Environmental justice and conceptions of the green economy

Green economy has become one of the most fashionable terms in global environmental public policy discussions and forums. Despite this popularity, and its being selected as one of the organizing themes of the United Nations Rio+20 Conference in Brazil, June 2012, its prospects as an effective mobilization tool for global environmental sustainability scholarship and practice remains unclear. A major reason for this is that much like its precursor concepts such as environmental sustainability and sustainable development, green economy is a woolly concept which lends itself to many interpretations. Hence, rather than resolve long-standing controversies, green economy merely reinvigorates existing debates over the visions, actors and policies best suited to secure a more sustainable future for all. In this review article, we aim to fill an important gap in scholarship by suggesting various ways in which green economy may be organized and synthesized as a concept, and especially in terms of its relationship with the idea of social and environmental justice. Accordingly, we offer a systemization of possible interpretations of green economy mapped onto a synthesis of existing typologies of environmental justice. This classification provides the context for future analysis of which, and how, various notions of green economy link with various conceptions of justice.

Do good deeds make bad people?

According to the so-called ‘self-licensing effect’, committing to a virtuous act in a preceding choice may lead to behave less virtuously in the succeeding decision. Consequently, well-intentioned policies can lead to overall counter-productive effects by licensing people to behave badly in related behaviors. On the other side, motivational crowding theory argues that constraining people to adopt a desirable behavior can backfire. We use of a classroom experiment to test whether a regulatory framework to incentivize individuals to adopt pro-environmental behavior generate similar spillovers in terms of licensing effect than a non-regulatory framework. We show that the way the good deed is caused doesn’t seem to influence the licensing effect. Nevertheless, we found that business- and environmental-orientated majors react adversely to the regulatory framework. We show that environmental-orientated students exhibit higher intrinsically motivations than business-orientated ones. Accordingly, we suggest that the licensing effect is more likely to arise when the preceding ‘virtuous’ act is freely chosen (respectively regulatory caused) for non-intrinsically (respectively intrinsically) motivated individuals.

Simulating the impact of regulation changes on the market for prostitution services

The paper draws on recent research on the economics of prostitution focussing on the role of stigma in shaping the interaction between demand and supply and the resulting sub-markets in which this activity is typically organised. Here we extend the framework to consider the role of reputation and stigma in determining policy decisions regarding the regulation of prostitution and show how sub-optimal outcomes (from the point of view of the welfare of sex workers) may prevail.

Regulating vertical relations in the presence of retailer differentiation costs

We discuss public policy towards vertical relations, comparing different types of contracts between a manufacturer and a maximum of two retailers. Together with (potential) price competition between the retailers, we study the role of a (sunk) differentiation cost paid by them in order to relax competition in the retail market and broaden the market potential of the distributed product. This non-price competition element in the downstream market is responsible for our conclusion that, unlike in standard policy guidelines and previous theoretical analysis, restrictions in intra-brand competition may deserve a permissive treatment even in the absence of inter-brand competition, if retailer differentiation is costly.

Dominance in the Tetra Pak case: an empirical approach

The 1991 decision of the European Commission on the Tetra Pak case was based on information which seemed to prove the firm's anti-competitive behavior. The Tetra Pak case is investigated here focusing on the meaning of multimarket dominance, using empirical techniques. We find that a more rigorous analysis of the data available would not confirm the Commission's assertions. That is, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the Commission was right to relate Tetra Pak's dominance in the aseptic sector to its market power in the non-aseptic sector. Our results suggest a general framework for the analysis of abusive transfer of market power across vertically or/and horizontally related markets.

Does terrorism threaten human rights? Evidence from panel data

Using panel data for 111 countries over the period 1982–2002, we employ two indexes that cover a wide range of human rights to empirically analyze whether and to what extent terrorism affects human rights. According to our results,terrorism significantly, but not dramatically, diminishes governments’ respect for basic human rights such as the absence of extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment, and torture. The result is robust to how we measure terrorist attacks, to the method of estimation, and to the choice of countries in our sample. However, we find no effect of terrorism on empowerment rights.

Cost-benefit analysis

Over the past 30 years, cost–benefit analysis (CBA) has been applied to various areas of public policies and projects. The aim of this essay is to describe the origins of CBA, classify typologies of costs and benefits, define efficiency under CBA and discuss issues associated with the use of a microeconomic tool in macroeconomic contexts.

Margin squeeze: an above cost predatory pricing approach

We provide a new legal perspective for the antitrust analysis of margin squeeze conducts. Building on recent economic analysis, we explain why margin squeeze conducts should solely be evaluated under adjusted predatory pricing standards. The adjustment corresponds to an increase in the cost benchmark used in the predatory pricing test by including opportunity costs due to missed upstream sales. This can reduce both the risks of false-positives and false-negatives in margin squeeze cases. We justify this approach by explaining why classic arguments against above-cost predatory pricing typically do not hold in vertical structures where margin squeezes take place and by presenting case law evidence supporting this adjustment. Our approach can help to reconcile the divergent US and EU antitrust stances on margin squeeze.