Plutarch's 'Lives' and the critical reader

This paper analyses the kind of reader constructed in the Lives and the response expected of that reader. It begins by attempting a typology of moralising in the Lives. Plutarch does sometimes make general 'gnomic' statements about right and wrong, and occasionally passes explicit judgement on a subject's behaviour. In addition, the language with which Plutarch describes character is inherently moralistic; and even when he does not pass explicit judgment, Plutarch can rely on a common set of notions about what makes behaviour virtuous or vicious. However, the application of any moral lessons is left to the reader's own judgement. Furthermore, Plutarch's use of multiple focalisations means that the reader is sometimes presented with varying ways of looking at the same individual or the same historical situation. In addition, many incidents or anecdotes are marked by 'multivalence': that is, they resist reduction to a single moral message or lesson. In such cases, the reader is encouraged to exercise his or her own critical faculties. Indeed, the prologues which precede many pairs of Lives and the synkriseis which follow them sometimes explicitly invite the reader's participation in the work of judging. The syncritic structure of the Parallel Lives also invites the reader's participation, as do the varying perspectives provided by a corpus of overlapping Lives. In fact, the presence of a critical, engaged reader is presupposed by the agonistic nature of much of Greek literature, and of several texts in the Moralia which stage opposing viewpoints or arguments. Plutarch himself argues for such a reader in his How the young man should listen to poems.

Social consensus, moral intensity and willingness to pay to address a farm animal welfare issue

An experimental contingent valuation (CV) survey of university students was undertaken to explore the impact of social consensus information on people's stated willingness to pay (wtp) to address a farm animal welfare issue. The survey found that additional information presented to respondents on social consensus concerning the moral dimensions of the issue led to a greater perception of social consensus by respondents. This greater perception of social consensus appeared to result in a higher level of moral intensity associated with the issue and a higher stated wtp by respondents for policy to address the issue. However, as for many CV studies of public goods, a question remains as to whether the estimated wtp is a true measure of people's preferences and relative values or merely a measure of attitudes on an arbitrary monetary scale.

Moral intensity and willingness to pay concerning farm animal welfare issues and the implications for agricultural policy

An experimental survey was undertaken to explore the links between the characteristics of a moral issue, the degree of moral intensity/moral imperative associated with the issue (Jones, 1991), and people's stated willingness to pay (wtp) for policy to address the issue. Two farm animal welfare issues were chosen for comparison and the contingent valuation method was used to elicit people's wtp. The findings of the survey suggest that increases in moral characteristics do appear to result in an increase in moral intensity and the degree of moral imperative associated with an issue. Moreover, there was a positive link between moral intensity/moral imperative associated with an issue and people's stated wtp for policy to address the issue. The paper discusses the relevance of the findings of the survey in the context of the debate concerning the relationship between moral and economic values and the use of the contingent valuation method to estimate people's wtp of policy options with moral dimensions.

‘God’s Truth’: Kant, Mill and moral epistemology in Oliver Twist

This essay aims to demonstrate how Dickens’s search for ‘truth’ (and his understanding of what that abstraction consists of) entered into and emerged from one of the key philosophical discussions of the early nineteenth century: namely whether moral knowledge is the sum of one’s experiences or whether there are such things as a priori or ‘natural’ principles of ethics that transcend human practice.

A model intervenes: the many faces of moral hazard

This article builds on advances in social ontology to develop a new understanding of how mainstream economic modelling affects reality. We propose a new framework for analysing and describing how models intervene in the social sphere. This framework allows us to identify and articulate three key epistemic features of models as interventions: specificity, portability and formal precision. The second part of the article uses our framework to demonstrate how specificity, portability and formal precision explain the use of moral hazard models in a variety of different policy contexts, including worker compensation schemes, bank regulation and the euro-sovereign debt crisis.