Parliamentary sovereignty, popular sovereignty, and Henry Parker's adjudicative standpoint

Discussions of popular sovereignty in early modern England have usually been premised upon a sharp distinction between ‘legal/constitutional’ forms of discourse (which merely interpret the law) and ‘political’ ones (which focus upon the right to make it). In such readings of the period, Henry Parker has a pivotal position as a writer who abandoned merely legalistic thinking. This chapter takes a different view. It argues that Parker’s major intellectual achievement was not so much to abandon legal/constitutional discourse as to offer a theorisation of its most distinctive features: he offered an account of a new kind of politics in which concern for ‘interests’ in property and in self-preservation replaced humanist concern with promotion of virtue. Parker drew upon ideas about representation best expressed by Sir Thomas Smith and ideas about law best expressed by Oliver St John. The theory he developed was not intended as a justification of legislative sovereignty, but of adjudicative supremacy. His picture of the two Houses as supreme adjudicators was meant to block the path to direct democracy. But the adjudicative standpoint they came to occupy presupposed that freeborn adults had ‘interests’ in life, liberty, and possessions. This had democratising implications.

Basic Income, Republican Freedom, and Effective Market Power

This article examines republican arguments for a basic income that turn on a right to exit the labour market. It gives criteria for the maintenance of republican freedom in markets, arguing that a right to exit or effective market power will guarantee republican freedom in markets. The article then considers whether a basic income is either sufficient or necessary to protect republican freedom both in labour markets and elsewhere. If a basic income is necessary to protect republican freedom in the labour market, I argue it is not sufficient to protect that freedom elsewhere. If citizens lack the means to maintain their republican freedom in the labour market, then there may be other spheres of life where they are vulnerable to subordination, whether or not they have a basic income. Some sociological evidence on cultural consumption patterns is presented.

Voting rights of refugees

The book develops a novel legal argument about the voting rights of recognised 1951 Geneva Convention Refugees. The main normative contention is that such refugees should have the right to vote in the political community where they reside, assuming that the political community is a democracy and that its citizens have the right to vote. The basis of this contention is that the right to political participation in some political community is a basic right from the point of view of dignity and the protection of one’s interests. Due to their unique political predicament, 1951 Geneva Convention Refugees are a special category of non-citizen residents. They are unable to participate in elections of their state of origin, do not enjoy its diplomatic protection and consular assistance abroad, and – most fundamentally – are unable or unwilling, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, to return to it; thus, they are in limbo for a potentially protracted period. Refugees, too, deserve to have a place in the world in the Arendtian sense, where their opinions are significant and their actions are effective. Their state of asylum is, for the time being, the only community in which there is any realistic prospect of political participation on their part.