A survey of multi-fingered robot hands: issues and grasping achievements

Recently a substantial amount of research has been done in the field of dextrous manipulation and hand manoeuvres. The main concern has been how to control robot hands so that they can execute manipulation tasks with the same dexterity and intuition as human hands. This paper surveys multi-fingered robot hand research and development topics which include robot hand design, object force distribution and control, grip transform, grasp stability and its synthesis, grasp stiffness and compliance motion and robot arm-hand coordination. Three main topics are presented in this article. The first is an introduction to the subject. The second concentrates on examples of mechanical manipulators used in research and the methods employed to control them. The third presents work which has been done on the field of object manipulation.

Dextrous hands: issues relating to a four-finger articulated hand

Manipulation of an object by a multi-fingered robot hand requires task planning which involves computation of joint space vectors and fingertip forces. To implement a task as fast as possible, computations have to be carried out in minimum time. The state of the art in manipulation by multi-fingered robot hand designs has shown the possible use of remotely driven finger joints. Such remotely driven hands require computation of tendon displacement for evaluating joint space vectors before signals are sent to actuators. Alternatively, a direct drive hand is a mechanical hand in which the shafts of articulated joints are directly coupled to the rotors of motors with high output torques. This article has been divided into two main sections. The first section presents a brief view of manipulation using a direct drive approach. Meanwhile, the other section presents ongoing research which is being carried out to design a four-finger articulated hand in the Department of Cybernetics at the University of Reading.

Principal-agent issues in asset acquisition: UK institutions and their investment agents

This paper explores principal‐agent issues in the stock selection processes of institutional property investors. Drawing upon an interview survey of fund managers and acquisition professionals, it focuses on the relationships between principals and external agents as they engage in property transactions. The research investigated the extent to which the presence of outcome‐based remuneration structures could lead to biased advice, overbidding and/or poor asset selection. It is concluded that institutional property buyers are aware of incentives for opportunistic behaviour by external agents, often have sufficient expertise to robustly evaluate agents’ advice and that these incentives are counter‐balanced by a number of important controls on potential opportunistic behaviour. There are strong counter‐incentives in the need for the agents to establish personal relationships and trust between themselves and institutional buyers, to generate repeat and related business and to preserve or generate a good reputation in the market.