63 resultados para Incentives
Resumo:
The paper presents a theory of the use of buzz-words in academic discourse. It uses economic principles to analyse the incentives to innovate new buzz words and to use existing buzz-words promoted by other people. It argues that the lack of a credible dominant intellectual elite in business studies, combined with the rapid growth of academic employment in business schools, has stimulated an inefficient proliferation of buzz-words in management studies. It argues that this proliferatilon of buzz-words is in danger of bringing the field of study into disrepute.
Resumo:
That construction procurement needs to be re-organized to make it more sustainable implies that there is a problem with the current situation. Starting from this assumption, an overview of construction procurement sets the scene for a discussion of some recent developments relating to organizational frameworks for sustainable construction procurement. Emergent theories dealing with sustainable procurement are considered. There is a plethora of standards and guidance documents for organizing sustainable procurement, originating from a variety of organizations involved. These considerations form the context for approaches being used in practice to achieve sustainable procurement. The Chapter concludes with reflections on why current approaches are insufficient. It seems difficult to persuade clients to spend less money over the life cycle of their buildings. Future directions needed to translate sustainable procurement from rhetoric to reality include the development of suitable incentives and appropriate organizational structures.
Resumo:
In Kazakhstan, a transitional nation in Central Asia, the development of public–private partnerships (PPPs) is at its early stage and increasingly of strategic importance. This case study investigates risk allocation in an ongoing project: the construction and operation of 11 kindergartens in the city of Karaganda in the concession form for 14 years. Drawing on a conceptual framework of effective risk allocation, the study identifies principal PPP risks, provides a critical assessment of how and in what way each partner bears a certain risk, highlights the reasons underpinning risk allocation decisions and delineates the lessons learned. The findings show that the government has effectively transferred most risks to the private sector partner, whilst both partners share the demand risk of childcare services and the project default risk. The strong elements of risk allocation include clear assignment of parties’ responsibilities, streamlined financing schemes and incentives to complete the main project phases on time. However, risk allocation has missed an opportunity to create incentives for service quality improvements and take advantage of economies of scale. The most controversial element of risk allocation, as the study finds, is a revenue stream that an operator is supposed to receive from the provision of services unrelated to childcare, as neither partner is able to mitigate this revenue risk. The article concludes that in the kindergartens’ PPP, the government has achieved almost complete transfer of risks to the private sector partner. However, the costs of transfer are extensive government financial outlays that seriously compromise the PPP value for money.
Resumo:
European labour markets are increasingly divided between insiders in full-time permanent employment and outsiders in precarious work or unemployment. Using quantitative as well as qualitative methods, this thesis investigates the determinants and consequences of labour market policies that target these outsiders in three separate papers. The first paper looks at Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) that target the unemployed. It shows that left and right-wing parties choose different types of ALMPs depending on the policy and the welfare regime in which the party is located. These findings reconcile the conflicting theoretical expectations from the Power Resource approach and the insider-outsider theory. The second paper considers the regulation and protection of the temporary work sector. It solves the puzzle of temporary re-regulation in France, which contrasts with most other European countries that have deregulated temporary work. Permanent workers are adversely affected by the expansion of temporary work in France because of general skills and low wage coordination. The interests of temporary and permanent workers for re-regulation therefore overlap in France and left governments have an incentive to re-regulate the sector. The third paper then investigates what determines inequality between median and bottom income workers. It shows that non-inclusive economic coordination increases inequality in the absence of compensating institutions such as minimum wage regulation. The deregulation of temporary work as well as spending on employment incentives and rehabilitation also has adverse effects on inequality. Thus, policies that target outsiders have important economic effects on the rest of the workforce. Three broader contributions can be identified. First, welfare state policies may not always be in the interests of labour, so left parties may not always promote them. Second, the interests of insiders and outsiders are not necessarily at odds. Third, economic coordination may not be conducive to egalitarianism where it is not inclusive.
