A new scenario framework for climate change research: background, process, and future directions

The scientific community is developing new global, regional, and sectoral scenarios to facilitate interdisciplinary research and assessment to explore the range of possible future climates and related physical changes that could pose risks to human and natural systems; how these changes could interact with social, economic, and environmental development pathways; the degree to which mitigation and adaptation policies can avoid and reduce risks; the costs and benefits of various policy mixes; residual impacts under alternative pathways; and the relationship of future climate change and adaptation and mitigation policy responses with sustainable development. This paper provides the background to and process of developing the conceptual framework for these scenarios, as described in the three subsequent papers in this Special Issue (Van Vuuren et al.; O’Neill et al.; Kriegler et al.). The paper also discusses research needs to further develop and apply this framework. A key goal of the current framework design and its future development is to facilitate the collaboration of climate change researchers from a broad range of perspectives and disciplines to develop policy- and decision-relevant scenarios and explore the challenges and opportunities human and natural systems could face with additional climate change.

Bounding the role of black carbon in the climate system: a scientific assessment

Black carbon aerosol plays a unique and important role in Earth’s climate system. Black carbon is a type of carbonaceous material with a unique combination of physical properties. This assessment provides an evaluation of black-carbon climate forcing that is comprehensive in its inclusion of all known and relevant processes and that is quantitative in providing best estimates and uncertainties of the main forcing terms: direct solar absorption; influence on liquid, mixed phase, and ice clouds; and deposition on snow and ice. These effects are calculated with climate models, but when possible, they are evaluated with both microphysical measurements and field observations. Predominant sources are combustion related, namely, fossil fuels for transportation, solid fuels for industrial and residential uses, and open burning of biomass. Total global emissions of black carbon using bottom-up inventory methods are 7500 Gg yr�-1 in the year 2000 with an uncertainty range of 2000 to 29000. However, global atmospheric absorption attributable to black carbon is too low in many models and should be increased by a factor of almost 3. After this scaling, the best estimate for the industrial-era (1750 to 2005) direct radiative forcing of atmospheric black carbon is +0.71 W m�-2 with 90% uncertainty bounds of (+0.08, +1.27)Wm�-2. Total direct forcing by all black carbon sources, without subtracting the preindustrial background, is estimated as +0.88 (+0.17, +1.48) W m�-2. Direct radiative forcing alone does not capture important rapid adjustment mechanisms. A framework is described and used for quantifying climate forcings, including rapid adjustments. The best estimate of industrial-era climate forcing of black carbon through all forcing mechanisms, including clouds and cryosphere forcing, is +1.1 W m�-2 with 90% uncertainty bounds of +0.17 to +2.1 W m�-2. Thus, there is a very high probability that black carbon emissions, independent of co-emitted species, have a positive forcing and warm the climate. We estimate that black carbon, with a total climate forcing of +1.1 W m�-2, is the second most important human emission in terms of its climate forcing in the present-day atmosphere; only carbon dioxide is estimated to have a greater forcing. Sources that emit black carbon also emit other short-lived species that may either cool or warm climate. Climate forcings from co-emitted species are estimated and used in the framework described herein. When the principal effects of short-lived co-emissions, including cooling agents such as sulfur dioxide, are included in net forcing, energy-related sources (fossil fuel and biofuel) have an industrial-era climate forcing of +0.22 (�-0.50 to +1.08) W m-�2 during the first year after emission. For a few of these sources, such as diesel engines and possibly residential biofuels, warming is strong enough that eliminating all short-lived emissions from these sources would reduce net climate forcing (i.e., produce cooling). When open burning emissions, which emit high levels of organic matter, are included in the total, the best estimate of net industrial-era climate forcing by all short-lived species from black-carbon-rich sources becomes slightly negative (�-0.06 W m�-2 with 90% uncertainty bounds of �-1.45 to +1.29 W m�-2). The uncertainties in net climate forcing from black-carbon-rich sources are substantial, largely due to lack of knowledge about cloud interactions with both black carbon and co-emitted organic carbon. In prioritizing potential black-carbon mitigation actions, non-science factors, such as technical feasibility, costs, policy design, and implementation feasibility play important roles. The major sources of black carbon are presently in different stages with regard to the feasibility for near-term mitigation. This assessment, by evaluating the large number and complexity of the associated physical and radiative processes in black-carbon climate forcing, sets a baseline from which to improve future climate forcing estimates.

