The role of incentives for sustainable implementation of marine protected areas: an example from Tanzania

Although Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) are an increasingly popular policy tool for protecting marine stocks and biodiversity, they pose high costs for small-scale fisherfolk in poor countries. With Tanzania’s Mnazi Bay Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park as an example, we develop a spatial economic decision-modelling framework as a lens to examine fishers’ reactions to incentives created by an MPA. We argue that MPAs in poor countries can only contribute to sustainability if management induces changes in incentives to fish through a combination of enforcement (‘sticks’) and livelihood projects (‘carrots’). We emphasise practical implementation issues and implications for fostering marine ecosystem sustainability.

Forest livelihoods: beekeeping as men's work in western Tanzania

This chapter takes the example of local African beekeeping to explore how the forest can act as an important locus for men's work in Western Tanzania. Here we scrutinise how beekeeping enables its practitioners to situate themselves in the forest locality and observe how the social relationships, interactions and everyday practices entailed in living and working together are a means through which beekeepers generate a sense of belonging and identity. As part and parcel of this process, men transmit their skills to a new generation, thus reproducing themselves and their social environment.

Implementing REDD through community-based forest management: lessons from Tanzania

REDD (reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation) aims to slow carbon releases caused by forest disturbance by making payments conditional on forest quality over time. Like earlier policies to slow deforestation, REDD must change the behaviour of forest degrading actors. Broadly, it can be implemented with payments to forest users in exchange for improved forest management, thus creating incentives; through payments for enforcement, thus creating disincentives; or through addressing external drivers such as urban charcoal demand. In Tanzania, community-based forest management (CBFM), a form of participatory forest management, was chosen by the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group, a local NGO, as a model for implementing REDD pilot programmes. Payments are made to villages that have the rights to forest carbon. In exchange, the villages must demonstrably reduce deforestation at the village level. In this paper, using this pilot programme as a case study, combined with a review of the literature, we provide insights for REDD implementation in sub-Saharan Africa. We pay particular attention to leakage, monitoring and enforcement. We suggest that implementing REDD through CBFM-type structures can create appropriate incentives and behaviour change when the recipients of the REDD funds are also the key drivers of forest change. When external forces drive forest change, however, REDD through CBFM-type structures becomes an enforcement programme with local communities rather than government agencies being responsible for the enforcement. That structure imposes costs on local communities, whose local authority limits the ability to address leakage outside the particular REDD village.

Occupying the margins: Labour integration and social exclusion in artisanal mining in Tanzania

This article examines the marginal position of artisanal miners in sub-Saharan Africa, and considers how they are incorporated into mineral sector change in the context of institutional and legal integration. Taking the case of diamond and gold mining in Tanzania, the concept of social exclusion is used to explore the consequences of marginalization on people's access to mineral resources and ability to make a living from artisanal mining. Because existing inequalities and forms of discrimination are ignored by the Tanzanian state, the institutionalization of mineral titles conceals social and power relations that perpetuate highly unequal access to resources. The article highlights the complexity of these processes, and shows that while legal integration can benefit certain wealthier categories of people, who fit into the model of an 'entrepreneurial small-scale miner', for others adverse incorporation contributes to socio-economic dependence, exploitation and insecurity. For the issue of marginality to be addressed within integration processes, the existence of local forms of organization, institutions and relationships, which underpin inequalities and discrimination, need to be recognized.

Simulations of angular momentum evolution in wind-fed CV precursors

It is thought that the secondary stars in cataclysmic variables (CVs) may undergo a period of mass loss in the form of a wind during the evolution of the system (Mullan et al. 1992). This wind is thought to magnetically brake the secondary star with a time-scale ~ 10^8 yr (e.g. van Paradijs 1986). When the secondary’s spin has been brought close to synchronism with the orbit it is possible for tidal torques to lock the secondary in synchronous rotation.

Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: an example from Tanzania

In low-income countries, both nearby local villagers, “insiders”, and non-locals, “outsiders”, extract products from protected forests even though their actions are illegal. Forest managers typically combine enforcement and livelihood projects offered to nearby communities to reduce this illegal activity, but with limited budgets cannot deter all extraction. We develop a game theoretic model of a forest manager's decision interacting with the extraction decisions of insiders and outsiders. Our analysis suggests that, depending on the relative ecological damage caused by each group, budget-constrained forest managers may reduce total forest degradation by legalizing “insider” extraction in return for local villagers' involvement in enforcement activities against outsiders.

