Self-concept clarity and compulsive Internet use: the role of preference for virtual interactions and employment status in British and North-American samples

Background and Aims Compulsive Internet Use (CIU) describes a maladaptive relationship with the Internet characterised by loss of control and conflict. Although also affecting adults, most studies use teenage samples, and theoretical development on risk factors is scarce. According to Davis (2001), the social connectivity function of the Internet is key in identifying traits associated with CIU. Since Self-Concept Clarity (SCC) is strongly related to social anxiety, and virtual interactions allow “self-edition”, we hypothesized that individuals low in SCC could choose virtual interactions as safer alternative to satisfy their social needs. This could in turn increase the risk of CIU. Building on a previous study, we also expected CIU to be more harmful in the unemployed. Methods We collected samples from the UK (N = 532) and US (N = 502) with equal distribution of employed and unemployed individuals. We ran Measurement Invariance tests to confirm that the constructs were equivalent across countries. Subsequently, we conducted mediation and moderation analysis to test our hypothesis with Multigroup Confirmatory Factor Analysis. Results Measurement Invariance was confirmed. The relationship between SCC and CIU was partially mediated by preference of virtual interactions in both countries. This preference was significantly related to lower social support. Short term unemployment seemed to accentuate the negative impact of CIU on life satisfaction in both countries, although only marginally significantly in the US. The unemployed reported significantly lower levels of life satisfaction. Conclusion We demonstrated that SCC is a key vulnerability factor to CIU in adults, and confirmed the additional risks for the unemployed.

Breaking the double-edged sword of effort/trying hard: developmental equilibrium and Longitudinal relations among effort, achievement, and academic self-concept

Ever since the classic research of Nicholls (1976) and others, effort has been recognized as a double-edged sword: whilst it might enhance achievement, it undermines academic self-concept (ASC). However, there has not been a thorough evaluation of the longitudinal reciprocal effects of effort, ASC and achievement,in the context of modern self-concept theory and statistical methodology. Nor have there been developmental equilibrium tests of whether these effects are consistent across the potentially volatile early-to-middle adolescence. Hence, focusing on mathematics, we evaluate reciprocal effects models over the first four years of secondary school, relating effort, achievement (test scores and school grades), ASC, and ASCxEffort interactions for a representative sample of 3,421 German students (Mn age = 11.75 years at Wave 1). ASC, effort and achievement were positively correlated at each wave, and there was a clear pattern of positive reciprocal positive effects among ASC, test scores and school grades—each contributing to the other, after controlling for the prior effects of all others. There was an asymmetrical pattern of effects for effort that is consistent with the double-edged sword premise: prior school grades had positive effects on subsequent effort, but prior effort had non-significant or negative effects on subsequent grades and ASC. However, on the basis of a synergistic application of new theory and methodology, we predicted and found a significant ASC-by-effort interaction, such that prior effort had more positive effects on subsequent ASC and school grades when prior ASC was high—thus providing a key to breaking the double-edged sword.

Reflections on the concept of the common good from an economic perspective

The chapter considers how the common good can be implemented when opinions differ within society about the nature of the common good. It explains how economic analysis can shed light on efficient conflict-management in these circumstances. The chapter argues, more generally, that virtue theorists make too little use of economics because they have an unduly restricted view of the nature and scope of the discipline