Options for support to agriculture and food security under climate change

Agriculture and food security are key sectors for intervention under climate change. Agricultural production is highly vulnerable even to 2C (low-end) predictions for global mean temperatures in 2100, with major implications for rural poverty and for both rural and urban food security. Agriculture also presents untapped opportunities for mitigation, given the large land area under crops and rangeland, and the additional mitigation potential of aquaculture. This paper presents a summary of current knowledge on options to support farmers, particularly smallholder farmers, in achieving food security through agriculture under climate change. Actions towards adaptation fall into two broad overlapping areas: (1) accelerated adaptation to progressive climate change over decadal time scales, for example integrated packages of technology, agronomy and policy options for farmers and food systems, and (2) better management of agricultural risks associated with increasing climate variability and extreme events, for example improved climate information services and safety nets. Maximization of agriculture’s mitigation potential will require investments in technological innovation and agricultural intensification linked to increased efficiency of inputs, and creation of incentives and monitoring systems that are inclusive of smallholder farmers. Food systems faced with climate change need urgent, broad-based action in spite of uncertainties.

Committed terrestrial ecosystem changes due to climate change

Targets for stabilizing climate change are often based on considerations of the impacts of different levels of global warming, usually assessing the time of reaching a particular level of warming. However, some aspects of the Earth system, such as global mean temperatures1 and sea level rise due to thermal expansion2 or the melting of large ice sheets3, continue to respond long after the stabilization of radiative forcing. Here we use a coupled climate–vegetation model to show that in turn the terrestrial biosphere shows significant inertia in its response to climate change. We demonstrate that the global terrestrial biosphere can continue to change for decades after climate stabilization. We suggest that ecosystems can be committed to long-term change long before any response is observable: for example, we find that the risk of significant loss of forest cover in Amazonia rises rapidly for a global mean temperature rise above 2 °C. We conclude that such committed ecosystem changes must be considered in the definition of dangerous climate change, and subsequent policy development to avoid it.

Climate impacts on river flow: projections for the Medway catchment UK with UKCP09 and CATCHMOD

The potential impact of climate change on areas of strategic importance for water resources remains a concern. Here, river flow projections for the River Medway, above Teston in southeast England are presented, which is just such an area of strategic importance. The river flow projections use climate inputs from the Hadley Centre Regional Climate Model (HadRM3) for the time period 1960–2080 (a subset of the early release UKCP09 projections). River flow predictions are calculated using CATCHMOD, the main river flow prediction tool of the Environment Agency (EA) of England and Wales. In order to use this tool in the best way for climate change predictions, model setup and performance are analysed using sensitivity and uncertainty analysis. The model's representation of hydrological processes is discussed and the direct percolation and first linear storage constant parameters are found to strongly affect model results in a complex way, with the former more important for low flows and the latter for high flows. The uncertainty in predictions resulting from the hydrological model parameters is demonstrated and the projections of river flow under future climate are analysed. A clear climate change impact signal is evident in the results with a persistent lowering of mean daily river flows for all months and for all projection time slices. Results indicate that a projection of lower flows under future climate is valid even taking into account the uncertainties considered in this modelling chain exercise. The model parameter uncertainty becomes more significant under future climate as the river flows become lower. This has significant implications for those making policy decisions based on such modelling results. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment

Advances in the science and observation of climate change are providing a clearer understanding of the inherent variability of Earth’s climate system and its likely response to human and natural influences. The implications of climate change for the environment and society will depend not only on the response of the Earth system to changes in radiative forcings, but also on how humankind responds through changes in technology, economies, lifestyle and policy. Extensive uncertainties exist in future forcings of and responses to climate change, necessitating the use of scenarios of the future to explore the potential consequences of different response options. To date, such scenarios have not adequately examined crucial possibilities, such as climate change mitigation and adaptation, and have relied on research processes that slowed the exchange of information among physical, biological and social scientists. Here we describe a new process for creating plausible scenarios to investigate some of the most challenging and important questions about climate change confronting the global community

Global-scale climate impact functions: the relationship between climate forcing and impact