Resumo:
Purpose – Progress in retrofitting the UK's commercial properties continues to be slow and fragmented. New research from the UK and USA suggests that radical changes are needed to drive large-scale retrofitting, and that new and innovative models of financing can create new opportunities. The purpose of this paper is to offer insights into the terminology of retrofit and the changes in UK policy and practice that are needed to scale up activity in the sector. Design/methodology/approach – The paper reviews and synthesises key published research into commercial property retrofitting in the UK and USA and also draws on policy and practice from the EU and Australia. Findings – The paper provides a definition of “retrofit”, and compares and contrasts this with “refurbishment” and “renovation” in an international context. The paper summarises key findings from recent research and suggests that there are a number of policy and practice measures which need to be implemented in the UK for commercial retrofitting to succeed at scale. These include improved funding vehicles for retrofit; better transparency in actual energy performance; and consistency in measurement, verification and assessment standards. Practical implications – Policy and practice in the UK needs to change if large-scale commercial property retrofit is to be rolled out successfully. This requires mandatory legislation underpinned by incentives and penalties for non-compliance. Originality/value – This paper synthesises recent research to provide a set of policy and practice recommendations which draw on international experience, and can assist on implementation in the UK.
Resumo:
A series of inquiries and reports suggest considerable failings in the care provided to some patients in the NHS. Although the Bristol Inquiry report of 2001 led to the creation of many new regulatory bodies to supervise the NHS, they have never enjoyed consistent support from government and the Mid Staffordshire Inquiry in 2013 suggests they made little difference. Why do some parts of the NHS disregard patients’ interests and how we should we respond to the challenge? The following discusses the evolution of approaches to NHS governance through the Hippocratic, Managerial and Commercial models, and assesses their risks and benefits. Apart from the ethical imperative, the need for effective governance is driven both by the growth in information available to the public and the resources wasted by ineffective systems of care. Appropriate solutions depend on an understanding of the perverse incentives inherent in each model and the need for greater sensitivity to the voices of patients and the public.
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This article investigates the determinants of union inclusiveness towards agency workers in Western Europe, using an index which combines unionization rates with dimensions of collective agreements covering agency workers. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, we identify two combinations of conditions leading to inclusiveness: the ‘Northern path’ includes high union density, high bargaining coverage and high union authority, and is consistent with the power resources approach. The ‘Southern path’ combines high union authority, high bargaining coverage, statutory regulations of agency work and working-class orientation, showing that ideology rather than institutional incentives shapes union strategies towards the marginal workforce.
Resumo:
Payments for ecosystem services (PES) typically reward landowners for managing their land to provide ecosystem services that would not otherwise be provided. REDD—Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation—is a form of PES aimed at decreasing carbon emissions from forest conversion and extraction in lower-income countries. A key challenge for REDD occurs when it is implemented at the community rather than the individual landowner level. Whilst achieving this community-level reduction relies on individuals changing their interaction with the forest, incentives are not aligned explicitly at the individual level. Rather, payments are made to the community as a single entity in exchange for verified reduced forest loss, as per a PES scheme. In this paper, we explore how community level REDD has been implemented in one multiple-village pilot in Tanzania. Our findings suggest that considerable attention has been paid to monitoring, reporting, verification, and equity. Though no explicit mechanism ensures individual compliance with the group PES, the development of village level institutions, “social fencing,” and a shared future through equal REDD payments factor into community decisions that influence the level of community compliance that the program will eventually achieve. However, few villages allocate funds for explicit enforcement efforts to protect the forest from illegal activities undertaken by outsiders.
Resumo:
The use of economic incentives for biodiversity (mostly Compensation and Reward for Environmental Services including Payment for ES) has been widely supported in the past decades and became the main innovative policy tools for biodiversity conservation worldwide. These policy tools are often based on the insight that rational actors perfectly weigh the costs and benefits of adopting certain behaviors and well-crafted economic incentives and disincentives will lead to socially desirable development scenarios. This rationalist mode of thought has provided interesting insights and results, but it also misestimates the context by which ‘real individuals’ come to decisions, and the multitude of factors influencing development sequences. In this study, our goal is to examine how these policies can take advantage of some unintended behavioral reactions that might in return impact, either positively or negatively, general policy performances. We test the effect of income's origin (‘Low effort’ based money vs. ‘High effort’ based money) on spending decisions (Necessity vs. Superior goods) and subsequent pro social preferences (Future pro-environmental behavior) within Madagascar rural areas, using a natural field experiment. Our results show that money obtained under low effort leads to different consumption patterns than money obtained under high efforts: superior goods are more salient in the case of low effort money. In parallel, money obtained under low effort leads to subsequent higher pro social behavior. Compensation and rewards policies for ecosystem services may mobilize knowledge on behavioral biases to improve their design and foster positive spillovers on their development goals.
