Emotion and anticipation in an enactive framework for cognition (response to Andy Clark)

Undeniably, anticipation plays a crucial role in cognition. By what means, to what extent, and what it achieves remain open questions. In a recent BBS target article, Clark (in press) depicts an integrative model of the brain that builds on hierarchical Bayesian models of neural processing (Rao and Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005; Brown et al., 2011), and their most recent formulation using the free-energy principle borrowed from thermodynamics (Feldman and Friston, 2010; Friston, 2010; Friston et al., 2010). Hierarchical generative models of cognition, such as those described by Clark, presuppose the manipulation of representations and internal models of the world, in as much detail as is perceptually available. Perhaps surprisingly, Clark acknowledges the existence of a “virtual version of the sensory data” (p. 4), but with no reference to some of the historical debates that shaped cognitive science, related to the storage, manipulation, and retrieval of representations in a cognitive system (Shanahan, 1997), or accounting for the emergence of intentionality within such a system (Searle, 1980; Preston and Bishop, 2002). Instead of demonstrating how this Bayesian framework responds to these foundational questions, Clark describes the structure and the functional properties of an action-oriented, multi-level system that is meant to combine perception, learning, and experience (Niedenthal, 2007).

Psychophysics of emotion: the QUEST for emotional attention

To investigate the mechanisms involved in automatic processing of facial expressions, we used the QUEST procedure to measure the display durations needed to make a gender decision on emotional faces portraying fearful, happy, or neutral facial expressions. In line with predictions of appraisal theories of emotion, our results showed greater processing priority of emotional stimuli regardless of their valence. Whereas all experimental conditions led to an averaged threshold of about 50 ms, fearful and happy facial expressions led to significantly less variability in the responses than neutral faces. Results suggest that attention may have been automatically drawn by the emotion portrayed by face targets, yielding more informative perceptions and less variable responses. The temporal resolution of the perceptual system (expressed by the thresholds) and the processing priority of the stimuli (expressed by the variability in the responses) may influence subjective and objective measures of awareness, respectively.

The link between temporal attention and emotion: a playground for psychology, neuroscience, and plausible artificial neural networks

In this paper, we will address the endeavors of three disciplines, Psychology, Neuroscience, and Artificial Neural Network (ANN) modeling, in explaining how the mind perceives and attends information. More precisely, we will shed some light on the efforts to understand the allocation of attentional resources to the processing of emotional stimuli. This review aims at informing the three disciplines about converging points of their research and to provide a starting point for discussion.

FACSGen 2.0 animation software: generating three-dimensional FACS-valid facial expressions for emotion research

In this article, we present FACSGen 2.0, new animation software for creating static and dynamic threedimensional facial expressions on the basis of the Facial Action Coding System (FACS). FACSGen permits total control over the action units (AUs), which can be animated at all levels of intensity and applied alone or in combination to an infinite number of faces. In two studies, we tested the validity of the software for the AU appearance defined in the FACS manual and the conveyed emotionality of FACSGen expressions. In Experiment 1, four FACS-certified coders evaluated the complete set of 35 single AUs and 54 AU combinations for AU presence or absence, appearance quality, intensity, and asymmetry. In Experiment 2, lay participants performed a recognition task on emotional expressions created with FACSGen software and rated the similarity of expressions displayed by human and FACSGen faces. Results showed good to excellent classification levels for all AUs by the four FACS coders, suggesting that the AUs are valid exemplars of FACS specifications. Lay participants’ recognition rates for nine emotions were high, and comparisons of human and FACSGen expressions were very similar. The findings demonstrate the effectiveness of the software in producing reliable and emotionally valid expressions, and suggest its application in numerous scientific areas, including perception, emotion, and clinical and euroscience research.

Increases in prefrontal cortex activity when regulating negative emotion predicts symptom severity trajectory over six months in depression

Context: Emotion regulation is critically disrupted in depression and use of paradigms tapping these processes may uncover essential changes in neurobiology during treatment. In addition, as neuroimaging outcome studies of depression commonly utilize solely baseline and endpoint data – which is more prone to week-to week noise in symptomatology – we sought to use all data points over the course of a six month trial. Objective: To examine changes in neurobiology resulting from successful treatment. Design: Double-blind trial examining changes in the neural circuits involved in emotion regulation resulting from one of two antidepressant treatments over a six month trial. Participants were scanned pretreatment, at 2 months and 6 months posttreatment. Setting: University functional magnetic resonance imaging facility. Participants: 21 patients with Major Depressive Disorder and without other Axis I or Axis II diagnoses and 14 healthy controls. Interventions: Venlafaxine XR (doses up to 300mg) or Fluoxetine (doses up to 80mg). Main Outcome Measure: Neural activity, as measured using functional magnetic resonance imaging during performance of an emotion regulation paradigm as well as regular assessments of symptom severity by the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression. To utilize all data points, slope trajectories were calculated for rate of change in depression severity as well as rate of change of neural engagement. Results: Those depressed individuals showing the steepest decrease in depression severity over the six months were those individuals showing the most rapid increases in BA10 and right DLPFC activity when regulating negative affect over the same time frame. This relationship was more robust than when using solely the baseline and endpoint data. Conclusions: Changes in PFC engagement when regulating negative affect correlate with changes in depression severity over six months. These results are buttressed by calculating these statistics which are more reliable and robust to week-to-week variation than difference scores.

