Emotional reasoning and anxiety sensitivity: associations with social anxiety disorder in childhood

Background Two specific cognitive constructs that have been implicated in the development and maintenance of anxiety symptoms are anxiety sensitivity and emotional reasoning, both of which relate to the experience and meaning of physical symptoms of arousal or anxiety. The interpretation of physical symptoms has been particularly implicated in theories of social anxiety disorder, where internal physical symptoms are hypothesized to influence the individual's appraisals of the self as a social object. Method The current study compared 75 children on measures of anxiety sensitivity and emotional reasoning: 25 with social anxiety disorder, 25 with other anxiety disorders, and 25 nonanxious children (aged 7–12 years). Results Children with social anxiety disorder reported higher levels of anxiety sensitivity and were more likely than both other groups to view ambiguous situations as anxiety provoking, whether physical information was present or not. There were no group differences in the extent to which physical information altered children's interpretation of hypothetical scenarios. Limitations This study is the first to investigate emotional reasoning in clinically anxious children and therefore replication is needed. In addition, those in both anxious groups commonly had comorbid conditions and, consequently, specific conclusions about social anxiety disorder need to be treated with caution. Conclusion The findings highlight cognitive characteristics that may be particularly pertinent in the context of social anxiety disorder in childhood and which may be potential targets for treatment. Furthermore, the findings suggest that strategies to modify these particular cognitive constructs may not be necessary in treatments of some other childhood anxiety disorders.

A model intervenes: the many faces of moral hazard

This article builds on advances in social ontology to develop a new understanding of how mainstream economic modelling affects reality. We propose a new framework for analysing and describing how models intervene in the social sphere. This framework allows us to identify and articulate three key epistemic features of models as interventions: specificity, portability and formal precision. The second part of the article uses our framework to demonstrate how specificity, portability and formal precision explain the use of moral hazard models in a variety of different policy contexts, including worker compensation schemes, bank regulation and the euro-sovereign debt crisis.

National interest to global reform: patterns of reasoning in British foreign policy discourse

Discussion of the national interest often focuses on how Britain's influence can be maximized, rather than on the goals that influence serves. Yet what gives content to claims about the national interest is the means-ends reasoning which links interests to deeper goals. In ideal-typical terms, this can take two forms. The first, and more common, approach is conservative: it infers national interests and the goals they advance from existing policies and commitments. The second is reformist: it starts by specifying national goals and then asks how they are best advanced under particular conditions. New Labour's foreign policy discourse is notable for its explicit use of a reformist approach. Indeed, Gordon Brown's vision of a 'new global society' not only identifies global reform as a key means of fulfilling national goals, but also thereby extends the concept of the national interest well beyond a narrow concern with national security.

A semiotic approach to critical reasoning

Information can be interpreted as in-formation, which refers to the potential of the form for a mediation of meaning. In this paper we focus on reasoning information and consider the question how form involved in reasoning can be used for an analysis of accounting narratives in corporate disclosures. An evaluation of experimental results is included.

Expecting moral philosophers to be reliable

Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that philosophers’ experience in philosophy plausibly affects their intuitions. Consequently, the type of argument Ryberg offers fails to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy.

Pippi Longstocking, juvenile delinquent? Hachette, self-censorship and the moral reconstruction of postwar France

This paper looks at the blockages to the publication of children’s literature caused by the intellectual climate of the postwar era, through a case study of the editorial policy of Hachette, the largest publisher for children at this time. This period witnessed heightened tensions surrounding the social and humanitarian responsibilities of literature. Writers were blamed for having created a culture of defeatism, and collaborationist authors were punished harshly in the purges. In the case of children’s literature, the discourse on responsibility was made more urgent by the assumption that children were easily influenced by their reading material, and by the centrality of the young to the discourse on the moral reconstruction of France. As the politician and education reformer Gustave Monod put it: “penser l’avenir, c’est penser le sort des enfants et de la jeunesse.” These concerns led to the expansion of associations and publications dedicated to protecting children and promoting “good” reading matter for them, and, famously, to the 1949 law regulating publications for children, which banned the depiction of crime, debauchery and violence that might demoralise young readers. Using the testimonials of former employees, along with readers’ reports and editorial correspondence preserved in the Hachette archives, this paper will examine how individual editorial decisions and self-censorship strategies were shaped by the 1949 law with its attendant discourse of moral panic on children’s reading, and how national concerns for future citizens were balanced with commercial imperatives.

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.

Moral uncertainty and permissibility: evaluating option sets

In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between option sets rather than particular conduct options. We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist.