing day temperatures (t) from 20 to 40°C. Transfers were during booting and/or anthesis and pots maintained at field capacity (FC) or had water withheld. Logistic responses (y = c/1+e-b(t -m)) described declining grain set with increasing t, and t5 was that fitted to give a 5% reduction in grain set. Averaged over NIL, t5 for anthesis at FC was 31.7±0.47°C (S.E.M, 26 d.f.). Drought at anthesis reduced t5 by <2°C. Maintaining FC at booting conferred considerable resistance to high temperatures (t5=33.9°C) but booting was particularly heat susceptible without water (t5 =26.5°C). In one background (cv. Mercia), for NILs varying at the Rht-D1 locus, there was progressive reduction in t5 with dwarfing and reduced gibberellic acid (GA) sensitivity (Rht-D1a, tall, 32.7±0.72; Rht-D1b, semi-dwarf, 29.5±0.85; Rht-D1c, severe dwarf, 24.2±0.72). This trend was not evident for the Rht-B1 locus, or for Rht-D1b in an alternative background (Maris Widgeon). The GA-sensitive severe dwarf Rht12 was more heat tolerant (t5=29.4±0.72) than the similarly statured GA-insensitive Rht-D1c. The GA-sensitive, semi-dwarfing Rht8 conferred greater drought tolerance in one experiment. Despite the effects of Rht-D1 alleles in Mercia on stress tolerance, the inconsistency of the effects over background and locus led to the conclusion that semi-dwarfing with GA-insensitivity did not necessarily increase sensitivity to stress at booting and flowering. In comparison to effects of semi-dwarfing alleles, responses to heat stress are much more dramatically affected by water availability and the precise growth stage at which the stress is experienced by the plants.

An Experiment on Prisoner's Dilemma with confirmed Proposals

We apply an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. We interpret players’ proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of signing a cooperative agreement in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players’ willingness to cooperate and on their beliefs about the others’ type.

General circulation model estimates of aerosol transport and radiative forcing during the Indian Ocean Experiment

Aerosol sources, transport, and sinks are simulated, and aerosol direct radiative effects are assessed over the Indian Ocean for the Indian Ocean Experiment (INDOEX) Intensive Field Phase during January to March 1999 using the Laboratoire de Me´te´orologie Dynamique (LMDZT) general circulation model. The model reproduces the latitudinal gradient in aerosol mass concentration and optical depth (AOD). The model-predicted aerosol concentrations and AODs agree reasonably well with measurements but are systematically underestimated during high-pollution episodes, especially in the month of March. The largest aerosol loads are found over southwestern China, the Bay of Bengal, and the Indian subcontinent. Aerosol emissions from the Indian subcontinent are transported into the Indian Ocean through either the west coast or the east coast of India. Over the INDOEX region, carbonaceous aerosols are the largest contributor to the estimated AOD, followed by sulfate, dust, sea salt, and fly ash. During the northeast winter monsoon, natural and anthropogenic aerosols reduce the solar flux reaching the surface by 25 W m�2, leading to 10–15% less insolation at the surface. A doubling of black carbon (BC) emissions from Asia results in an aerosol single-scattering albedo that is much smaller than in situ measurements, reflecting the fact that BC emissions are not underestimated in proportion to other (mostly scattering) aerosol types. South Asia is the dominant contributor to sulfate aerosols over the INDOEX region and accounts for 60–70% of the AOD by sulfate. It is also an important but not the dominant contributor to carbonaceous aerosols over the INDOEX region with a contribution of less than 40% to the AOD by this aerosol species. The presence of elevated plumes brings significant quantities of aerosols to the Indian Ocean that are generated over Africa and Southeast and east Asia.

An experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with confirmed proposals

We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner's Dilemma game. We interpret players' proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of cooperation in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players' willingness to cooperate and as signals pursuing individualistic objectives like publicizing one's bargaining abilities or eliciting those of the opponent.

How do markets manage water resources? An experiment

We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of differing qualities to households and farmers. Most of our results are in line with the theoretical predictions. Overexploitation of the resources is observed independently of the market structure. Stock depletion for the public utility is the fastest, followed by the private duopoly and private monopoly. On the positive aspects of centralized public management, we find that the average quality to price ratio offered by the public monopoly is substantially higher than that offered by the private monopoly or duopoly.

An experiment on spatial competition with endogenous pricing

Hotelling's (1929) principle of minimum differentiation and the alternative prediction that firms will maximally differentiate from their rivals in order to relax price competition have not been explicitly tested so far. We report results from experimental spatial duopolies designed to address this issue. The levels of product differentiation observed are systematically lower than predicted in equilibrium under risk neutrality and compatible with risk aversion. The observed prices are consistent with collusion attempts. Our main findings are robust to variations in three experimental conditions: automated vs. human market sharing rule for ties, individual vs. collective decision making, and even vs. odd number of locations.

An ultimatum bargaining experiment on trade union efficiency

We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency.

Managing a duopolistic water market with confirmed proposals. An experiment

We report results from experimental water markets in which owners of two different sources of water supply water to households and farmers. The final water quality consumed by each type of consumer is determined through mixing of qualities from two different resources. We compare the standard duopolistic market structure with an alternative market clearing mechanism inspired by games with confirmed strategies (which have been shown to yield collusive outcomes). As in the static case, complex dynamic markets operating under a confirmed proposals protocol yield less efficient outcomes because coordination among independent suppliers has the usual effects of restricting output and increasing prices to the users. Our results suggest that, when market mechanisms are used to allocate water to its users, the rule of thumb used by competition authorities can also serve as a guide towards water market regulation.

Identified consumers: an experiment on the informativeness of cross-demand price effects

Often, firms have no information on the specification of the true demand model they are faced with. It is, however, a well established fact that trial-and-error algorithms may be used by them in order to learn how to make optimal decisions. Using experimental methods, we identify a property of the information on past actions which helps the seller of two asymmetric demand substitutes to reach the optimal prices more precisely and faster. The property concerns the possibility of disaggregating changes in each product’s demand into client exit/entry and shift from one product to the other.

An experiment on subjective game valuations

We report experimental results on a prisoners' dilemma implemented in a way which allows us to elicit incentive−compatible valuations of the game. We test the hypothesis that players' valuations coincide with their Nash equilibrium earnings. Our results offer significantly less support for this hypothesis than for the prediction of Dominant Strategy (DS) play.

Studying economics reduces overexploitation in a common resource experiment

This paper studies the economic behavior of agents, who make decisions regarding the sustainability of Common-Pool Resources (CPR). For this purpose, economic experiments are applied to simulate the yield of a CPR, taking into account the influence of economics training on the learning process of individuals, regarding their decisions for sustainability. Based on a non-cooperative game with simultaneous choices, the results of experiments show that after several rounds the existence of economics knowledge reflects a better learning process for making decisions regarding sustainability of CPR.