Understanding stakeholder requirements on an NHS hospital project: application of semiotics-rooted theories.

Hospitals represent complex and difficult contexts for AEC (architecture, engineering and construction) professionals to engage with due to their functional complexity and diversity of stakeholder interests (i.e. patient, visitor, medical specialist). Hospital designers need to take note of changing NHS policy contexts (e.g. the possible empowerment of general practitioners to shape services), technological advances in medical equipment design and the potential health needs of future generations. It is imperative for hospital designers and architects to align their processes and methodologies (e.g. briefing and requirements capture) to the needs and desires of their clients so that a medical facility design is produced which is truly aligned to the requirements of the hospital stakeholders. Semiotics, the “study” or “discipline” of signs aims to investigate the nature of signs (their inception, representation and meaning), whilst semiotics-rooted theories are concerned with investigating how meaning and understanding is mobilized between persons and between organisations. This paper details a semiotics-rooted research approach for investigating the interactions between hospital designers and stakeholders on a forthcoming NHS hospital project in the UK. A semiotics grounded study will potentially provide a deeper understanding of how meaning and understanding is established between hospital project stakeholders and construction professionals.

Choices, chance and change: luck egalitarianism over time

The family of theories dubbed ‘luck egalitarianism’ represent an attempt to infuse egalitarian thinking with a concern for personal responsibility, arguing that inequalities are just when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, choice, but are unjust when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, luck. In this essay I argue that luck egalitarians should sometimes seek to limit inequalities, even when they have a fully choice-based pedigree (i.e., result only from the choices of agents). I grant that the broad approach is correct but argue that the temporal standpoint from which we judge whether the person can be held responsible, or the extent to which they can be held responsible, should be radically altered. Instead of asking, as Standard (or Static) Luck Egalitarianism seems to, whether or not, or to what extent, a person was responsible for the choice at the time of choosing, and asking the question of responsibility only once, we should ask whether, or to what extent, they are responsible for the choice at the point at which we are seeking to discover whether, or to what extent, the inequality is just, and so the question of responsibility is not settled but constantly under review. Such an approach will differ from Standard Luck Egalitarianism only if responsibility for a choice is not set in stone – if responsibility can weaken then we should not see the boundary between luck and responsibility within a particular action as static. Drawing on Derek Parfit’s illuminating discussions of personal identity, and contemporary literature on moral responsibility, I suggest there are good reasons to think that responsibility can weaken – that we are not necessarily fully responsible for a choice for ever, even if we were fully responsible at the time of choosing. I call the variant of luck egalitarianism that recognises this shift in temporal standpoint and that responsibility can weaken Dynamic Luck Egalitarianism (DLE). In conclusion I offer a preliminary discussion of what kind of policies DLE would support.

Social consensus, moral intensity and willingness to pay to address a farm animal welfare issue

An experimental contingent valuation (CV) survey of university students was undertaken to explore the impact of social consensus information on people's stated willingness to pay (wtp) to address a farm animal welfare issue. The survey found that additional information presented to respondents on social consensus concerning the moral dimensions of the issue led to a greater perception of social consensus by respondents. This greater perception of social consensus appeared to result in a higher level of moral intensity associated with the issue and a higher stated wtp by respondents for policy to address the issue. However, as for many CV studies of public goods, a question remains as to whether the estimated wtp is a true measure of people's preferences and relative values or merely a measure of attitudes on an arbitrary monetary scale.

Moral intensity and willingness to pay concerning farm animal welfare issues and the implications for agricultural policy

An experimental survey was undertaken to explore the links between the characteristics of a moral issue, the degree of moral intensity/moral imperative associated with the issue (Jones, 1991), and people's stated willingness to pay (wtp) for policy to address the issue. Two farm animal welfare issues were chosen for comparison and the contingent valuation method was used to elicit people's wtp. The findings of the survey suggest that increases in moral characteristics do appear to result in an increase in moral intensity and the degree of moral imperative associated with an issue. Moreover, there was a positive link between moral intensity/moral imperative associated with an issue and people's stated wtp for policy to address the issue. The paper discusses the relevance of the findings of the survey in the context of the debate concerning the relationship between moral and economic values and the use of the contingent valuation method to estimate people's wtp of policy options with moral dimensions.

‘God’s Truth’: Kant, Mill and moral epistemology in Oliver Twist

This essay aims to demonstrate how Dickens’s search for ‘truth’ (and his understanding of what that abstraction consists of) entered into and emerged from one of the key philosophical discussions of the early nineteenth century: namely whether moral knowledge is the sum of one’s experiences or whether there are such things as a priori or ‘natural’ principles of ethics that transcend human practice.

'Response and Responsibility: Theories of the Implied Reader in Children's Literature Criticism'

Reader Response Theory remains popular within Children's Literature Criticism. It seems to offer a sensible resolution to the question of whether meaning derives from text or reader. Through a close reading of one example of this criticism, I suggest that its dualisms are constantly collapsing into appeals to singular authority. at various stages the text or the reader is wholly responsible for meaning. I further suggest that the criticism bypasses the question of interpretation through claiming knowledge of a child reader whose opinions and reactions can be unproblematically accessed. We do not have to worry about reading texts, because we can, apparently, know the child's response to them with certainty. Anything other than this claim to certainty is taken to be a failure of responsibility, a wallowing in the subjective, obscure and perverse. My intention is to reinstate reading as the responsibility of criticism.

Review of theories for blocking

A typical feature of the atmospheric circulation at middle and high latitudes is a tendency to fluctuate between two rather extreme circulation patterns. This behaviour of the atmosphere is most common at the Northern Hemisphere during the winter and has been known among the meteorologists for a considerable time (e.g. Garriott (1904)). One of these two states is identified by a predominantly zonal circulation or a so-called high-index circulation, the other state by a meridional or a low-index circulation. The meridional circulation is often broken up in a characteristic atmospheric pattern of cut-off lows and highs. These features usually have a time scale of several days during which they affect the weather in a very dominating way. The transition from the zonal to the meridional or cellular circulation is very characteristic and follows a very typical chain of events.

The heuristic application of explanatory theories in international relations

Explanatory theorists increasingly insist that their theories are useful even though they cannot be deductively applied. But if so, then how do such theories contribute to our understanding of international relations? I argue that explanatory theories are typically heuristically applied: theorists’ accounts of specific empirical episodes are shaped by their theories’ thematic content, but are not inferred from putative causal generalizations or covering laws. These accounts therefore gain no weight from their purely rhetorical association with theories’ quasi-deductive arguments: they must be judged on the plausibility of their empirical claims. Moreover, the quasi-deductive form in which explanatory theories are typically presented obscures their actual explanatory role, which is to indicate what sort of explanation may be required, to provide conceptual categories, and to suggest an empirical focus. This account of how theoretical explanations are constructed subverts the nomothetic–idiographic distinction that is often used to distinguish International Relations from History.