Charles Prentice and T.F. Powys: a publisher’s influence

This article draws substantially on archival evidence to present a full account of the publishing history of the major works of T.F. Powys. It reveals the crucial role played by Charles Prentice, senior partner at the firm of Chatto & Windus, and places the discussion within the context of inter-war publishing and literary culture.

Two unpublished letters of Robert Louis Stevenson

This article prints and discusses two uncollected letters by Robert Louis Stevenson to the publishing firm of Chatto & Windus, concerning his book Memories and Portraits.

Understanding the land in Scot(t)land

This essay discusses ideas of landscape in nineteenth-century Scottish literature, art, photography and tourism, showing the pervasive influence of the works of Sir Walter Scott on constructions of Scotland and Scottish identity.

Evaluating the alternatives

In this article, I study the impacts of a specific incentives-based approach to safety regulation, namely the control of quality through sampling and threatening penalties when quality fails to meet some minimum standard. The welfare-improving impacts of this type of scheme seem high and are cogently illustrated in a recent contribution by Segerson, which stimulated many of the ideas in this paper. For this reason, the reader is referred to Segerson for a background on some of the motivation, and throughout, I make an effort to indicate differences between the two approaches. There are three major differences. First, I dispense with the calculus as much as possible, seeking readily interpreted, closedform solutions to illustrate the main ideas. Second, (strategically optimal, symmetric) Nash equilibria are the mainstay of each of the current models. Third, in the uncertainquality- provision equilibria, each of the Nash suppliers chooses the level of the lower bound for quality as a control and offers a draw from its (private) distribution in a contribution to the (public) pool of quality.

Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games: an experimental test

We apply experimental methods to study the role of risk aversion on players’ behavior in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games. Faced with quantitatively equal discount factors, the most risk-averse players will choose Nash strategies more often in the presence of uncertainty than when future profits are discounted in a deterministic way. Overall, we find that risk aversion relates negatively with the frequency of collusive outcomes.