Emotion strengthens high priority memory traces but weakens low priority memory traces

When people encounter emotional events, their memory for those events is typically enhanced. But it has been unclear how emotionally arousing events influence memory for preceding information. Does emotional arousal induce retrograde amnesia or retrograde enhancement? The current study revealed that this depends on the top-down goal relevance of the preceding information. Across three studies, we found that emotional arousal induced by one image facilitated memory for the preceding neutral item when people prioritized that neutral item. In contrast, an emotionally arousing image impaired memory for the preceding neutral item when people did not prioritize that neutral item. Emotional arousal elicited by both negative and positive pictures showed this pattern of enhancing or impairing memory for the preceding stimulus depending on its priority. These results indicate that emotional arousal amplifies the effects of top-down priority in memory formation.

Putting the emotion back: exploring the role of emotion in disengagement

This chapter explores the nature of disengagement and the role played by emotions and in doing so will disentangle the overlapping theories and definitions of both engagement and disengagement. The research that forms the basis for the chapter comes from two related studies exploring engagement and disengagement in 10 large UK public and private sector organisations. Both studies used an interpretive approach involving 75 managers and employees. The chapter suggests the that emotions play a mediating role in the process of disengagement and the emotional reaction involved provides a distinction to being ‘not engaged’. It highlights the confusion that different approaches bring to distinguishing engagement and disengagement from other job attitudes.

The lottery-panel task for bi-dimensional parameter-free elicitation of risk attitudes

We propose first, a simple task for the eliciting attitudes toward risky choice, the SGG lottery-panel task, which consists in a series of lotteries constructed to compensate riskier options with higher risk-return trade-offs. Using Principal Component Analysis technique, we show that the SGG lottery-panel task is capable of capturing two dimensions of individual risky decision making i.e. subjects’ average risk taking and their sensitivity towards variations in risk-return. From the results of a large experimental dataset, we confirm that the task systematically captures a number of regularities such as: A tendency to risk averse behavior (only around 10% of choices are compatible with risk neutrality); An attraction to certain payoffs compared to low risk lotteries, compatible with over-(under-) weighting of small (large) probabilities predicted in PT and; Gender differences, i.e. males being consistently less risk averse than females but both genders being similarly responsive to the increases in risk-premium. Another interesting result is that in hypothetical choices most individuals increase their risk taking responding to the increase in return to risk, as predicted by PT, while across panels with real rewards we see even more changes, but opposite to the expected pattern of riskier choices for higher risk-returns. Therefore, we conclude from our data that an “economic anomaly” emerges in the real reward choices opposite to the hypothetical choices. These findings are in line with Camerer's (1995) view that although in many domains, paid subjects probably do exert extra mental effort which improves their performance, choice over money gambles is not likely to be a domain in which effort will improve adherence to rational axioms (p. 635). Finally, we demonstrate that both dimensions of risk attitudes, average risk taking and sensitivity towards variations in the return to risk, are desirable not only to describe behavior under risk but also to explain behavior in other contexts, as illustrated by an example. In the second study, we propose three additional treatments intended to elicit risk attitudes under high stakes and mixed outcome (gains and losses) lotteries. Using a dataset obtained from a hypothetical implementation of the tasks we show that the new treatments are able to capture both dimensions of risk attitudes. This new dataset allows us to describe several regularities, both at the aggregate and within-subjects level. We find that in every treatment over 70% of choices show some degree of risk aversion and only between 0.6% and 15.3% of individuals are consistently risk neutral within the same treatment. We also confirm the existence of gender differences in the degree of risk taking, that is, in all treatments females prefer safer lotteries compared to males. Regarding our second dimension of risk attitudes we observe, in all treatments, an increase in risk taking in response to risk premium increases. Treatment comparisons reveal other regularities, such as a lower degree of risk taking in large stake treatments compared to low stake treatments and a lower degree of risk taking when losses are incorporated into the large stake lotteries. Results that are compatible with previous findings in the literature, for stake size effects (e.g., Binswanger, 1980; Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Silvestre, 1999; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1990; Holt & Laury, 2002; Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992; Kühberger et al., 1999; B. J. Weber & Chapman, 2005; Wik et al., 2007) and domain effect (e.g., Brooks and Zank, 2005, Schoemaker, 1990, Wik et al., 2007). Whereas for small stake treatments, we find that the effect of incorporating losses into the outcomes is not so clear. At the aggregate level an increase in risk taking is observed, but also more dispersion in the choices, whilst at the within-subjects level the effect weakens. Finally, regarding responses to risk premium, we find that compared to only gains treatments sensitivity is lower in the mixed lotteries treatments (SL and LL). In general sensitivity to risk-return is more affected by the domain than the stake size. After having described the properties of risk attitudes as captured by the SGG risk elicitation task and its three new versions, it is important to recall that the danger of using unidimensional descriptions of risk attitudes goes beyond the incompatibility with modern economic theories like PT, CPT etc., all of which call for tests with multiple degrees of freedom. Being faithful to this recommendation, the contribution of this essay is an empirically and endogenously determined bi-dimensional specification of risk attitudes, useful to describe behavior under uncertainty and to explain behavior in other contexts. Hopefully, this will contribute to create large datasets containing a multidimensional description of individual risk attitudes, while at the same time allowing for a robust context, compatible with present and even future more complex descriptions of human attitudes towards risk.

