La monarquia francesa y los financieros en el Antiguo Régimen. El ejemplo de los traitants durante la Guerra de los Nueve Años, 1689-1697 = The French Monarchy and the financiers during the Old Regime. The case of the traitants during the Nine Years War, 1689-1697

This article explores the relationship between the Crown, the French society and the king's financiers. It starts with a brief review of the discourses on the financiers and a survey of the work done by historians. Further to a description of the various groups of financiers, it analyses the nature of the contracts passed between the king and the traitants to pay for the Nine Years War, as well as the latter’s activities and profits. The article argues that the government supervised effectively the traitants and that, given the constraints of the Old Regime, these financiers provided essential services, but too costly to be sustainable.

Bank integration and co-movements across housing markets

This paper investigates whether bank integration measured by cross-border bank flows can capture the co-movements across housing markets in developed countries by using a spatial dynamic panel model. The transmission can occur through a global banking channel in which global banks intermediate wholesale funding to local banks. Changes in financial conditions are passed across borders through the banks’ balance-sheet exposure to credit, currency, maturity, and funding risks resulting in house price spillovers. While controlling for country-level and global factors, we find significant co-movement across housing markets of countries with proportionally high bank integration. Bank integration can better capture house price co-movements than other measures of economic integration. Once we account for bank exposure, other spatial linkages traditionally used to account for return co-movements across region – such as trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, geographic proximity, etc. – become insignificant. Moreover, we find that the co-movement across housing markets decreases for countries with less developed mortgage markets characterized by fixed mortgage rate contracts, low limits of loan-to-value ratios and no mortgage equity withdrawal.

What drives ICT clustering in European Cities?

ICT clusters have attracted much attention because of their rapid growth and their value for other economic activities. Using a nested multi-level model, we examine how conditions at the country level and at the city level affect ICT clustering activity in 227 cities across 22 European countries. We test for the influence of three country regulations (starting a business, registering property, enforcing contracts) and two city conditions (proximity to university, network density) on ICT clustering. We consider heterogeneity within the sector and study two types of ICT activities: ICT product firms and ICT content firms. Our results indicate that country conditions and city conditions each have idiosyncratic implications for ICT clustering, and further, that these can vary by activities in ICT products or ICT content manufacturing.

Missing steps in a staircase: a qualitative study of the perspectives of key stakeholders on the use of adaptive designs in confirmatory trials

Background Despite the promising benefits of adaptive designs (ADs), their routine use, especially in confirmatory trials, is lagging behind the prominence given to them in the statistical literature. Much of the previous research to understand barriers and potential facilitators to the use of ADs has been driven from a pharmaceutical drug development perspective, with little focus on trials in the public sector. In this paper, we explore key stakeholders’ experiences, perceptions and views on barriers and facilitators to the use of ADs in publicly funded confirmatory trials. Methods Semi-structured, in-depth interviews of key stakeholders in clinical trials research (CTU directors, funding board and panel members, statisticians, regulators, chief investigators, data monitoring committee members and health economists) were conducted through telephone or face-to-face sessions, predominantly in the UK. We purposively selected participants sequentially to optimise maximum variation in views and experiences. We employed the framework approach to analyse the qualitative data. Results We interviewed 27 participants. We found some of the perceived barriers to be: lack of knowledge and experience coupled with paucity of case studies, lack of applied training, degree of reluctance to use ADs, lack of bridge funding and time to support design work, lack of statistical expertise, some anxiety about the impact of early trial stopping on researchers’ employment contracts, lack of understanding of acceptable scope of ADs and when ADs are appropriate, and statistical and practical complexities. Reluctance to use ADs seemed to be influenced by: therapeutic area, unfamiliarity, concerns about their robustness in decision-making and acceptability of findings to change practice, perceived complexities and proposed type of AD, among others. Conclusions There are still considerable multifaceted, individual and organisational obstacles to be addressed to improve uptake, and successful implementation of ADs when appropriate. Nevertheless, inferred positive change in attitudes and receptiveness towards the appropriate use of ADs by public funders are supportive and are a stepping stone for the future utilisation of ADs by researchers.

The Role of Collateral in Entrepreneurial Finance

Previous research has suggested collateral has the role of sorting entrepreneurs either by observed risk or by private information. In order to test these roles, this paper develops a model which incorporates a signalling process (sorting by observed risk) into the design of an incentivecompatible menu of loan contracts which works as a self-selection mechanism (sorting by private information). It then tests this Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model, using the 1998 US Survey of Small Business Finances. It reports for the first time that: high type entrepreneurs are more likely to pledge collateral and pay a lower interest rate; and entrepreneurs who transfer good signals enjoy better contracts than those transferring bad signals. These findings suggest that the Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model sheds more light on entrepreneurial debt finance than either the sorting-by-observed-risk or the sorting-by-private information paradigms on their own.