Although there is a strong policy interest in the impacts of climate change corresponding to different degrees of climate change, there is so far little consistent empirical evidence of the relationship between climate forcing and impact. This is because the vast majority of impact assessments use emissions-based scenarios with associated socio-economic assumptions, and it is not feasible to infer impacts at other temperature changes by interpolation. This paper presents an assessment of the global-scale impacts of climate change in 2050 corresponding to defined increases in global mean temperature, using spatially-explicit impacts models representing impacts in the water resources, river flooding, coastal, agriculture, ecosystem and built environment sectors. Pattern-scaling is used to construct climate scenarios associated with specific changes in global mean surface temperature, and a relationship between temperature and sea level used to construct sea level rise scenarios. Climate scenarios are constructed from 21 climate models to give an indication of the uncertainty between forcing and response. The analysis shows that there is considerable uncertainty in the impacts associated with a given increase in global mean temperature, due largely to uncertainty in the projected regional change in precipitation. This has important policy implications. There is evidence for some sectors of a non-linear relationship between global mean temperature change and impact, due to the changing relative importance of temperature and precipitation change. In the socio-economic sectors considered here, the relationships are reasonably consistent between socio-economic scenarios if impacts are expressed in proportional terms, but there can be large differences in absolute terms. There are a number of caveats with the approach, including the use of pattern-scaling to construct scenarios, the use of one impacts model per sector, and the sensitivity of the shape of the relationships between forcing and response to the definition of the impact indicator.

Characterising loss and damage from climate change

Policy-makers are creating mechanisms to help developing countries cope with loss and damage from climate change, but the negotiations are largely neglecting scientific questions about what the impacts of climate change actually are. Mitigation efforts have failed to prevent the continued increase of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Adaptation is now unlikely to be sufficient to prevent negative impacts from current and future climate change1. In this context, vulnerable nations argue that existing frameworks to promote mitigation and adaptation are inadequate, and have called for a third international mechanism to deal with residual climate change impacts, or “loss and damage”2. In 2013, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) responded to these calls and established the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) to address loss and damage from the impacts of climate change in developing countries3. An interim Executive Committee of party representatives has been set up, and is currently drafting a two-year workplan comprising meetings, reports, and expert groups; and aiming to enhance knowledge and understanding of loss and damage, strengthen dialogue among stakeholders, and promote enhanced action and support. Issues identified as priorities for the WIM thus far include: how to deal with non-economic losses, such as loss of life, livelihood, and cultural heritage; and linkages between loss and damage and patterns of migration and displacement2. In all this, one fundamental issue still demands our attention: which losses and damages are relevant to the WIM? What counts as loss and damage from climate change?

Attribution of extreme weather events in Africa: A preliminary exploration of the science and policy implications

At the most recent session of the Conference of the Parties (COP19) in Warsaw (November 2013) the Warsaw international mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change impacts was established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The mechanism aims at promoting the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change. Specifically, it aims to enhance understanding of risk management approaches to address loss and damage. Understanding risks associated with impacts due to highly predictable (slow onset) events like sea-level rise is relatively straightforward whereas assessing the effects of climate change on extreme weather events and their impacts is much more difficult. However, extreme weather events are a significant cause of loss of life and livelihoods, particularly in vulnerable countries and communities in Africa. The emerging science of probabilistic event attribution is relevant as it provides scientific evidence on the contribution of anthropogenic climate change to changes in risk of extreme events. It thus provides the opportunity to explore scientifically-backed assessments of the human influence on such events. However, different ways of framing attribution questions can lead to very different assessments of change in risk. Here we explain the methods of, and implications of different approaches to attributing extreme weather events with a focus on Africa. Crucially, it demonstrates that defining the most appropriate attribution question to ask is not a science decision but needs to be made in dialogue with those stakeholders who will use the answers.

Challenging climate change and migration discourse: different understandings of time-scale and temporality in the Maldives

This article draws on ongoing research in the Maldives to explore differences between elite and non-elite perceptions of climate change and migration. It argues that, in addition to variations in perceptions based on diverse knowledge, priorities and agendas, there exists a more fundamental divergence based upon different understandings of the time-scale of climate change and related ideas of urgency and crisis. Specifically, elites tend to focus on a distant future which is generally abstracted from people’s everyday lived realities, as well as utilise the language of a climate change-induced migration ‘crisis’ in their discussions about impacts in a manner not envisaged by non-elites. The article concludes that, rather than unproblematically mapping global, external facing narratives wholesale onto ordinary people’s lives and experiences, there needs to be more dialogue between elites and non-elites on climate change and migration issues. These perspectives should be integrated more effectively in the development of policy interventions designed to help people adapt to the impacts of global environmental change.

