Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES) and efficient design of contracts in developing countries. Behavioral insights from a natural field experiment

The use of economic incentives for biodiversity (mostly Compensation and Reward for Environmental Services including Payment for ES) has been widely supported in the past decades and became the main innovative policy tools for biodiversity conservation worldwide. These policy tools are often based on the insight that rational actors perfectly weigh the costs and benefits of adopting certain behaviors and well-crafted economic incentives and disincentives will lead to socially desirable development scenarios. This rationalist mode of thought has provided interesting insights and results, but it also misestimates the context by which ‘real individuals’ come to decisions, and the multitude of factors influencing development sequences. In this study, our goal is to examine how these policies can take advantage of some unintended behavioral reactions that might in return impact, either positively or negatively, general policy performances. We test the effect of income's origin (‘Low effort’ based money vs. ‘High effort’ based money) on spending decisions (Necessity vs. Superior goods) and subsequent pro social preferences (Future pro-environmental behavior) within Madagascar rural areas, using a natural field experiment. Our results show that money obtained under low effort leads to different consumption patterns than money obtained under high efforts: superior goods are more salient in the case of low effort money. In parallel, money obtained under low effort leads to subsequent higher pro social behavior. Compensation and rewards policies for ecosystem services may mobilize knowledge on behavioral biases to improve their design and foster positive spillovers on their development goals.

Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies

Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on the strategic choice of firms' owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment device aiming at gaining competitive advantage in the product market. In a quantity setting duopoly we experimentally test whether firms' owners compensate their managers through contracts combining own profits either with revenues or with relative performance, and the resulting managerial behaviour in the product market. Prominent among our results is that firms' owners choose relative performance over profit revenue contracts more frequently. Further, firms' owners successfully induce a more aggressive behaviour by their managers in the market, by setting incentives which deviate from strict profit maximization.

Consent and the use of force: an examination of ‘intervention by invitation’ as a basis for US drone strikes in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen

Drone strikes are becoming a key feature of the United States’ global military response to nonstate actors, and it has been widely adduced that these strikes have been carried out with the consent of the host states in which such non-state actors reside. This article examines the degree to which assertions of consent (or ‘intervention by invitation’), provided as a justification for drone strikes by the United States in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, can be said to accord with international law. First the article provides a broad sketch of the presence of consent in international law. It then analyses in detail the individual elements of consent as provided by Article 20 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles of State Responsibility. These require that consent should be ‘valid’, given by the legitimate government and expressed by an official empowered to do so. These elements will be dealt with individually, and each in turn will be applied to the cases of Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Finally, the article will examine the breadth of the exculpatory power of consent, and the extent to which it can preclude the wrongfulness of acts carried out in contravention of international law other than the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations.

Corticomuscular coherence modulation with the pattern of finger force coordination

We assess the corticomuscular coherence (CMC) of the contralateral primary motor cortex and the hand muscles during a finger force-tracking task and explore whether the pattern of finger coordination has an impact on the CMC level. Six healthy subjects (three men and three women) were recruited to conduct the force-tracking tasks comprising two finger patterns, i.e., natural combination of index and middle fingers and unnatural combination of index and middle fingers (i.e., simultaneously producing equal force strength in index and middle finger). During the conducting of the tasks with right index and middle finger, MEG and sEMG signals were recorded from left primary motor cortex (M1) and right flexor digitorum superficialis (FDS), respectively; the contralateral CMC was calculated to assess the neuromuscular interaction. Finger force-tracking tasks of Common-IM only induce beta-band CMC, whereas Uncommon-IM tasks produce CMC in both beta and low-gamma band. Compared to the force-tracking tasks of Common-IM, the Uncommon-IM task is associated with the most intensive contralateral CMC. Our study demonstrated that the pattern of finger coordination had significant impact on the CMC between the contralateral M1 and hand muscles, and more corticomuscular interaction was necessary for unnaturally coordinated finger activities to regulate the fixed neural drive of hand muscles.