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This paper considers methods for regulating the trafficking of rhino horn and ivory, seen through the lens of compliance theories. It stresses the importance of the distinction between normative and instrumental motivations. It argues for a balanced set of strategies that include normative levers designed to change the behaviour of poachers, traffickers and consumers of these products. In particular it considers the options needed to achieve demand reduction in consumer countries, and those needed to provide incentives to local communities in producer countries to disengage from poaching.
Can institutional investors bias real estate portfolio appraisals? Evidence from the market downturn
Resumo:
This paper investigates the extent to which institutional investors may have influenced independent real estate appraisals during the financial crisis. A conceptual model of the determinants of client influence on real estate appraisals is proposed. It is suggested that the extent of clients’ ability and willingness to bias appraisal outputs is contingent upon market and regulatory environments (ethical norms and legal and institutional frameworks), the salience of the appraisal(s) to the client, financial incentives for the appraiser to respond to client pressure, organisational culture, the level of moral reasoning of both individual clients and appraisers, client knowledge and the degree of appraisal uncertainty. The potential of client influence to bias ostensibly independent real estate appraisals is examined using the opportunity afforded by the market downturn commencing in 2007 in the UK. During the market turbulence at the end of 2007, the motivations of different types of owners to bias appraisals diverged clearly and temporarily provided a unique opportunity to assess potential appraisal bias. We use appraisal-based performance data for individual real estate assets to test whether there were significant ownership effects on performance during this period. The results support the hypothesis that real estate appraisals in this period reflected the differing needs of clients.
Resumo:
Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on the strategic choice of firms' owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment device aiming at gaining competitive advantage in the product market. In a quantity setting duopoly we experimentally test whether firms' owners compensate their managers through contracts combining own profits either with revenues or with relative performance, and the resulting managerial behaviour in the product market. Prominent among our results is that firms' owners choose relative performance over profit revenue contracts more frequently. Further, firms' owners successfully induce a more aggressive behaviour by their managers in the market, by setting incentives which deviate from strict profit maximization.
Resumo:
Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.
Resumo:
The ratio bias—according to which individuals prefer to bet on probabilities expressed as a ratio of large numbers to normatively equivalent or superior probabilities expressed as a ratio of small numbers—has recently gained momentum, with researchers especially in health economics emphasizing the policy importance of the phenomenon. Although the bias has been replicated several times, some doubts remain about its economic significance. Our two experiments show that the bias disappears once order effects are excluded, and once salient and dominant incentives are provided. This holds true for both choice and valuation tasks. Also, adding context to the decision problem does not alter this finding. No ratio bias could be found in between-subject tests either, which leads us to the conclusion that the policy relevance of the phenomenon is doubtful at best.
Resumo:
For over three decades, negotiated planning obligations have been the primary form of land value capture in England. Diffusing and evolving over the last decade, a significant policy innovation has been the use of financial calculations to estimate the extent to which policies on planning obligations for actual, proposed development projects and in plan making affect the financial viability of development. This paper assesses the extent to which the use of financial appraisals has provided a robust, just and practical procedure to support land value capture. It is concluded that development viability appraisals are saturated with intrinsic uncertainty and that land value capture that is based on such calculations is, to some extent, capricious. In addition, clear incentives for developers and land owners to bias viability calculations, the economic dependence of many viability consultants on developers and land owners, a lack of transparency, contested or ambiguous guidance and the opportunities created by input uncertainty for bias are further failings. It is argued that how viability calculations are applied has been, is being and will continue to be shaped by power relations.