A socio-technical network approach to the adoption of low and zero carbon technologies in new housing

Housing in the UK accounts for 30.5% of all energy consumed and is responsible for 25% of all carbon emissions. The UK Government’s Code for Sustainable Homes requires all new homes to be zero carbon by 2016. The development and widespread diffusion of low and zero carbon (LZC) technologies is recognised as being a key solution for housing developers to deliver against this zero-carbon agenda. The innovation challenge to design and incorporate these technologies into housing developers’ standard design and production templates will usher in significant technical and commercial risks. In this paper we report early results from an ongoing Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council project looking at the innovation logic and trajectory of LZC technologies in new housing. The principal theoretical lens for the research is the socio-technical network approach which considers actors’ interests and interpretative flexibilities of technologies and how they negotiate and reproduce ‘acting spaces’ to shape, in this case, the selection and adoption of LZC technologies. The initial findings are revealing the form and operation of the technology networks around new housing developments as being very complex, involving a range of actors and viewpoints that vary for each housing development.

A multidisciplinary literature review of low and zero carbon technologies into new housing

The UK Government is committed to all new homes being zero-carbon from 2016. The use of low and zero carbon (LZC) technologies is recognised by housing developers as being a key part of the solution to deliver against this zero-carbon target. The paper takes as its starting point that the selection of new technologies by firms is not a phenomenon which takes place within a rigid sphere of technical rationality (for example, Rip and Kemp, 1998). Rather, technology forms and diffusion trajectories are driven and shaped by myriad socio-technical structures, interests and logics. A literature review is offered to contribute to a more critical and systemic foundation for understanding the socio-technical features of the selection of LZC technologies in new housing. The problem is investigated through a multidisciplinary lens consisting of two perspectives: technological and institutional. The synthesis of the perspectives crystallises the need to understand that the selection of LZC technologies by housing developers is not solely dependent on technical or economic efficiency, but on the emergent ‘fit’ between the intrinsic properties of the technologies, institutional logics and the interests and beliefs of various actors in the housing development process.

Happiness, well-being and housing policy

The literature on the meaning of home emphasises the security, positive meaning and self-esteem that home generates. However, housing policy has traditionally viewed houses as units of accommodation rather than homes. This article tackles the question of whether it is possible to devise a housing policy that aims at improving the self-esteem and positive identity of residents. The article reviews the growing literature stressing the importance of seeking to promote happiness or well-being as the primary objective of government policy and concludes with an evaluation of the potential for the application of these ideas to housing policy.

Cooperative housing/ownership

Cooperative housing is a long-established form of housing tenure found in many countries. This article will examine the different definitions and forms of cooperative housing and the different roles it has donned in a number of countries, including the United Kingdom and Sweden. The philosophy behind this form of housing will be described. The pragmatic reasons for its existence, such as the need for a collective form of tenure to deal with common repair problems, will also be discussed. The main areas of research on housing cooperatives will be described: (i) their efficiencies being compared with those of other tenure forms and (ii) identifying the factors that influence resident involvement.

I wouldn’t start from here: some reflections on the analysis of housing markets

The insights of behavioural economics are questioned and an approach suggested that is based on empirical studies of how people actually behave in housing markets.

The impact of buy to let residential investment on local housing markets: evidence from Glasgow, Scotland

The advent of the 'buy to let' (BTL) phenomenon in the UK. apart from producing a new wave of individualized rental market investment, has been widely judged to be a speculative and destabilizing force in the housing market. This paper provides a detailed empirical investigation of new residential investment in one city (Glasgow) where BTL has made a relatively large impact. In seeking to overcome data problems, the study employed qualitative (expert interviews and a landlord survey) and quantitative methods (census, the Register of Sasines, standardized house price information and modelling thereof) in order to assess the nature and scale of BTL, the motivations of investors and its impact on the private housing market. The evidence suggests that white Glasgow is in many re.spects different to rental markets elsewhere in the UK and although the investment has thus far largely occurred in a benign environment, the context for future investment, on balance, looks sustainable (i.e.favourable changes to pension planning law and the maturing market for BTL}. Long-term market impact is an empirical question that depends on the specific interactions of market niches or segments (i.e. the first-time buyer market for apartments} with potential buy to let investment. Our conclusion, to borrow a Scottish legal term, is that BTL induced volatility is 'not proven'.

Transfers, contracts and regulation: a new institutional economics perspective on the changing provision of social housing in Britain

Social housing policy in the UK mirrors wider processes Associated with shifts in broad welfare regimes. Social housing has moved from dominance by state housing provision to the funding of new investment through voluntary sector housing associations to what is now a greater focus on the regulation and private financing of these not-for-profit bodies. If these trends run their course, we are likely to see a range of not-for-profit bodies providing non-market housing in a highly regulated quasi-market. This paper examines these issues through the lens of new institutional economics, which it is believed can provide important insights into the fundamental contractual and regulatory relationships that are coming to dominate social housing from the perspective of the key actors in the sector (not-for-profit housing organisations, their tenants, private lenders and the regulatory state). The paper draws on evidence recently collected from a study evaluating more than 100 stock transfer organisations that inherited ex-public housing in Scotland, including 12 detailed case studies. The paper concludes that social housing stakeholders need to be aware of the risks (and their management) faced across the sector and that the state needs to have clear objectives for social housing and coherent policy instruments to achieve those ends.

