Object-love at the Science Museum: cultural geographies of museum storerooms

The field of museum geography is taking on new significance as geographers and museum-studies scholars make sense of the spatial relations between the people, things, practices and buildings that make and remake museums. In order to strengthen this spatial interest in museums, this paper makes important connections between recent work in cultural geography and museum studies on love, materiality and the museum effect. This paper marks a departure from the preoccupation with the public spaces of museums to go behind the scenes of the Science Museum in London to explore its rarely visited, but nonetheless lively, small-to-medium-sized object storerooms at Blythe House. Incorporating field diary entries and interview extracts from two research projects based upon the museum storerooms at Blythe House, this paper brings to life the social interactions that take place between museum curators and conservators and the objects they care for. This focus on object-love enables scholars to consider anew what museums are and what they are for, the life of the museum object in the storeroom, and the emotional practices of professional curatorship and conservation. This journey into the storeroom at Blythe House makes explicit how object-love shapes museum space.

Selecting object pairs for action: is the active object always first?

Perception is linked to action via two routes: a direct route based on affordance information in the environment and an indirect route based on semantic knowledge about objects. The present study explored the factors modulating the recruitment of the two routes, in particular which factors affecting the selection of paired objects. In Experiment 1, we presented real objects among semantically related or unrelated distracters. Participants had to select two objects that can interact. The presence of distracters affected selection times, but not the semantic relations of the objects with the distracters. Furthermore, participants first selected the active object (e.g. teaspoon) with their right hand, followed by the passive object (e.g. mug), often with their left hand. In Experiment 2, we presented pictures of the same objects with no hand grip, congruent or incongruent hand grip. Participants had to decide whether the two objects can interact. Action decisions were faster when the presentation of the active object preceded the presentation of the passive object, and when the grip was congruent. Interestingly, participants were slower when the objects were semantically but not functionally related; this effect increased with congruently gripped objects. Our data showed that action decisions in the presence of strong affordance cues (real objects, pictures of congruently gripped objects) relied on sensory-motor representation, supporting the direct route from perception-to-action that bypasses semantic knowledge. However, in the case of weak affordance cues (pictures), semantic information interfered with action decisions, indicating that semantic knowledge impacts action decisions. The data support the dual-route account from perception-to-action.

Video stimuli reduce object-directed imitation accuracy: a novel two-person motion-tracking approach

Imitation is an important form of social behavior, and research has aimed to discover and explain the neural and kinematic aspects of imitation. However, much of this research has featured single participants imitating in response to pre-recorded video stimuli. This is in spite of findings that show reduced neural activation to video vs. real life movement stimuli, particularly in the motor cortex. We investigated the degree to which video stimuli may affect the imitation process using a novel motion tracking paradigm with high spatial and temporal resolution. We recorded 14 positions on the hands, arms, and heads of two individuals in an imitation experiment. One individual freely moved within given parameters (moving balls across a series of pegs) and a second participant imitated. This task was performed with either simple (one ball) or complex (three balls) movement difficulty, and either face-to-face or via a live video projection. After an exploratory analysis, three dependent variables were chosen for examination: 3D grip position, joint angles in the arm, and grip aperture. A cross-correlation and multivariate analysis revealed that object-directed imitation task accuracy (as represented by grip position) was reduced in video compared to face-to-face feedback, and in complex compared to simple difficulty. This was most prevalent in the left-right and forward-back motions, relevant to the imitator sitting face-to-face with the actor or with a live projected video of the same actor. The results suggest that for tasks which require object-directed imitation, video stimuli may not be an ecologically valid way to present task materials. However, no similar effects were found in the joint angle and grip aperture variables, suggesting that there are limits to the influence of video stimuli on imitation. The implications of these results are discussed with regards to previous findings, and with suggestions for future experimentation.

Temporally stable feature clusters for maritime object tracking in visible and thermal imagery

This paper describes a new approach to detect and track maritime objects in real time. The approach particularly addresses the highly dynamic maritime environment, panning cameras, target scale changes, and operates on both visible and thermal imagery. Object detection is based on agglomerative clustering of temporally stable features. Object extents are first determined based on persistence of detected features and their relative separation and motion attributes. An explicit cluster merging and splitting process handles object creation and separation. Stable object clus- ters are tracked frame-to-frame. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated on four challenging real-world public datasets.

Logical and epistemic foundationalism about grounding: the triviality of facts and principles

In this paper, I seek to undermine G.A. Cohen’s polemical use of a metaethical claim he makes in his article, ‘Facts and Principles’, by arguing that that use requires an unsustainable equivocation between epistemic and logical grounding. I begin by distinguishing three theses that Cohen has offered during the course of his critique of Rawls and contractualism more generally, the foundationalism about grounding thesis, the justice as non-regulative thesis, and the justice as all-encompassing thesis, and briefly argue that they are analytically independent of each other. I then offer an outline of the foundationalism about grounding thesis, characterising it, as Cohen does, as a demand of logic. That thesis claims that whenever a normative principle is dependent on a fact, it is so dependent in virtue of some other principle. I then argue that although this is true as a matter of logic, it, as Cohen admits, cannot be true of actual justifications, since logic cannot tell us anything about the truth as opposed to the validity of arguments. Facts about a justification cannot then be decisive for whether or not a given argument violates the foundationalism about grounding thesis. As long as, independently of actual justifications, theorists can point to plausible logically grounding principles, as I argue contractualists can, Cohen’s thesis lacks critical bite.

A new regime of carbon counting: the practices and politics of accounting for everyday carbon through C02e

Inspired by the commercial desires of global brands and retailers to access the lucrative green consumer market, carbon is increasingly being counted and made knowable at the mundane sites of everyday production and consumption, from the carbon footprint of a plastic kitchen fork to that of an online bank account. Despite the challenges of counting and making commensurable the global warming impact of a myriad of biophysical and societal activities, this desire to communicate a product or service's carbon footprint has sparked complicated carbon calculative practices and enrolled actors at literally every node of multi-scaled and vastly complex global supply chains. Against this landscape, this paper critically analyzes the counting practices that create the ‘e’ in ‘CO2e’. It is shown that, central to these practices are a series of tools, models and databases which, in building upon previous work (Eden, 2012 and Star and Griesemer, 1989) we conceptualize here as ‘boundary objects’. By enrolling everyday actors from farmers to consumers, these objects abstract and stabilize greenhouse gas emissions from their messy material and social contexts into units of CO2e which can then be translated along a product's supply chain, thereby establishing a new currency of ‘everyday supply chain carbon’. However, in making all greenhouse gas-related practices commensurable and in enrolling and stabilizing the transfer of information between multiple actors these objects oversee a process of simplification reliant upon, and subject to, a multiplicity of approximations, assumptions, errors, discrepancies and/or omissions. Further the outcomes of these tools are subject to the politicized and commercial agendas of the worlds they attempt to link, with each boundary actor inscribing different meanings to a product's carbon footprint in accordance with their specific subjectivities, commercial desires and epistemic framings. It is therefore shown that how a boundary object transforms greenhouse gas emissions into units of CO2e, is the outcome of distinct ideologies regarding ‘what’ a product's carbon footprint is and how it should be made legible. These politicized decisions, in turn, inform specific reduction activities and ultimately advance distinct, specific and increasingly durable transition pathways to a low carbon society.

Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?

Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers' worry---the folk seem to agree!