44 resultados para epistemic cognition
Resumo:
Previous studies have demonstrated that there is a tight link between grammatical concepts and cognitive preferences in monolingual speakers (Lucy 1992, Lucy & Gaskins 2003, Imai & Gentner 1997, Imai & Mazuka 2003). Recent research has also shown that bilinguals with languages that differ in their concepts may shift their cognitive preferences as a function of their proficiency (Athanasopoulos, 2006) or cultural immersion (Cook, Bassetti, Kasai, Sasaki, & Takahashi, 2006). The current short paper assesses the relative impact of each of these variables, and furthermore asks whether bilinguals alternate between two distinct cognitive representations of language-specific concepts depending on the language used in the experiment. Results from an object classification task showed that Japanese–English bilinguals shifted their behaviour towards the second language (L2) pattern primarily as a function of their L2 proficiency, while cultural immersion and language of instruction played a minimal role. These findings suggest that acquisition of novel grammatical categories leads to cognitive restructuring in the bilingual mind and have implications for the relationship between language and cognitive processing.
Resumo:
Reviewed here is the existing evidence for the effects of ginseng extracts and isolated ginsenosides relevant to cognition in humans. Clinical studies in healthy volunteers and in patients with neurological disease or deficit, evidence from preclinical models of cognition, and pharmacokinetic data are considered. Conditions under which disease modification may indirectly benefit cognition but may not translate to cognitive benefits in healthy subjects are discussed. The number of chronic studies of ginseng effects in healthy individuals is limited, and the results from acute studies are inconsistent, making overall assessment of ginseng's efficacy as a cognitive enhancer premature. However, mechanistic results are encouraging; in particular, the ginsenosides Rg 3 , Rh 1 , Rh 2 , Rb 1 , Rd, Rg 2 , and Rb 3 , along with the aglycones protopanaxadiol and protopanaxatriol, warrant further attention. Compound K has a promising pharmacokinetic profile and can affect neurotransmission and neuroprotection. Properly conducted trials using standardized tests in healthy individuals reflecting the target population for ginseng supplementation are required to address inconsistencies in results from acute studies. The evidence summarized here suggests ginseng has potential, but unproven, benefits on cognition.
Resumo:
Low glycaemic index (GI) foods consumed at breakfast can enhance memory in comparison to high-GI foods; however, the impact of evening meal GI manipulations on cognition the following morning remains unexplored. Fourteen healthy males consumed a high-GI evening meal or a low-GI evening meal in a counterbalanced order on two separate evenings. Memory and attention were assessed before and after a high-GI breakfast the following morning. The high-GI evening meal elicited significantly higher evening glycaemic responses than the low-GI evening meal. Verbal recall was better the morning following the high-GI evening meal compared to after the low-GI evening meal. In summary, the GI of the evening meal was associated with memory performance the next day, suggesting a second meal cognitive effect. The present findings imply that an overnight fast may not be sufficient to control for previous nutritional consumption.
Resumo:
There has been a recent rejuvenation of interest in studies of motivation-cognition interactions arising from many different areas of psychology and neuroscience. The current issue of Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Neuroscience provides a sampling of some of the latest research from a number of these different areas. In this introductory paper, we provide an overview of the current state of the field, in terms of key research developments and candidate neural mechanisms receiving focused investigation as potential sources of motivation-cognition interaction. However, our primary goal is conceptual: to highlight the distinct perspectives taken by different research areas in terms of how motivation is defined, the relevant dimensions and dissociations that are emphasized, and the theoretical questions being targeted. Together, these distinctions present both challenges and opportunities for efforts aiming towards a more unified and cross-disciplinary approach. We identify a set of pressing research questions calling out for this sort of cross-disciplinary approach, with the explicit goal of encouraging integrative and collaborative investigations directed towards them.
