Predicating from an early age: edusemiotics and the potential of children’s preconceptions

This paper aims to explain how semiotics and constructivism can collaborate in an educational epistemology by developing a joint approach to prescientific conceptions. Empirical data and findings of constructivist research are interpreted in the light of Peirce’s semiotics. Peirce’s semiotics is an anti-psychologistic logic (CP 2.252; CP 4.551; W 8:15; Pietarinen in Signs of logic, Springer, Dordrecht, 2006; Stjernfelt in Diagrammatology. An investigation on the borderlines of phenomenology, ontology and semiotics, Springer, Dordrecht, 2007) and relational logic. Constructivism was traditionally developed within psychology and sociology and, therefore, some incompatibilities can be expected between these two schools. While acknowledging the differences, we explain that constructivism and semiotics share the assumption of realism that knowledge can only be developed upon knowledge and, therefore, an epistemological collaboration is possible. The semiotic analysis performed confirms the constructivist results and provides a further insight into the teacher-student relation. Like the constructivist approach, Peirce’s doctrine of agapism infers that the personal dimension of teaching must not be ignored. Thus, we argue for the importance of genuine sympathy in teaching attitudes. More broadly, the article also contributes to the development of postmodern humanities. At the end of the modern age, the humanities are passing through a critical period of transformation. There is a growing interest in semiotics and semiotic philosophy in many areas of the humanities. Such a case, on which we draw, is the development of a theoretical semiotic approach to education, namely edusemiotics (Stables and Semetsky, Pedagogy and edusemiotics: theoretical challenge/practical opportunities, Sense Publishers, Rotterdam, 2015).

Exploring the role the brand plays in the choice of charity by UK volunteers

Charities need to understand why volunteers choose one brand rather than another in order to attract more volunteers to their organisation. There has been considerable academic interest in understanding why people volunteer generally. However, this research explores the more specific question of why a volunteer chooses one charity brand rather than another. It builds on previous conceptualisations of volunteering as a consumption decision. Seen through the lens of the individual volunteer, it considers the under-researched area of the decision-making process. The research adopts an interpretivist epistemology and subjectivist ontology. Qualitative data was collected through depth interviews and analysed using both Means-End Chain (MEC) and Framework Analysis methodology. The primary contribution of the research is to theory: understanding the role of brand in the volunteer decision-making process. It identifies two roles for brand. The first is as a specific reason for choice, an ‘attribute’ of the decision. Through MEC, volunteering for a well-known brand connects directly through to a sense of self, both self-respect but also social recognition by others. All four components of the symbolic consumption construct are found in the data: volunteers choose a well-known brand to say something about themselves. The brand brings credibility and reassurance, it reduces the risk and enables the volunteer to meet their need to make a difference and achieve a sense of accomplishment. The second closely related role for brand is within the process of making the volunteering decision. Volunteers built up knowledge about the charity brands from a variety of brand touchpoints, over time. At the point of decision-making that brand knowledge and engagement becomes relevant, enabling some to make an automatic choice despite the significant level of commitment being made. The research identifies four types of decision-making behaviour. The research also makes secondary contributions to MEC methodology and to the non-profit context. It concludes within practical implications for management practice and a rich agenda for future research.

Abduction by philosophers: reorienting philosophical methodology

A reorientation is needed in methodological debate about the role of intuitions in philosophy. Methodological debate has lost sight of the reason why it makes sense to focus on questions about intuitions when thinking about the methods or epistemology of philosophy. The problem is an approach to methodology which gives a near exclusive focus to questions about some evidential role that intuitions may or may not play in philosophers' arguments. A new approach is needed. Approaching methodological questions about the role of intuitions in philosophy with an abductive model of philosophical enquiry in mind will help ensure the debate doesn't lose sight of what motivates the debate.