Amygdalar function reflects common individual differences in emotion and pain regulation success

Although the co-occurrence of negative affect and pain is well recognized, the mechanism underlying their association is unclear. To examine whether a common self-regulatory ability impacts the experience of both emotion and pain, we integrated neuroimaging, behavioral, and physiological measures obtained from three assessments separated by substantial temporal intervals. Out results demonstrated that individual differences in emotion regulation ability, as indexed by an objective measure of emotional state, corrugator electromyography, predicted self-reported success while regulating pain. In both emotion and pain paradigms, the amygdala reflected regulatory success. Notably, we found that greater emotion regulation success was associated with greater change of amygdalar activity following pain regulation. Furthermore, individual differences in degree of amygdalar change following emotion regulation were a strong predictor of pain regulation success, as well as of the degree of amygdalar engagement following pain regulation. These findings suggest that common individual differences in emotion and pain regulatory success are reflected in a neural structure known to contribute to appraisal processes.

Platonic allusion in Plutarch's Alcibiades 4-7

Plutarch deals with Socrates' relationship with Alcibiades in chs. 4-7 of his Life. He draws heavily here on two Platonic works, the First Alcibiades and the Symposium, but engagement with the Platonic texts is denser and more profound in Alcibiades than a study of just those two texts would suggest. In fact, this part of the Alcibiades contains allusions to several other Platonic texts in which Alcibiades does not occur as a character and in which his name is not mentioned: Republic Books 6 and 8, Charmides, Phaedrus, Apology, and Lysis. These texts function as ‘intertexts’ against which the Alcibiades is to be read.

Plutarch's 'Lives' and the critical reader

This paper analyses the kind of reader constructed in the Lives and the response expected of that reader. It begins by attempting a typology of moralising in the Lives. Plutarch does sometimes make general 'gnomic' statements about right and wrong, and occasionally passes explicit judgement on a subject's behaviour. In addition, the language with which Plutarch describes character is inherently moralistic; and even when he does not pass explicit judgment, Plutarch can rely on a common set of notions about what makes behaviour virtuous or vicious. However, the application of any moral lessons is left to the reader's own judgement. Furthermore, Plutarch's use of multiple focalisations means that the reader is sometimes presented with varying ways of looking at the same individual or the same historical situation. In addition, many incidents or anecdotes are marked by 'multivalence': that is, they resist reduction to a single moral message or lesson. In such cases, the reader is encouraged to exercise his or her own critical faculties. Indeed, the prologues which precede many pairs of Lives and the synkriseis which follow them sometimes explicitly invite the reader's participation in the work of judging. The syncritic structure of the Parallel Lives also invites the reader's participation, as do the varying perspectives provided by a corpus of overlapping Lives. In fact, the presence of a critical, engaged reader is presupposed by the agonistic nature of much of Greek literature, and of several texts in the Moralia which stage opposing viewpoints or arguments. Plutarch himself argues for such a reader in his How the young man should listen to poems.