HIV-related stigma, asset inheritance and chronic poverty: vulnerability and resilience of widows and caregiving children and youth in Tanzania and Uganda

This paper develops a framework of risk and protective factors to conceptualise the relationship between HIV-related stigma, asset inheritance and chronic poverty among widows and caregiving children and youth in eastern Africa. Analysis of two qualitative studies with 85 participants in rural and urban areas of Tanzania and Uganda reveals that gendered and generational inequalities and stigmatisation sometimes led to property grabbing and chronic poverty. Human and social capital and preventative measures however may help widows and caregiving young people in HIV-affected households to safeguard land and other assets, within a wider supportive environment that seeks to tackle structural inequalities.

Foreign direct investment through acquisitions and implications for technological upgrading: case evidence from Tanzania

Using a case study approach, this paper examines the role of privatisation on the industrial landscape of Tanzania. We examine the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) through acquisitions on technology transfer within the acquired firm as well as the development of linkages to other firms based in the host country. Our results suggest that technological upgrading has occurred following FDI, the intensity of which reflects the type of firm-specific assets of the parent multinational enterprise (MNE), as well as the pre-acquisition state of these industrial activities. Improved backward linkages are also evident with local economic agents, but their type and extent – reflecting Tanzania's comparative advantage in the primary sector – confirm that capabilities both within the acquired firms and also in the industrial base of the host country greatly influence the magnitude and intensity of technological upgrading. 'Narrower' technology gaps between the MNE affiliate and the domestic sector are more likely to result in backward linkages and determine the type of technological content of inputs sourced locally rather than within the MNE.

HIV care and interdependence in Tanzania and Uganda

Within many communities in East Africa, people living with HIV are increasingly involved in delivering home-based care and healthcare for family members and peers. Such interdependent caring relations blur conventional boundaries between ‘care-givers’ and ‘care-recipients’, and constructions of 'service users' as dependent, passive recipients of healthcare. The participation of people living with HIV in healthcare provision, home-based care and peer support groups can enhance ‘relational autonomy’ for both care-givers and care-recipients, although such initiatives often play out in highly gendered ways. The care and support of people living with HIV, particularly the emotion work of caring, however, continues to be associated with women's and girls' assumed 'natural' nurturing roles and has been largely devalued and overlooked in HIV policy and practice to date.

Marine protected areas in artisanal fisheries: a spatial bio-economic model based on observations in Costa Rica and Tanzania

In many lower-income countries, the establishment of marine protected areas (MPAs) involves significant opportunity costs for artisanal fishers, reflected in changes in how they allocate their labor in response to the MPA. The resource economics literature rarely addresses such labor allocation decisions of artisanal fishers and how, in turn, these contribute to the impact of MPAs on fish stocks, yield, and income. This paper develops a spatial bio-economic model of a fishery adjacent to a village of people who allocate their labor between fishing and on-shore wage opportunities to establish a spatial Nash equilibrium at a steady state fish stock in response to various locations for no-take zone MPAs and managed access MPAs. Villagers’ fishing location decisions are based on distance costs, fishing returns, and wages. Here, the MPA location determines its impact on fish stocks, fish yield, and villager income due to distance costs, congestion, and fish dispersal. Incorporating wage labor opportunities into the framework allows examination of the MPA’s impact on rural incomes, with results determining that win-wins between yield and stocks occur in very different MPA locations than do win-wins between income and stocks. Similarly, villagers in a high-wage setting face a lower burden from MPAs than do those in low-wage settings. Motivated by issues of central importance in Tanzania and Costa Rica, we impose various policies on this fishery – location specific no-take zones, increasing on-shore wages, and restricting MPA access to a subset of villagers – to analyze the impact of an MPA on fish stocks and rural incomes in such settings.

Allocating community-level payments for ecosystem services initial experiences from a REDD pilot in Tanzania

Payments for ecosystem services (PES) typically reward landowners for managing their land to provide ecosystem services that would not otherwise be provided. REDD—Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation—is a form of PES aimed at decreasing carbon emissions from forest conversion and extraction in lower-income countries. A key challenge for REDD occurs when it is implemented at the community rather than the individual landowner level. Whilst achieving this community-level reduction relies on individuals changing their interaction with the forest, incentives are not aligned explicitly at the individual level. Rather, payments are made to the community as a single entity in exchange for verified reduced forest loss, as per a PES scheme. In this paper, we explore how community level REDD has been implemented in one multiple-village pilot in Tanzania. Our findings suggest that considerable attention has been paid to monitoring, reporting, verification, and equity. Though no explicit mechanism ensures individual compliance with the group PES, the development of village level institutions, “social fencing,” and a shared future through equal REDD payments factor into community decisions that influence the level of community compliance that the program will eventually achieve. However, few villages allocate funds for explicit enforcement efforts to protect the forest from illegal activities undertaken by outsiders.