UK construction orders and output: A comparison of government and commercially available data 1995-2001

Because of the importance and potential usefulness of construction market statistics to firms and government, consistency between different sources of data is examined with a view to building a predictive model of construction output using construction data alone. However, a comparison of Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and Office for National Statistics (ONS) series shows that the correlation coefcient (used as a measure of consistency) of the DTI output and DTI orders data and the correlation coefficient of the DTI output and ONS output data are low. It is not possible to derive a predictive model of DTI output based on DTI orders data alone. The question arises whether or not an alternative independent source of data may be used to predict DTI output data. Independent data produced by Emap Glenigan (EG), based on planning applications, potentially offers such a source of information. The EG data records the value of planning applications and their planned start and finish dates. However, as this data is ex ante and is not correlated with DTI output it is not possible to use this data to describe the volume of actual construction output. Nor is it possible to use the EG planning data to predict DTI construc-tion orders data. Further consideration of the issues raised reveal that it is not practically possible to develop a consistent predictive model of construction output using construction statistics gathered at different stages in the development process.

Understanding construction consortia: Theory, practice and opinions

Firms form consortia in order to win contracts. Once a project has been awarded to a consortium each member then concentrates on his or her own contract with the client. Therefore, consortia are marketing devices, which present the impression of teamworking, but the production process is just as fragmented as under conventional procurement methods. In this way, the consortium forms a barrier between the client and the actual construction production process. Firms form consortia, not as a simple development of normal ways of working, but because the circumstances for specific projects make it a necessary vehicle. These circumstances include projects that are too large or too complex to undertake alone or projects that require on-going services which cannot be provided by the individual firms inhouse. It is not a preferred way of working, because participants carry extra risk in the form of liability for the actions of their partners in the consortium. The behaviour of members of consortia is determined by their relative power, based on several factors, including financial commitment and ease of replacement. The level of supply chain visibility to the public sector client and to the industry is reduced by the existence of a consortium because the consortium forms an additional obstacle between the client and the firms undertaking the actual construction work. Supply chain visibility matters to the client who otherwise loses control over the process of construction or service provision, while remaining accountable for cost overruns. To overcome this separation there is a convincing argument in favour of adopting the approach put forward in the Project Partnering Contract 2000 (PPC2000) Agreement. Members of consortia do not necessarily go on to work in the same consortia again because members need to respond flexibly to opportunities as and when they arise. Decision-making processes within consortia tend to be on an ad hoc basis. Construction risk is taken by the contractor and the construction supply chain but the reputational risk is carried by all the firms associated with a consortium. There is a wide variation in the manner that consortia are formed, determined by the individual circumstances of each project; its requirements, size and complexity, and the attitude of individual project leaders. However, there are a number of close working relationships based on generic models of consortia-like arrangements for the purpose of building production, such as the Housing Corporation Guidance Notes and the PPC2000.

Risk under performance-based contracting in the UK construction sector

As a method of procuring the services of the built environment, performance-based contracting (PBC) seeks to link the building supplier to longer term commitments than has traditionally been the case in the construction sector. By rewarding the building producer according to the way that building or structure delivers the users' requirements, rather than according to a list of assembled parts, a number of additional risks are taken by contractors, including fitness for purpose, costs and briefing. The extent to which contractors recognize these risks and their methods of dealing with them vary considerably and are influenced by their attitudes towards risk. As the risks associated with PBC are seen as large, uninsurable, and vulnerable to changing client requirements, the majority of respondents would reject the use of PBC as a method of contracting. Nevertheless, PBC may be used under particular conditions, where rewards are deemed sufficient to compensate for the additional risk to the contractor of undertaking work on the basis of a stream of payments paid over the life of a structure depending on the satisfactory performance of the building or as part of a private finance initiative.

