Rawls and Rousseau: 'amour-propre' and the strains of commitment

In this paper I try to illuminate the Rawlsian architectonic through an interpretation of what Rawls’ Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy say about Rousseau. I argue that Rawls’ emphasis there when discussing Rousseau on interpreting amour-propre so as to make it compatible with a life in at least some societies draws attention to, and helps explicate, an analogous feature of his own work, the strains of commitment broadly conceived. Both are centrally connected with protecting a sense of self which is vital for one’s own agency. This allows us to appreciate better than much of the literature presently does the requirement for Rawls that justice and the good are congruent, that a society of justice does not disfigure citizens’ ability to live out lives relatively unmarked by relations of domination. Some comments on G. A. Cohen’s critiques of Rawls are made.

The tragedy of non-ideal theory

This paper has three aims. First, it argues that the present use of ‘ideal theory’ is unhelpful, and that an earlier and apparently more natural use focusing on perfection would be preferable. Second, it has tried to show that revision of the use of the term would better expose two distinctive normative issues, and illustrated that claim by showing how some contributors to debates about ideal theory have gone wrong partly through not distinguishing them. Third, in exposing those two distinct normative issues, it has revealed a particular way in which ideal theory even under the more specific, revisionary definition will often be central to working out what to do in non-ideal circumstances. By clarifying the terms on which debates over ideal and non-ideal theory should take place, and highlighting the particular problems each deals with, it tries to clear the ground for turning to the actual problem, which is what to do in our non-ideal and often tragic circumstances.

Contribution to collective harms and responsibility

In the present contribution, I discuss the claim, endorsed by a number of authors, that contributing to a collective harm is the ground for special responsibilities to the victims of that harm. Contributors should, between them, cover the costs of the harms they have inflicted, at least if those harms would otherwise be rights-violating. I raise some doubts about the generality of this principle before moving on to sketch a framework for thinking about liability for the costs of harms in general. This framework uses a contractualist framework to build an account of how to think about liability for costs on the basis of the presumably attractive thought that individual agents should have as much control over their liabilities as is compatible with others having like control. I then use that framework to suggest that liability on the basis of contribution should be restricted to cases in which the contributors could have avoided their contribution relatively costlessly, in which meeting the liability is not crippling for them, and in which such a liability would not have chilling effects, either on them or on third parties. This account of the grounds for contributory liability also has the advantage of avoiding a number of awkward questions about what counts as a contribution by shifting the issue away from often unanswerable questions about the precise causal genesis of some harm or other. Instead, control over conduct, which plausibly has some relation to the harm, becomes crucial. On the basis of this account, I then investigate whether a number of uses of the contributory principle are entirely appropriate. I argue that contributory liability is not appropriate for cases of collective harms committed by coordinated groups in the way that, for example, Iris Marion Young and Thomas Pogge have suggested and that further investigation of how members of such groups may be liable will be needed.

No country for honest men: political philosophers and real politics

There are limits on the duty to tell the truth. Sometimes, because of the undesirable consequences of honesty, we are morally required not to reveal certain truths and can even be required to lie. In this article, we explore the implications of this uncontroversial claim for the practice of political philosophers. We argue that, given the consequences of misunderstandings and misrepresentations that might occur, political philosophers will sometimes be under a moral duty not to disseminate their research and, in highly exceptional cases, have a moral duty to lie outright.

Social connection and practice-dependence: some recent developments in the global justice literature

This review essay discusses two recent attempts to reform the framework in which issues of international and global justice are discussed: Iris Marion Young’s ‘social connection’ model and the practice-dependent approach, here exemplified by Ayelet Banai, Miriam Ronzoni and Christian Schemmel’s edited collection. I argue that while Young’s model may fit some issues of international or global justice, it misconceives the problems that many of them pose. Indeed, its difficulties point precisely in the direction of practice dependence as it is presented by Banai et al. I go on to discuss what seem to be the strengths of that method, and particularly Banai et al.’s defence of it against the common claim that it is biased towards the status quo. I also discuss Andrea Sangiovanni and Kate MacDonald’s contributions to the collection.

Biodiversity and resilience of ecosystem functions

Accelerating rates of environmental change and the continued loss of global biodiversity threaten functions and services delivered by ecosystems. Much ecosystem monitoring and management is focused on the provision of ecosystem functions and services under current environmental conditions, yet this could lead to inappropriate management guidance and undervaluation of the importance of biodiversity. The maintenance of ecosystem functions and services under substantial predicted future environmental change (i.e., their ‘resilience’) is crucial. Here we identify a range of mechanisms underpinning the resilience of ecosystem functions across three ecological scales. Although potentially less important in the short term, biodiversity, encompassing variation from within species to across landscapes, may be crucial for the longer-term resilience of ecosystem functions and the services that they underpin.

A cautionary note on the use of Ornstein Uhlenbeck models in macroevolutionary studies

Phylogenetic comparative methods are increasingly used to give new insights into the dynamics of trait evolution in deep time. For continuous traits the core of these methods is a suite of models that attempt to capture evolutionary patterns by extending the Brownian constant variance model. However, the properties of these models are often poorly understood, which can lead to the misinterpretation of results. Here we focus on one of these models – the Ornstein Uhlenbeck (OU) model. We show that the OU model is frequently incorrectly favoured over simpler models when using Likelihood ratio tests, and that many studies fitting this model use datasets that are small and prone to this problem. We also show that very small amounts of error in datasets can have profound effects on the inferences derived from OU models. Our results suggest that simulating fitted models and comparing with empirical results is critical when fitting OU and other extensions of the Brownian model. We conclude by making recommendations for best practice in fitting OU models in phylogenetic comparative analyses, and for interpreting the parameters of the OU model.