Profits, malversations, restitutions. Les bénéfices des financiers durant la guerre de la Ligue d’Augsbourg et la taxe de Chamillart

Profit, embezzlement, restitution. The role of the traitants in the Nine Years War and Chamillart’s tax on financial benefits The aim of this article is to revisit the question of the financiers in Old Regime France. It starts with an analysis of the discourses about the financiers under the Absolute monarchy that underlines the complexity of their relationship with the government and the public. It then reviews the secondary literature and highlights the existence of competing historical interpretations (functional, political, utilitarian), which raise the question of their overall capacity to account for the role and impact of the financiers at different times. On this ground, the article focuses on a specific group of financiers, the so-called traitants d’affaires extraordinaires, during the Nine Years War. Further to a description of the specific role and scope of the activities of the various financiers responsible for helping the monarchy to raise the funds it needed to pay for its peace and wartime expenditure, the article examines the conditions and profits granted by the king in his contracts with the traitants whose services were hired for the purpose of selling royal offices in the public and advancing the revenue to the Treasury. It also explores the contractual arrangements of the companies established by the financiers to manage their operations as well as the rights and the responsibilities of their various stakeholders. These bases being laid, the article relies on the administrative correspondence relating to the traités during the Nine Years War to address a range of issues, in particular the extent to which these contracts, and other control procedures, were robust enough to deter fraud. The accounts of two traitants’ companies offer an opportunity to analyse and compare the structure of their income and expenditure (including the volume and cost of the promissory notes sold in the public to finance their payments to the Treasury), to explore the strategies of the contractors, to calculate their net profits and further discuss the problem of embezzlement. The article ends with the study of the context and debates which led to the introduction by finance minister Michel Chamillart, in 1700, of a shortfall tax on the financial profits of the gens d’affaires or traitants, the method used to determine its rate (50 % of the net benefits), its distribution among the various stakeholders (including the bailleurs de fonds or backers), and the related procedures. In total, the article argues that the relationship between the monarchy, society and the financiers under the Ancien Regime was not static and, therefore, suggests that the broad question of control and fraud must be examined against changing circumstances. With regard specifically to the Nine Years War, the article concludes that within the constraints of the Absolute monarchy, contractors offered valuable services by raising capital for the benefit of a king who ruled over a country which, at the time, was by far the wealthiest in Europe, and where ministers failed to foresee long wars of attrition and whose financial strategy was limited by the very existence of privilege. Overall, the traités were too costly to be a viable system of war financing. In these conditions, the substantial fortunes made by a handful of very successful traitants suffice to explain that the government easily gave in to public criticism against the wealth of the financiers and felt compelled, when peace resumed, to cancel the advantageous conditions offered in the treaties by taxing financial profits.

Detecting abnormal and collusive bids in capped tendering

Recent developments in the area of Bid Tender Forecasting have enabled bidders to implement new types of easy-to-use tools for increasing their chances of winning contracts. Although these new tools (such as iso-Score Curve Graphs, Scoring Probability Graphs, and Position Probability Graphs) are designed for bidders in capped tendering (tenders with an upper price limit), some of their principles can also be applied by a Contracting Authority to detect which bidders do not follow a standard pattern, that is, their bids are extremely high or low. Since a collusive bid generally needs to be sufficiently high or low to make an impact on the bid distribution, any person in charge of supervising capped tenders can be alerted to any bidder that might be involved in a cartel after identifying the same abnormal behavior in a series of tenders through simple calculations and a new type of graph.

Modeling bidding competitiveness and position performance in multi-attribute construction auctions

Currently, multi-attribute auctions are becoming widespread awarding mechanisms for contracts in construction, and in these auctions, criteria other than price are taken into account for ranking bidder proposals. Therefore, being the lowest-price bidder is no longer a guarantee of being awarded, thus increasing the importance of measuring any bidder’s performance when not only the first position (lowest price) matters. Modeling position performance allows a tender manager to calculate the probability curves related to the more likely positions to be occupied by any bidder who enters a competitive auction irrespective of the actual number of future participating bidders. This paper details a practical methodology based on simple statistical calculations for modeling the performance of a single bidder or a group of bidders, constituting a useful resource for analyzing one’s own success while benchmarking potential bidding competitors.