Ownership rights in performance-based contracting: A case study of English law

Clients and contractors need to be aware of the project’s legal environment because the viability of a procurement strategy can be vitiated by legal rules. This is particularly true regarding Performance-Based Contracting (PBC) whose viability may be threatened by rules of property law: while the PBC concept does not require that the contractor transfers the ownership in the building materials used to the client, the rules of property law often lead to an automatic transfer of ownership. But does the legal environment really render PBC unfeasible? In particular, is PBC unfeasible because contractors lose their materials as assets? These questions need to be answered with respect to the applicable property law. As a case study, English property law has been chosen. Under English law, the rule which governs the automatic transfer of ownership is called quicquid plantatur solo, solo credit (whatever is fixed to the soil belongs to the soil). An analysis of this rule reveals that not all materials which are affixed to land become part of the land. This fate only occurs in relation to materials which have been affixed with the intention of permanently improving the land. Five fictitious PBC cases have been considered in terms of the legal status of the materials involved, and several subsequent legal questions have been addressed. The results suggest that English law does actually threaten the feasibility of PBC in some cases. However, it is also shown that the law provides means to circumvent the unwanted results which flow from the rules of property law. In particular, contractors who are interested in keeping their materials as assets can insist on agreeing a property right in the client’s land, i.e. a contractor’s lien. Therefore, the outcome is that English property law does not render the implementation of the PBC concept unfeasible. At a broader level, the results contribute to the theoretical framework of PBC as an increasingly used procurement strategy.

The impact of procurement method on costs of procurement

Collaborative working methods offer the hope of reduced waste, lower tendering costs and improved outputs. The costs of tendering may be influenced by the introduction of different working methods. Transaction cost economics appears to offer an analytical framework for studying the costs of tendering, but it is more to do with providing explanations at the institutional/industry level, not at the level of individual projects. Surveys and interviews were carried out with small samples in UK. The data show that that while tendering costs are not necessarily higher in collaborative working arrangements, there is no correlation between costs of tendering and the way the work is organized. Practitioners perceive that the benefits of working in collaborative procurement routes far outweigh the costs. Tendering practices can be improved to avoid waste, and the suggested improvements include restricting selective tendering lists to 23 bidders, letting bidders know who they are competing with, reimbursing tendering costs for aborted projects and ensuring that timely and comprehensive information is provided to bidders.

Developing a system for assessing the costs associated with different procurement routes in the construction industry

In developing techniques for monitoring the costs associated with different procurement routes, the central task is disentangling the various project costs incurred by organizations taking part in construction projects. While all firms are familiar with the need to analyse their own costs, it is unusual to apply the same kind of analysis to projects. The purpose of this research is to examine the claims that new, ways of working such as strategic alliancing and partnering bring positive business benefits. This requires that costs associated with marketing, estimating, pricing, negotiation of terms, monitoring of performance and enforcement of contract are collected for a cross-section of projects under differing arrangements, and from those in the supply, chain from clients to consultants, contractors, subcontractors and suppliers. Collaboration with industrial partners forms the basis for developing a research instrument, bused on time sheets, which will be relevant for all those taking part in the work. The signs are that costs associated with,with tendering are highly variable, 1-15%, depending upon what precisely, is taken into account. The research to date reveals that there are mechanisms for measuring the costs of transactions and these will generate useful data for subsequent analysis.

Standardization of procurement: National or international?

The ISO has issued a Draft International Standard on construction procurement and the British Standards Institute is drafting a standard based upon this for use in the UK. Three questions arise from these observations. First, what kind of consultation processes would be adequate to ensure that such a standard meets the requirements of an industry as diverse as construction? Second, why would an international standard be inappropriate for use in a country like UK? Third, what sort of issues should such a standard seek to cover? There are strong precedents for process standards, such as quality assurance, design management and workmanship on building sites. So the idea of a standard on procurement is not unusual. Moreover, there are many differences in tendering and procurement practice that are wasteful and even collusive or illegal. These issues are explored with a view to offering insights and suggestions for guidance based on the experiences in UK. The research method is first-hand observation of the drafting committee who are dealing with the British Standard. As an example to test and inform the standardization concept, six different standard guidance documents on tendering procedures are compared. This reveals a significant degree of diversity, and based on this, nine stages for implementing a tendering procedure are derived.