Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.

Developments in the quality of treated greywater supplies for buildings, and associated user perception and acceptance

A manufactured aeration and nanofiltration MBR greywater system was tested during continuous operation at the University of Reading, to demonstrate reliability in delivery of high quality treated greywater. Its treatment performance was evaluated against British Standard criteria [BSI (Greywater Systems—Part 1 Code of Practice: BS8525-1:2010. BS Press, 2010); (Greywater Systems—Part 2 Domestic Greywater Treatment, Requirements and Methods: BS 8525-2:2011. BS Press, 2011)]. The low carbon greywater recycling technology produced excellent analytical results as well as consistency in performance. User acceptance of such reliably treated greywater was then evaluated through user perception studies. The results inform the potential supply of treated greywater to student accommodation. Out of 135 questionnaire replies, 95% demonstrated a lack of aversion in one or more attributes, to using treated, recycled greywater.