The British state and the Irish rebellion of 1916: an intelligence failure or an failure of response

The teleological narrative that has dominated the handling of intelligence by the British state in the events that led up to the 1916 Irish Rebellion in Dublin has been characterised as a cocktail of incompetence and mendacity. Using new and existing archive material this article argues that both the cabinet in London and key members of the Irish Executive in Dublin were supplied with accurate and timely intelligence by the Admiralty's signals intelligence unit, the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police with respect to this event. Far from being a failure of intelligence here is evidence to show that there occurred a failure of response on behalf of key decision-makers. The warnings that were given by intelligence organisations were filtered through the existing policy preferences and assumptions. As a result of these factors accurate evaluations and sound judgement were not exercised by key officials, such as Sir Matthew Nathan, in Dublin Castle.

Spooked: Britain, empire and intelligence since 1945

A collection of pieces on British intelligence including sources (Christopher R. Moran), methodology (Richard Aldrich), media (Philip H.J. Davies), historiography (Calder Walton and Christopher Andrew), South Africa and the Wilson government (Philip Murphy), Pakistan and ISI (Rob Johnson), and UK security policy in the face of radical Islam (Anthony Glees).

Enterprise intelligence: searching for a single version of the truth

Multiple versions of information and associated problems are well documented in both academic research and industry best practices. Many solutions have proposed a single version of the truth, with Business intelligence being adopted by many organizations. Business Intelligence (BI), however, is largely based on the collection of data, processing and presentation of information to meet different stakeholders’ requirement. This paper reviews the promise of Enterprise Intelligence, which promises to support decision-making based on a defined strategic understanding of the organizations goals and a unified version of the truth.

The impact of Group Intelligence software on enquiry-based learning

Despite the increasing use of groupware technologies in education, there is little evidence of their impact, especially within an enquiry-based learning (EBL) context. In this paper, we examine the use of a commercial standard Group Intelligence software called GroupSystems®ThinkTank. To date, ThinkTank has been adopted mainly in the USA and supports teams in generating ideas, categorising, prioritising, voting and multi-criteria decision-making and automatically generates a report at the end of each session. The software was used by students carrying out an EBL project, set by employers, for a full academic year. The criteria for assessing the impact of ThinkTank on student learning were those of creativity, participation, productivity, engagement and understanding. Data was collected throughout the year using a combination of interviews and questionnaires, and written feedback from employers. The overall findings show an increase in levels of productivity and creativity, evidence of a deeper understanding of their work but some variation in attitudes towards participation in the early stages of the project.

Artificial Intelligence: the basics

Artificial Intelligence: The Basics is a concise and cutting-edge introduction to the fast moving world of AI. The author Kevin Warwick, a pioneer in the field, examines issues of what it means to be man or machine and looks at advances in robotics which have blurred the boundaries. Topics covered include: how intelligence can be defined, whether machines can 'think', sensory input in machine systems, the nature of consciousness, the controversial culturing of human neurons. Exploring issues at the heart of the subject, this book is suitable for anyone interested in AI, and provides an illuminating and accessible introduction to this fascinating subject.

A reappraisal of blood clotting response tests for anticoagulant resistance and a proposal for a standardised BCR test methodology

Blood clotting response (BCR) resistance tests are available for a number of anticoagulant rodenticides. However, during the development of these tests many of the test parameters have been changed, making meaningful comparisons between results difficult. It was recognised that a standard methodology was urgently required for future BCR resistance tests and, accordingly, this document presents a reappraisal of published tests, and proposes a standard protocol for future use (see Appendix). The protocol can be used to provide information on the incidence and degree of resistance in a particular rodent population; to provide a simple comparison of resistance factors between active ingredients, thus giving clear information about cross-resistance for any given strain; and to provide comparisons of susceptibility or resistance between different populations. The methodology has a sound statistical basis in being based on the ED50 response, and requires many fewer animals than the resistance tests in current use. Most importantly, tests can be used to give a clear indication of the likely practical impact of the resistance on field efficacy. The present study was commissioned and funded by the Rodenticide Resistance Action Committee (RRAC) of CropLife International.

A police state? The Nyasaland emergency and colonial intelligence.

The Nyasaland Emergency in 1959 proved a decisive turning point in the history of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which from 1953 to 1963 brought together the territories of Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) under a settler-dominated federal government. The British and Nyasaland governments defended the emergency by claiming to have gathered intelligence which showed that the Nyasaland African Congress was preparing a campaign of sabotage and murder. The Devlin Commission, appointed to investigate the emergency, dismissed the evidence of a ‘murder plot’, criticised the Nyasaland government's handling of the Emergency and, notoriously, described Nyasaland as a ‘police state’. This article has two principal aims. First, using the recently declassified papers of the Intelligence and Security Department (ISD) of the Colonial Office, it seeks to provide the first detailed account of what the British government knew of the intelligence relating to the ‘murder plot’ and how they assessed it, prior to the outbreak of the emergency. It demonstrates that officials in the ISD and members of the Security Service adopted a far more cautious attitude towards the intelligence than did Conservative ministers, and had greater qualms about allowing it into the public domain to justify government policy. Second, the article examines the implications of Devlin's use of the phrase ‘police state’ for Nyasaland and for the late colonial state in general. It contrasts Devlin's use of the term with that of security experts in the ISD, who routinely applied it to policing systems that diverged from their own preferred model. Hence, whereas Devlin compared policing in Nyasaland unfavourably with that in Southern Rhodesia, implying, ironically, that Nyasaland was ‘under-policed’ (because there were fewer police per head of population in Nyasaland than in Southern Rhodesia), the ISD regarded the intensive system of policing operated by the British South Africa Police in Southern Rhodesia as characteristic of a ‘police state’. The article suggests that the frequent use of the term ‘police state’ was indicative of broader anxieties about what Britain's legacy would be for the post-independence African state.

Reviewing the sustainability/stationarity of current account imbalances with tests for bounded integration

We investigate for 26 OECD economies whether their current account imbalances to GDP are driven by stochastic trends. Regarding bounded stationarity as the more natural counterpart of sustainability, results from Phillips–Perron tests for unit root and bounded unit root processes are contrasted. While the former hint at stationarity of current account imbalances for 12 economies, the latter indicate bounded stationarity for only six economies. Through panel-based test statistics, current account imbalances are diagnosed as bounded non-stationary. Thus, (spurious) rejections of the unit root hypothesis might be due to the existence of bounds reflecting hidden policy controls or financial crises.