Mathematical relationships between scoring parameters in capped tendering

Mathematical relationships between Scoring Parameters can be used in Economic Scoring Formulas (ESF) in tendering to distribute the score among bidders in the economic part of a proposal. Each contracting authority must set an ESF when publishing tender specifications and the strategy of each bidder will differ depending on the ESF selected and the weight of the overall proposal scoring. This paper introduces the various mathematical relationships and density distributions that describe and inter-relate not only the main Scoring Parameters but the main Forecasting Parameters in any capped tender (those whose price is upper-limited). Forecasting Parameters, as variables that can be known in advance before the deadline of a tender is reached, together with Scoring Parameters constitute the basis of a future Bid Tender Forecasting Model.

On competitive bidding: scoring and position probability graphs

Iso-score curves graph (iSCG) and mathematical relationships between Scoring Parameters (SP) and Forecasting Parameters (FP) can be used in Economic Scoring Formulas (ESF) used in tendering to distribute the score among bidders in the economic part of a proposal. Each contracting authority must set an ESF when publishing tender specifications and the strategy of each bidder will differ depending on the ESF selected and the weight of the overall proposal scoring. The various mathematical relationships and density distributions that describe the main SPs and FPs, and the representation of tendering data by means of iSCGs, enable the generation of two new types of graphs that can be very useful for bidders who want to be more competitive: the scoring and position probability graphs.

Detecting abnormal and collusive bids in capped tendering

Recent developments in the area of Bid Tender Forecasting have enabled bidders to implement new types of easy-to-use tools for increasing their chances of winning contracts. Although these new tools (such as iso-Score Curve Graphs, Scoring Probability Graphs, and Position Probability Graphs) are designed for bidders in capped tendering (tenders with an upper price limit), some of their principles can also be applied by a Contracting Authority to detect which bidders do not follow a standard pattern, that is, their bids are extremely high or low. Since a collusive bid generally needs to be sufficiently high or low to make an impact on the bid distribution, any person in charge of supervising capped tenders can be alerted to any bidder that might be involved in a cartel after identifying the same abnormal behavior in a series of tenders through simple calculations and a new type of graph.

Copyright exceptions and contract in the UK: the impact of recent amendments

In June and October 2014 a number of amendments to the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 came into effect, introducing new copyright exceptions and amending several existing exceptions. Whilst following recent judicial review the private copying exception has been quashed, many of the remaining new exceptions significantly alter the relationship between copyright exceptions and contract, making contractual terms unenforceable where those terms restrict users from taking advantage of an exception. This paper explores the rationale for the UK amendments and considers whether the changes, as implemented, prevent rightsholders from contracting out of exceptions and whether they increase the clarity of the copyright system.

Bank loan terms and conditions: is there a macro effect?

We examine whether macroeconomic factors contain significant information for bank loan contracting terms and conditions (T&Cs), over and above that of standard firm-specific or country-level institutional factors. Our estimation is based on a seemingly unrelated mixed-processes methodology that accommodates two salient data properties: (i) the fact that loan contract terms are determined jointly as a single lending contract, and (ii) the fact that the elements of loan T&Cs are generated by different distributional formats. Our findings indicate that cross-country variation accounts for a significant portion of observed variation in loan T&Cs. In addition, macroeconomic fundamentals significantly explain the “package” of loan T&Cs offered to corporate borrowers, with this effect being distinct from any influence that T&Cs receive from firm-specific factors, and also from country-specific institutional factors.