'Rules of engagement’: how experiential learning facilitates the formation of a public–private partnership in Russia

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent one can apply experiential learning theory (ELT) to the public-private partnership (PPP) setting in Russia and to draw insights regarding the learning cycle ' s nature. Additionally, the paper assesses whether the PPP case confirms Kolb ' s ELT. Design/methodology/approach – The case study draws upon primary data which the authors collected by interviewing informants including a PPP operator ' s managers, lawyers from Russian law firms and an expert from the National PPP Centre. The authors accomplished data source triangulation in order to ensure a high degree of research validity. Findings – Experiential learning has resulted in a successful and a relatively fast PPP project launch without the concessionary framework. The lessons learned include the need for effective stakeholder engagement; avoiding being stuck in bureaucracy such as collaboration with Federal Ministries and anti-trust agency; avoiding application for government funding as the approval process is tangled and lengthy; attracting strategic private investors; shaping positive public perception of a PPP project; and making continuous efforts in order to effectively mitigate the public acceptance risk. Originality/value – The paper contributes to ELT by incorporating the impact of social environment in the learning model. Additionally, the paper tests the applicability of ELT to learning in the complex organisational setting, i.e., a PPP.

Scoring rules and abnormally low bids criteria in construction tenders: a taxonomic review

In the global construction context, the best value or most economically advantageous tender is becoming a widespread approach for contractor selection, as an alternative to other traditional awarding criteria such as the lowest price. In these multi-attribute tenders, the owner or auctioneer solicits proposals containing both a price bid and additional technical features. Once the proposals are received, each bidder’s price bid is given an economic score according to a scoring rule, generally called an economic scoring formula (ESF) and a technical score according to pre-specified criteria. Eventually, the contract is awarded to the bidder with the highest weighted overall score (economic + technical). However, economic scoring formula selection by auctioneers is invariably and paradoxically a highly intuitive process in practice, involving few theoretical or empirical considerations, despite having been considered traditionally and mistakenly as objective, due to its mathematical nature. This paper provides a taxonomic classification of a wide variety of ESFs and abnormally low bids criteria (ALBC) gathered in several countries with different tendering approaches. Practical implications concern the optimal design of price scoring rules in construction contract tenders, as well as future analyses of the effects of the ESF and ALBC on competitive bidding behaviour.

Stopping rules for phase II studies

This paper, the second in a series of three papers concerned with the statistical aspects of interim analyses in clinical trials, is concerned with stopping rules in phase II clinical trials. Phase II trials are generally small-scale studies, and may include one or more experimental treatments with or without a control. A common feature is that the results primarily determine the course of further clinical evaluation of a treatment rather than providing definitive evidence of treatment efficacy. This means that there is more flexibility available in the design and analysis of such studies than in phase III trials. This has led to a range of different approaches being taken to the statistical design of stopping rules for such trials. This paper briefly describes and compares the different approaches. In most cases the stopping rules can be described and implemented easily without knowledge of the detailed statistical and computational methods used to obtain the rules.

Scoring rules and competitive behavior in best value construction auctions

This paper examines the extent to which engineers can influence the competitive behavior of bidders in Best Value or multi-attribute construction auctions, where both the (dollar) bid and technical non-price criteria are scored according to a scoring rule. From a sample of Spanish construction auctions with a variety of bid scoring rules, it is found that bidders are influenced by the auction rules in significant and predictable ways. The bid score weighting, bid scoring formula and abnormally low bid criterion are variables likely to influence the competitiveness of bidders in terms of both their aggressive/conservative bidding and concentration/dispersion of bids. Revealing the influence of the bid scoring rules and their magnitude on bidders’ competitive behavior opens the door for the engineer to condition bidder competitive behavior in such a way as to provide the balance needed to achieve the owner’s desired strategic outcomes.