From Rio to Copenhagen: multilateral agreements, disagreements and situated actions

Governing climate change is arguably one of the most complex problems, environmental or otherwise, that the global community has had to contend with. This chapter highlights the innovations in governance that have characterized the global climate change regime as it sought to respond to and manage these complexities, political imperatives and competing interests. We suggest that the key contestations and innovations within climate governance can be understood in terms of four themes/questions all of which relate to issues of justice and equity.

Whose peace? Local ownership and UN peacebuilding

In recent years, there has been an increasing emphasis on the participation of national actors in United Nations peace operations, reflecting what has become a near orthodox commitment to ‘local ownership.’ Advocates of local ownership assert that it: (1) increases the legitimacy of UN peacebuilding efforts; (2) increases the sustainability of peacebuilding activities after the departure of the UN; and (3) increases democratic governance in post-conflict states. While such thinking about local ownership has informed UN peacebuilding policy to a large extent, the UN has, to date, assumed these positive benefits without critically examining the causal mechanisms that allegedly produce them, specifying the conditions under which this correlation holds, or providing convincing evidence for these assertions. Moreover, exactly what local ownership is, what is being owned, and who local ‘owners’ are remain unclear. Indeed a closer examination of ownership’s relation with legitimacy, sustainability, and democratization reveal a plethora of contradictions that imply that local ownership may in fact decrease the UN’s ability to deliver peacekeeping results. Crucially, however, the UN persists in adopting a local ownership approach to peacebuilding, suggesting that it does so because it is normatively appropriate rather than operationally effective.

Environmental agreements as a Hawk-Dove game with confirmed proposals

This paper aims at two different contributions to the literature on international environmental agreements. First, we model environmental agreements as a generic situation, characterized as a Hawk-Dove game with multiple asymmetric equilibria. Second, the article applies the theory on non-cooperative games with confirmed proposals, based on an alternating proposals bargaining protocol, as a way of overcoming the usual problems of coordination and bargaining failures in environmental agreement games, due to payoff asymmetry and equilibrium multiplicity.