Local ownership and UN peacebuilding: discourse versus operationalization

The UN asserts that local ownership boosts the legitimacy and sustainabil- ity of peacebuilding by preserving the principles of self-determination and nonimposition in an activity that can contravene them. At the same time, it also perceives local ownership to imperil the achievement of its operational goals, thus bringing its normative and operational obligations into conflict. This article evaluates the UN’s discourse and operationalization of local ownership, showing that despite the UN’s invocation of ownership dis- course, it operationalizes ownership in restrictive ways that are intended to protect the achievement of operational goals but that consequently limit self-determination and increase imposition. Moreover, because of contra- dictions in the UN’s practices of ownership, it also undercuts its ability to re- alize the very operational goals that it is trying to protect. KEYWORDS: UN peacebuilding, local ownership, discourse vs. practice.

Whose peace? Local ownership and UN peacebuilding

In recent years, there has been an increasing emphasis on the participation of national actors in United Nations peace operations, reflecting what has become a near orthodox commitment to ‘local ownership.’ Advocates of local ownership assert that it: (1) increases the legitimacy of UN peacebuilding efforts; (2) increases the sustainability of peacebuilding activities after the departure of the UN; and (3) increases democratic governance in post-conflict states. While such thinking about local ownership has informed UN peacebuilding policy to a large extent, the UN has, to date, assumed these positive benefits without critically examining the causal mechanisms that allegedly produce them, specifying the conditions under which this correlation holds, or providing convincing evidence for these assertions. Moreover, exactly what local ownership is, what is being owned, and who local ‘owners’ are remain unclear. Indeed a closer examination of ownership’s relation with legitimacy, sustainability, and democratization reveal a plethora of contradictions that imply that local ownership may in fact decrease the UN’s ability to deliver peacekeeping results. Crucially, however, the UN persists in adopting a local ownership approach to peacebuilding, suggesting that it does so because it is normatively appropriate rather than operationally effective.

Institutional investors: arbitrageurs or rational trend chasers?

This paper studies the relationship between institutional investor holdings and stock misvaluation in the U.S. between 1980 and 2010. I find that institutional investors overweigh overvalued and underweigh undervalued stocks in their portfolio, taking the market portfolio as a benchmark. Cross-sectionally, institutional investors hold more overvalued stocks than undervalued stocks. The time-series studies also show that institutional ownership of overvalued portfolios increases as the portfolios' degree of overvaluation. As an investment strategy, institutional investors' ride of stock misvaluation is neither driven by the fund flows from individual investors into institutions, nor industry-specific. Consistent with the agency problem explanation, investment companies and independent investment advisors have a higher tendency to ride stock misvaluation than other institutions. There is weak evidence that institutional investors make positive profit by riding stock misvaluation. My findings challenge the models that view individual investors as noise traders and disregard the role of institutional investors in stock market misvaluation.

State ownership, bank loans, and corporate investment

We study the effect of bank loans on Chinese publicly listed firms' investment decisions based on the underinvestment and overinvestment theories of leverage. Evidence from China is of particular importance because China is the world's largest emerging and transitional economy. At first we show that there is a negative relationship between bank loan ratios and investment for Chinese publicly listed firms. And this negative relationship is much stronger for firms with low growth than firms with high growth. Secondly, we find that both short-term and long-term loan ratios are negatively correlated with investment. However, the higher the long-term loan ratios are, the weaker the negative relationship between long-term loan ratios and investment is. Thirdly, firm ownership only matters to the effect of short-term bank loans on investment in our sample. That is, the negative relationship between short-term loan ratios and investment is weaker for SOEs than for non-SOEs. Lastly, we show that the reform of China's banking system in 2003 has not strengthened the negative relationship between bank loans and investment. Our findings suggest that although Chinese state-owned banks are severely intervened by government policies, they still have a disciplining role on firms' investment, especially in firms with low growth.