Growth and public infrastructure

The paper analyzes a multicountry extension of the Barro model of productive public expenditure. In the presence of positive infrastructural externalities between countries, the provision of infrastructure will be inefficiently low if countries do not coordinate. This provides a role for a supranational body, such as the European Union, to coordinate the policies of the individual governments. It is shown how intervention by a supranational body can raise welfare by internalizing the infrastructural externality. Infrastructural externalities increase the importance of tax policy in the growth process and distribute the benefits of taxation across countries.

Power properties if invariant tests for spatial autocorrelation in linear regression

This paper derives some exact power properties of tests for spatial autocorrelation in the context of a linear regression model. In particular, we characterize the circumstances in which the power vanishes as the autocorrelation increases, thus extending the work of Krämer (2005). More generally, the analysis in the paper sheds new light on how the power of tests for spatial autocorrelation is affected by the matrix of regressors and by the spatial structure. We mainly focus on the problem of residual spatial autocorrelation, in which case it is appropriate to restrict attention to the class of invariant tests, but we also consider the case when the autocorrelation is due to the presence of a spatially lagged dependent variable among the regressors. A numerical study aimed at assessing the practical relevance of the theoretical results is included