Making an effort to feel positive: insecure attachment in infancy predicts the neural underpinnings of emotion regulation in adulthood

Background: Animal research indicates that the neural substrates of emotion regulation may be persistently altered by early environmental exposures. If similar processes operate in human development then this is significant, as the capacity to regulate emotional states is fundamental to human adaptation. Methods: We utilised a 22-year longitudinal study to examine the influence of early infant attachment to the mother, a key marker of early experience, on neural regulation of emotional states in young adults. Infant attachment status was measured via objective assessment at 18-months, and the neural underpinnings of the active regulation of affect were studied using fMRI at age 22 years. Results: Infant attachment status at 18-months predicted neural responding during the regulation of positive affect 20-years later. Specifically, while attempting to up-regulate positive emotions, adults who had been insecurely versus securely attached as infants showed greater activation in prefrontal regions involved in cognitive control and reduced co-activation of prefrontal cortex and nucleus accumbens, consistent with relative inefficiency in the neural regulation of positive affect. Conclusions: Disturbances in the mother-infant relationship may persistently alter the neural circuitry of emotion regulation, with potential implications for adjustment in adulthood.

Age differences in brain activity during emotion processing: reflections of age-Related decline or increased emotion regulation?

Despite the fact that physical health and cognitive abilities decline with aging, the ability to regulate emotion remains stable and in some aspects improves across the adult life span. Older adults also show a positivity effect in their attention and memory, with diminished processing of negative stimuli relative to positive stimuli compared with younger adults. The current paper reviews functional magnetic resonance imaging studies investigating age-related differences in emotional processing and discusses how this evidence relates to two opposing theoretical accounts of older adults’ positivity effect. The aging-brain model [Cacioppo et al. in: Social Neuroscience: Toward Understanding the Underpinnings of the Social Mind. New York, Oxford University Press, 2011] proposes that older adults’ positivity effect is a consequence of age-related decline in the amygdala, whereas the cognitive control hypothesis [Kryla-Lighthall and Mather in: Handbook of Theories of Aging, ed 2. New York, Springer, 2009; Mather and Carstensen: Trends Cogn Sci 2005;9:496–502; Mather and Knight: Psychol Aging 2005;20:554–570] argues that the positivity effect is a result of older adults’ greater focus on regulating emotion. Based on evidence for structural and functional preservation of the amygdala in older adults and findings that older adults show greater prefrontal cortex activity than younger adults while engaging in emotion-processing tasks, we argue that the cognitive control hypothesis is a more likely explanation for older adults’ positivity effect than the aging-brain model.

Emotion regulation meets emotional attention: the influence of emotion suppression on emotional attention depends on the nature of the distracters

Recent evidence has suggested a crucial role of people’s current goals in attention to emotional information. This asks for research investigating how and what kinds of goals shape emotional attention. The present study investigated how the goal to suppress a negative emotional state influences attention to emotion-congruent events. After inducing disgust, we instructed participants to suppress all feelings of disgust during a subsequent dot probe task. Attention to disgusting images was modulated by the sort of distracter that was presented in parallel with disgusting imagery. When disgusting images were presented together with neutral images, emotion suppression was accompanied by a tendency to attend to disgusting images. However, when disgusting images were shown with positive images that allow coping with disgust (i.e., images representing cleanliness), attention tended away from disgusting images and toward images representing cleanliness. These findings show that emotion suppression influences the allocation of attention but that the successful avoidance of emotion-congruent events depends on the availability of effective distracters.