Modelling the medieval economy: money, prices and income in England, 1263-1520

This chapter presents a simple econometric model of the medieval English economy, focusing on the relationship between money, prices and incomes. The model is estimated using annual data for the period 1263-1520 obtained from various sources. The start date is determined by the availability of continuous runs of annual data, while the finishing date immediately precedes the take-off of Tudor price inflation. Accounts from the ecclesiastical and monastic estates have survived in great numbers for this period, thereby ensuring that crop yields can be estimated from a regionally representative set of estates.

Interest in Medieval accounts: examples from England, 1272-1340

The charging of interest for borrowing money, and the level at which it is charged, is of fundamental importance to the economy. Unfortunately, the study of the interest rates charged in the middle ages has been hampered by the diversity of terms and methods used by historians. This article seeks to establish a standardized methodology to calculate interest rates from historical sources and thereby provide a firmer foundation for comparisons between regions and periods. It should also contribute towards the current historical reassessment of medieval economic and financial development. The article is illustrated with case studies drawn from the credit arrangements of the English kings between 1272 and c.1340, and argues that changes in interest rates reflect, in part, contemporary perceptions of the creditworthiness of the English crown.

Bilingual 'tagging' of financial accounts in Demotic and Greek

‘Bilingual’ documents, with text in both Demotic and Greek, can be of several sorts, ranging from complete translations of the same information (e.g. Ptolemaic decrees) to those where the information presented in the two languages is complementary (e.g. mummy labels). The texts discussed in this paper consist of a number of examples of financial records where a full account in one language (L1) is annotated with brief pieces of information in a second language (L2). These L2 ‘tags’ are designed to facilitate extraction of summary data at another level of the administration, functioning in a different language, and probably also to make the document accessible to those who are not literate in the L1.

Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption: assessing the state of the operationally relevant evidence on donors' actions and approaches to reducing corruption

This paper charts the current evidence on effectiveness of different anti-corruption reforms, and identifies significant evidence gaps. Despite a substantial amount of literature on corruption, this review found very few studies focusing on anti-corruption reforms, and even fewer that credibly assess issues of effectiveness and impact. The evidence was strong for only two types of interventions: public financial management (PFM) reforms and supreme audit institutions (SAIs). For PFM, the evidence in general showed positive results, whereas the effectiveness was mixed for SAIs. No strong evidence indicates that any of the interventions pursued have been ineffective, but there is fair evidence that anti-corruption authorities, civil service reforms and the use of corruption conditionality in aid allocation decisions in general have not been effective. The paper advocates more operationally-relevant research and rigorous evaluations to build up the missing evidence base, particularly in conflict-afflicted states, in regards to the private sector, and on the interactions and interdependencies between different anti-corruption interventions.

Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry

This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might ‘grease the wheels’ of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets. Our results show that the existence of a larger number of procedures required to start a business, as well as larger minimum capital requirements are detrimental to entrepreneurship. Second, we test whether corruption reduces the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. Our empirical analysis, covering a maximum of 43 countries over the 2003–2005 period, shows that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. For example, the ‘greasing’ effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a new business. Our results thus provide support for the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis.

An empirical investigation of the effects of rounding on the SPF probabilities of decine and output growth histograms

I consider the possibility that respondents to the Survey of Professional Forecasters round their probability forecasts of the event that real output will decline in the future, as well as their reported output growth probability distributions. I make various plausible assumptions about respondents’ rounding practices, and show how these impinge upon the apparent mismatch between probability forecasts of a decline in output and the probabilities of this event implied by the annual output growth histograms. I find that rounding accounts for about a quarter of the inconsistent pairs of forecasts.

Physiological and behavioral patterns of corruption

We study the behavior and emotional arousal of the participants in an experimental auction, leading to an asymmetric social dilemma involving an auctioneer and two bidders. An antisocial transfer (bribe) which is beneficial for the auctioneer (official) is paid, if promised, by the winner of the auction. Some pro-social behavior on both the auctioneers' and the bidders' sides is observed even in the absence of any punishment mechanism (Baseline, Treatment 0). However, pro-social behavior is adopted by the vast majority of subjects when the loser of the auction can inspect the transaction between the winner and the auctioneer (Inspection, Treatment 1). The inspection and punishment mechanism is such that, if a bribe is (not) revealed, both corrupt agents (the denouncing bidder) lose(s) this period's payoffs. This renders the inspection option unprofitable for the loser and is rarely used, especially towards the end of the session, when pro-social behavior becomes pervasive. Subjects' emotional arousal was obtained through skin conductance responses. Generally speaking, our findings suggest that stronger emotions are associated with decisions deviating from pure monetary reward maximization, rather than with (un)ethical behavior per se. In fact, using response times as a measure of the subject's reflection during the decision-making process, we can associate emotional arousal with the conflict between primary or instinctive and secondary or contemplative motivations and, more specifically, with deviations from the subject's pure monetary interest.

Better dead: J. M. Barrie’s first book and the shilling fiction market

This article provides a critical and bibliographical discussion of J. M. Barrie’s neglected first book, Better Dead, published by Swan Sonnenschein, Lowrey & Co. in 1887. Drawing on previously unexamined evidence in the Sonnenschein archive, it shows how this shilling novel was marketed and sold to its readers at railway bookstalls, and argues that the content and style of the story was conditioned by its form. Examining the many references and allusions in the story, it proposes that the work is best understood as a satire on contemporary political, social and literary themes. The article also shows how, contrary to all published accounts, the author actually earned a small amount of money from a work which, in spite of his efforts, refused to stay dead.