Resumo:
The projected hand illusion (PHI) is a variant of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), and both are commonly used to study mechanisms of self-perception. A questionnaire was developed by Longo et al. (2008) to measure qualitative changes in the RHI. Such psychometric analyses have not yet been conducted on the questionnaire for the PHI. The present study is an attempt to validate minor modifications of the questionnaire of Longo et al. to assess the PHI in a community sample (n = 48) and to determine the association with selected demographic (age, sex, years of education), cognitive (Digit Span), and clinical (psychotic-like experiences) variables. Principal components analysis on the questionnaire data extracted four components: Embodiment of “Other” Hand, Disembodiment of Own Hand, Deafference, and Agency—in both synchronous and asynchronous PHI conditions. Questions assessing “Embodiment” and “Agency” loaded onto orthogonal components. Greater illusion ratings were positively associated with being female, being younger, and having higher scores on psychotic-like experiences. There was no association with cognitive performance. Overall, this study confirmed that self-perception as measured with PHI is a multicomponent construct, similar in many respects to the RHI. The main difference lies in the separation of Embodiment and Agency into separate constructs, and this likely reflects the fact that the “live” image of the PHI presents a more realistic picture of the hand and of the stroking movements of the experimenter compared with the RHI.
Resumo:
Although interpretation bias has been associated with the development and/or maintenance of childhood anxiety, its origins remain unclear. The present study is the first to examine intergenerational transmission of this bias from parents to their preschool-aged children via the verbal information pathway. A community sample of fifty parent–child pairs was recruited. Parents completed measures of their own trait anxiety and interpretation bias, their child’s anxiety symptoms, and a written story-stem measure, to capture the way parents tell their children stories. Interpretation bias was assessed in preschool-aged children (aged between 2 years 7 months and 5 years 8 months) using an extended story-stem paradigm. Young children’s interpretation bias was not significantly associated with their own anxiety symptoms. Neither was there evidence for a significant association between parent and child interpretation bias. However, parents who reported they would tell their child one or more threatening story endings in the written story-stem task had significantly higher anxiety than those who did not include any threatening story endings. In turn, children whose parents did not include any threatening endings in their written stories had significantly lower threat interpretations on the child story-stem paradigm, compared to those with parents who included at least one threatening story ending. The results suggest that parental verbal information could play a role in the development of interpretation bias in young children.
Resumo:
In this paper, I seek to undermine G.A. Cohen’s polemical use of a metaethical claim he makes in his article, ‘Facts and Principles’, by arguing that that use requires an unsustainable equivocation between epistemic and logical grounding. I begin by distinguishing three theses that Cohen has offered during the course of his critique of Rawls and contractualism more generally, the foundationalism about grounding thesis, the justice as non-regulative thesis, and the justice as all-encompassing thesis, and briefly argue that they are analytically independent of each other. I then offer an outline of the foundationalism about grounding thesis, characterising it, as Cohen does, as a demand of logic. That thesis claims that whenever a normative principle is dependent on a fact, it is so dependent in virtue of some other principle. I then argue that although this is true as a matter of logic, it, as Cohen admits, cannot be true of actual justifications, since logic cannot tell us anything about the truth as opposed to the validity of arguments. Facts about a justification cannot then be decisive for whether or not a given argument violates the foundationalism about grounding thesis. As long as, independently of actual justifications, theorists can point to plausible logically grounding principles, as I argue contractualists can, Cohen’s thesis lacks critical bite.
Resumo:
Anxiety and cognition are both linked to deficits in thyroid hormone concentrations in humans and in rodent models. Both processes have also been shown to be affected by the loss of the thyroid hormone receptors (TR) or by mutant transgenic TRs. Specifically, the unbalanced action of the unliganded TRα1 is thought to be important in the memory deficit and extreme anxiety seen in transgenic mice. The contribution of TRβ is less well defined and the molecular mechanisms that underlie these deficits are also unknown. We review the literature that demonstrates the importance of the thyroid hormone (TH) and the TR in these processes and focus on the mechanisms, in particular adult hippocampal neurogenesis in the dentate gyrus, that might be important in mediating both state anxiety and cognition by thyroid hormone.
Resumo:
Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers' worry---the folk seem to agree!