PRESENTATION. Experimental and behavioral economics. Theory, tools and topics

This note presents the special issue on Experimental and Behavioral Economics. The volume includes some recent contributions from these correlated disciplines –empirical the former and theoretical the latter– and their potential contribution to the intersection of Economics with Psychology and Sociology. The project “El papel de la comparación social en las decisiones económicas bajo incertidumbre” (Junta de Andalucía, P07-SEJ-03155)” provided us with inspiration and financial support to publish this volume.

Risk aversion, overconfidence and private information as determinants of majority thresholds

We present and experimentally test a theoretical model of majority threshold determination as a function of voters’ risk preferences. The experimental results confirm the theoretical prediction of a positive correlation between the voter's risk aversion and the corresponding preferred majority threshold. Furthermore, the experimental results show that a voter's preferred majority threshold negatively relates to the voter's confidence about how others will vote. Moreover, in a treatment in which individuals receive a private signal about others’ voting behaviour, the confidence-related motivation of behaviour loses ground to the signal's strength.

El papel del género en la toma de decisiones bajo incertidumbre

We study gender differences in individual decision making under uncertainty. we use the lottery panel test introduced in Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002). We find that females are more risk averse than males. Moreover, females are less sensitive to risk premia than males.

Corruption and individual ethics: insights from a public procurement auction

This article proposes an auction model where two firms compete for obtaining the license for a public project and an auctioneer acting as a public official representing the political power, decides the winner of the contest. Players as firms face a social dilemma in the sense that the higher is the bribe offered, the higher would be the willingness of a pure monetary maximizer public official to give her the license. However, it implies inducing a cost of reducing all players’ payoffs as far as our model includes an endogenous externality, which depends on bribe. All players’ payoffs decrease with the bribe (and increase with higher quality). We find that the presence of bribe aversion in either the officials’ or the firms’ utility function shifts equilibrium towards more pro-social behavior. When the quality and bribe-bid strategy space is discrete, multiple equilibria emerge including more pro-social bids than would be predicted under a continuous strategy space.

(How) Do research and administrative duties affect university professors’ teaching?

We analyze the interaction between university professors’ teaching quality and their research and administrative activities. Our sample is a high-quality individual panel data set from a medium size public Spanish university that allows us to avoid several types of biases frequently encountered in the literature. Although researchers teach roughly 20% more than non-researchers, their teaching quality is also 20% higher. Instructors with no research are 5 times more likely than the rest to be among the worst teachers. Over much of the relevant range, we find a nonlinear and positive relationship between research output and teaching quantity on teaching quality. Our conclusions may be useful for decision makers in universities and governments.

An experiment on energy-saving competition with socially responsible consumers: opening the black box

We present results from experimental price-setting oligopolies in which green firms undertake different levels of energy-saving investments motivated by public subsidies and demand-side advantages. We find that consumers reveal higher willingness to pay for greener sellers’ products. This observation in conjunction to the fact that greener sellers set higher prices is compatible with the use and interpretation of energy-saving behaviour as a differentiation strategy. However, sellers do not exploit the resulting advantage through sufficiently high price-cost margins, because they seem trapped into “run to stay still” competition. Regarding the use of public subsidies to energy-saving sellers we uncover an undesirable crowding-out effect of consumers’ intrinsic tendency to support green manufacturers. Namely, consumers may be less willing to support a green seller whose energy-saving strategy yields a direct financial benefit. Finally, we disentangle two alternative motivations for consumer’s attractions to pro-social firms; first, the self-interested recognition of the firm’s contribution to the public and private welfare and, second, the need to compensate a firm for the cost entailed in each pro-social action. Our results show the prevalence of the former over the latter.

Strategy Method (and payment cards)

Payment cards are a useful device to measure subjects’ preferences for a good and especially their willingness to pay for it. Together with some other similar elicitation methods, payment cards are especially appropriate for both hypothetical and incentive-compatible valuations of a good; a property which has prompted many researchers to use them in studies comparing stated and revealed valuations. The Strategy Method (hereafter SM) is a method based on a similar principle as that of payment cards, but is aimed at eliciting a subject’s full profile of responses to each of the strategies available to the rival(s).

Collusion in a Bertrand duopoly model with decreasing returns and product differentiation

We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show that a cartel may be equally stable in the presence of lower differentiation, provided that the decreasing returns parameter is high. In addition we demonstrate that for a given factor of discount, there are technologies that can have decreasing returns to scale where the cartel always is stable independent of the differentiation degree.

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

On the structure of infinity-harmonic maps

Let H ∈ C 2(ℝ N×n ), H ≥ 0. The PDE system arises as the Euler-Lagrange PDE of vectorial variational problems for the functional E ∞(u, Ω) = ‖H(Du)‖ L ∞(Ω) defined on maps u: Ω ⊆ ℝ n → ℝ N . (1) first appeared in the author's recent work. The scalar case though has a long history initiated by Aronsson. Herein we study the solutions of (1) with emphasis on the case of n = 2 ≤ N with H the Euclidean norm on ℝ N×n , which we call the “∞-Laplacian”. By establishing a rigidity theorem for rank-one maps of independent interest, we analyse a phenomenon of separation of the solutions to phases with qualitatively different behaviour. As a corollary, we extend to N ≥ 2 the Aronsson-Evans-Yu theorem regarding non existence of zeros of |Du| and prove a maximum principle. We further characterise all H for which (1) is elliptic and also study the initial value problem for the ODE system arising for n = 1 but with H(·, u, u′) depending on all the arguments.

Optimal infinity-quasiconformal immersions

For a Hamiltonian K ∈ C2(RN × n) and a map u:Ω ⊆ Rn − → RN, we consider the supremal functional (1) The “Euler−Lagrange” PDE associated to (1)is the quasilinear system (2) Here KP is the derivative and [ KP ] ⊥ is the projection on its nullspace. (1)and (2)are the fundamental objects of vector-valued Calculus of Variations in L∞ and first arose in recent work of the author [N. Katzourakis, J. Differ. Eqs. 253 (2012) 2123–2139; Commun. Partial Differ. Eqs. 39 (2014) 2091–2124]. Herein we apply our results to Geometric Analysis by choosing as K the dilation function which measures the deviation of u from being conformal. Our main result is that appropriately defined minimisers of (1)solve (2). Hence, PDE methods can be used to study optimised quasiconformal maps. Nonconvexity of K and appearance of interfaces where [ KP ] ⊥ is discontinuous cause extra difficulties. When n = N, this approach has previously been followed by Capogna−Raich ? and relates to Teichmüller’s theory. In particular, we disprove a conjecture appearing therein.