When do export subsidies have a redistributional role?

If an export subsidy is efficient, that is, has a surplus-transfer role, then there exists an implicit function relating the optimal level of the subsidy to the income target in the agricultural sector. If an export subsidy is inefficient no such function exists. We show that dependence exists in large-export equilibrium, not in small-export equilibrium and show that these results remain robust to concerns about domestic tax distortions. The failure of previous work to produce this result stems from its neglect of the income constraint on producer surplus in the programming problem transferring surplusfrom consumersand taxpayers to farmers.

When do export subsidies have a redistributional role? Reply

Our differences are three. The first arises from the belief that "... a nonzero value for the optimally chosen policy instrument implies that the instrument is efficient for redistribution" (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 3). Consider the two equations: (1) o* = f(P3) and (2) = -f(3) ++r h* (a, P3) representing the solution to the problem of maximizing weighted, Marshallian surplus using, simultaneously, a per-unit border intervention, 9, and a per-unit domestic intervention, wr. In the solution, parameter ot denotes the weight applied to producer surplus; parameter p denotes the weight applied to government revenues; consumer surplus is implicitly weighted one; and the country in question is small in the sense that it is unable to affect world price by any of its domestic adjustments (see the Appendix). Details of the forms of the functions f((P) and h(ot, p) are easily derived, but what matters in the context of Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's Comment is: Redistributivep referencest hatf avorp roducers are consistent with higher values "alpha," and whereas the optimal domestic intervention, 7r*, has both "alpha and beta effects," the optimal border intervention, r*, has only a "beta effect,"-it does not have a redistributional role. Garth Holloway is reader in agricultural economics and statistics, Department of Agricultural and Food Economics, School of Agriculture, Policy, and Development, University of Reading. The author is very grateful to Xavier Irz, Bhavani Shankar, Chittur Srinivasan, Colin Thirtle, and Richard Tiffin for their comments and their wisdom; and to Mario Mazzochi, Marinos Tsigas, and Cal Turvey for their scholarship, including help in tracking down a fairly complete collection of the papers that cite Alston and Hurd. They are not responsible for any errors or omissions. Note, in equation (1), that the border intervention is positive whenever a distortion exists because 8 > 0 implies 3 - 1 + 8 > 1 and, thus, f((P) > 0 (see Appendix). Using Alston, Smith, and Vercammen's definition, the instrument is now "efficient," and therefore has a redistributive role. But now, suppose that the distortion is removed so that 3 - 1 + 8 = 1, 8 = 0, and consequently the border intervention is zero. According to Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, the instrument is now "inefficient" and has no redistributive role. The reader will note that this thought experiment has said nothing about supporting farm incomes, and so has nothing whatsoever to do with efficient redistribution. Of course, the definition is false. It follows that a domestic distortion arising from the "excess-burden argument" 3 = 1 + 8, 8 > 0 does not make an export subsidy "efficient." The export subsidy, having only a "beta effect," does not have a redistributional role. The second disagreement emerges from the comment that Holloway "... uses an idiosyncratic definition of the relevant objective function of the government (Alston, Smith, and Vercammen, p. 543, paragraph 2)." The objective function that generates equations (1) and (2) (see the Appendix) is the same as the objective function used by Gardner (1995) when he first questioned Alston, Carter, and Smith's claim that a "domestic distortion can make a border intervention efficient in transferring surplus from consumers and taxpayers to farmers." The objective function used by Gardner (1995) is the same objective function used in the contributions that precede it and thus defines the literature on the debate about borderversus- domestic intervention (Streeten; Yeh; Paarlberg 1984, 1985; Orden; Gardner 1985). The objective function in the latter literature is the same as the one implied in another literature that originates from Wallace and includes most notably Gardner (1983), but also Alston and Hurd. Amer. J. Agr. Econ. 86(2) (May 2004): 549-552 Copyright 2004 American Agricultural Economics Association This content downloaded on Tue, 15 Jan 2013 07:58:41 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 550 May 2004 Amer. J. Agr. Econ. The objective function in Holloway is this same objective function-it is, of course, Marshallian surplus.1 The third disagreement concerns scholarship. The Comment does not seem to be cognizant of several important papers, especially Bhagwati and Ramaswami, and Bhagwati, both of which precede Corden (1974, 1997); but also Lipsey and Lancaster, and Moschini and Sckokai; one important aspect of Alston and Hurd; and one extremely important result in Holloway. This oversight has some unfortunate repercussions. First, it misdirects to the wrong origins of intellectual property. Second, it misleads about the appropriateness of some welfare calculations. Third, it prevents Alston, Smith, and Vercammen from linking a finding in Holloway (pp. 242-43) with an old theorem (Lipsey and Lancaster) that settles the controversy (Alston, Carter, and Smith 1993, 1995; Gardner 1995; and, presently, Alston, Smith, and Vercammen) about the efficiency of border intervention in the presence of domestic distortions.