Equipped to deal with uncertainty in climate and impacts predictions: lessons from internal peer review

The quantification of uncertainty is an increasingly popular topic, with clear importance for climate change policy. However, uncertainty assessments are open to a range of interpretations, each of which may lead to a different policy recommendation. In the EQUIP project researchers from the UK climate modelling, statistical modelling, and impacts communities worked together on ‘end-to-end’ uncertainty assessments of climate change and its impacts. Here, we use an experiment in peer review amongst project members to assess variation in the assessment of uncertainties between EQUIP researchers. We find overall agreement on key sources of uncertainty but a large variation in the assessment of the methods used for uncertainty assessment. Results show that communication aimed at specialists makes the methods used harder to assess. There is also evidence of individual bias, which is partially attributable to disciplinary backgrounds. However, varying views on the methods used to quantify uncertainty did not preclude consensus on the consequential results produced using those methods. Based on our analysis, we make recommendations for developing and presenting statements on climate and its impacts. These include the use of a common uncertainty reporting format in order to make assumptions clear; presentation of results in terms of processes and trade-offs rather than only numerical ranges; and reporting multiple assessments of uncertainty in order to elucidate a more complete picture of impacts and their uncertainties. This in turn implies research should be done by teams of people with a range of backgrounds and time for interaction and discussion, with fewer but more comprehensive outputs in which the range of opinions is recorded.

The implications of climate change for the water environment in England

This paper reviews the implications of climate change for the water environment and its management in England. There is a large literature, but most studies have looked at flow volumes or nutrients and none have considered explicitly the implications of climate change for the delivery of water management objectives. Studies have been undertaken in a small number of locations. Studies have used observations from the past to infer future changes, and have used numerical simulation models with climate change scenarios. The literature indicates that climate change poses risks to the delivery of water management objectives, but that these risks depend on local catchment and water body conditions. Climate change affects the status of water bodies, and it affects the effectiveness of measures to manage the water environment and meet policy objectives. The future impact of climate change on the water environment and its management is uncertain. Impacts are dependent on changes in the duration of dry spells and frequency of ‘flushing’ events, which are highly uncertain and not included in current climate scenarios. There is a good qualitative understanding of ways in which systems may change, but interactions between components of the water environment are poorly understood. Predictive models are only available for some components, and model parametric and structural uncertainty has not been evaluated. The impacts of climate change depend on other pressures on the water environment in a catchment, and also on the management interventions that are undertaken to achieve water management objectives. The paper has also developed a series of consistent conceptual models describing the implications of climate change for pressures on the water environment, based around the source-pathway-receptor concept. They provide a framework for a systematic assessment across catchments and pressures of the implications of climate change for the water environment and its management.

Implications of event attribution for loss and damage policy

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has established the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) to deal with loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, including extreme events, in developing countries. It is not yet known whether events will need to be attributed to anthropogenic climate change to be considered under the WIM. Attribution is possible for some extreme events- a climate model assessment can estimate how greenhouse gas emissions have affected the likelihood of their occurrence. Dialogue between scientists and stakeholders is required to establish whether, and how, this science could play a role in the WIM.

Adaptive social protection: mapping the evidence and policy context in the agriculture sector in south Asia

An aim of government and the international community is to respond to global processes and crises through a range of policy and practical approaches that help limit damage from shocks and stresses. Three approaches to vulnerability reduction that have become particularly prominent in recent years are social protection (SP), disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation (CCA). Although these approaches have much in common, they have developed separately over the last two decades. However, given the increasingly complex and interlinked array of risks that poor and vulnerable people face, it is likely that they will not be sufficient in the long run if they continue to be applied in isolation from one another. In recognition of this challenge, the concept of Adaptive Social Protection (ASP) has been developed. ASP refers to a series of measures which aims to build resilience of the poorest and most vulnerable people to climate change by combining elements of SP, DRR and CCA in programmes and projects. The aim of this paper is to provide an initial assessment of the ways in which these elements are being brought together in development policy and practice. It does this by conducting a meta-analysis of 124 agricultural programmes implemented in five countries in south Asia. These are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan. The findings show that full integration of SP, DRR and CCA is relatively limited in south Asia, although there has been significant progress in combining SP and DRR in the last ten years. Projects that combine elements of SP, DRR and CCA tend to emphasise broad poverty and vulnerability reduction goals relative to those that do not. Such approaches can provide valuable lessons and insights for the promotion of climate resilient livelihoods amongst policymakers and practitioners.