‘Modern Man’s Myths: The Influence of Historical Memory on Policy-Making’

Historical events are interpreted by collectivities in ways that are then instrumentalised in policy-making processes. This creates mythical "truths" and "rules of conduct" which in 20th (21st) century Western civilisations are not much different from those of pre-Enlightenment societies.

‘New World and Old Europe: American Screen Images of Britain and France‘

Contrary to the dearly held belief by Britons that among the nations of the world, they are the favourites of the Americans, Holliwood movies show that even today, judging by the accents of "baddies", the English incarnate the arch-enemy. French villains come a close second. Britain and France are the reactionary, corrupt "old Europe" from whom the Americans tried to cut away ever since 1775, and it is actually the Central-East European countries who as "new Europe" enjoy greater popularity as bearers of hope.

‘Clausewitz’ Ideas of Strategy and Victory’

Clausewitz's definition of "strategy" does not greatly differ from the original definition of the term in the 6th century East Roman Empire. His ideas of "victory" are limited to the military arena. Nevertheless, there are elements in his writing which have led subsequent authors, especially Andre Beaufre, to take them further and make them very useful tools for the analysis of conflicts and war aims in subsequent centuries.

A national security strategy for England: Matthew Sutcliffe, the Earl of Essex, and the Cadiz Expedition of 1596

The English cleric Matthew Sutcliffe arguably produced the first comprehensive security concept in history. It had at its centre the war between England and Spain (1585-1604), and Sutcliffe advocated taking the war to the Iberian Peninsula to seize Philip II's main Atlantic ports, rather than remaining satisfied with the indirect combat of Spain in Flanders, defensive action against naval attacks on England and the guerre de course on Spanish shipping at sea. This approach seems to be at the heart of Essex's 1596 naval campaing against Spanish ports, which foundered on the bureaucratic politics of the Elizabethan government.

Denial of change: the 'Military Revolution' as seen by contemporaries

Writers on military matters from the 14th century until the late 18th century either regretted the decadence of their times compared with Antiquity, or they saw no great change in military affairs since Antiquity. Few saw a revolutionary change ushered in by gunpowder, although this number increased since the great "querelle" about the Ancients and the Moderns under Louis XIV. In the early 19th century, the balance tipped, and few would have denied that technology had profoundly changed warfare. All this is a far cry, however, from any contemporary perception of a "Military Revolution" in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Réflexions sur le ‘Nucléaire interdit'

A discussion of the taboo on nuclear use from the perspective of different governments, focusing on the circumstances of the post-Cold War environment where the danger of nuclear proliferation looms large.

‘La coopération nucléaire européenne: de la guerre froide au XXIe siècle’

A discussion of nuclear guarantees as means of deterrence and security projection in Europe, and also a countermeasure against nuclear proliferation. My contribution to this jointly authored book is contained mainly, but not exclusively, under the above section.

‘Les puissances nucléaires officielles: entre désarmement et prolifération’

Review of the posture of the declared nuclear weapon states with regard to their own commitment to nuclear disarmament as contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and their shared fear of nuclear proliferation

‘The European Dream of Franz Josef Strauss’

Franz Josef Strauss, West German Minister of Atomic Energy and Minister of Defence, pursued a project by which European political integration was to be paralleled by co-operation in the field of nuclear energy and indeed nuclear weapons. It has often been alleged that this covered nationalist German ambitions to turn Germany into a nuclear power in its own rights. Seen in the context of his European integration programme - which foundered on the devotion of French President de Gaulle to French national sovereignty - Strauss' overall policy suggests that he did indeed aim not to obtain nuclear weapons for Germany, but for an integrated European superstate.

‘European strategists and European identity in the nuclear age’

European writers on strategy (in French: strategistes, as opposed to practitioners, stratèges) developed their thoughts on the best strategies and postures of nuclear deterrence against their own beliefs in the identities of their own countries - were they seen as "Europesn" or as "nation-states" who must under no condition surrender their sovereignty?

‘Containing Uncertainty: Options for British Nuclear Strategy’

If Britain wants to stem the tide of nuclear proliferation, it must continue to assume "the nuclear man's burden" and guarantee the security of non-nuclear allies, as it did in the Cold War.

‘Keystone in the Division of Europe: Germany in the Cold War’

Review essay on literature on the role of Germany in the Cold War

‘European defence before and after the "turn of the tide"’

Review essay on recent literature on the transformation of European security politics in the 1980s

Victory, peace, and justice : the neglected trinity

The assumption that the most important aim of war is to create a better peace than existed before the war, i.e. a peace with justice, was self-evident for writers prior to Clausewitz. This does not mean that princes saw this as their priority, but theoreticians did. This changed dramatically with the Napoleonic Wars: Clausewitz initiated an era where writers on strategy paid no heed to what would come after military victory, now seen as the be-all and end-all of war. Terrible consequences flowed from this, and a series of ephemeral victories leading to new wars. It was only around the Second World War, to some in itself the consequence of this obsession with victory and not with peace, that it began to dawn on writers that peace, not military victory must be the ultimate aim to be kept in sight.