The role of necessity in international humanitarian and human rights law

The nature of armed conflict has changed dramatically in recent decades. In particular, it is increasingly the case that hostilities now occur alongside ‘everyday’ situations. This has led to a pressing need to determine when a ‘conduct of hostilities’ model (governed by international humanitarian law—IHL) applies and when a ‘law enforcement’ model (governed by international human rights law—IHRL) applies. This in turn raises the question of whether these two legal regimes are incompatible or whether they might be applied in parallel. It is on this question that the current paper focuses, examining it at the level of principle. Whilst most accounts of the principles underlying these two areas of law focus on humanitarian considerations, few have compared the role played by necessity in each. This paper seeks to address this omission. It demonstrates that considerations of necessity play a prominent role in both IHL and IHRL, albeit with differing consequences. It then applies this necessity-based analysis to suggest a principled basis for rationalising the relationship between IHL and IHRL, demonstrating how this approach would operate in practice. It is shown that, by emphasising the role of necessity in IHL and IHRL, an approach can be adopted that reconciles the two in a manner that is sympathetic to their object and purpose.

The "value" of property rights in social security law

This article provides a critical examination of the way that property rules are applied judicially in the context of social security law concerned with the assessment of capital, and especially in connection with the determination of ownership and the valuation of assets, which can have a critical bearing on entitlement to various means-tested benefits.

Just another case of treaty interpretation? Reconciling humanitarian law and human rights law in the ICJ

This chapter offers a fresh critique of the approach taken by the International Court of Justice to the relationship between humanitarian law and human rights law. In so doing, it seeks to move beyond the intractable debates that have dominated this area, offering an original account of the relationship that is firmly grounded in general international law concepts of treaty interpretation.

The Léger ruling as another example of the ECJ’s disappointingly reticent approach to the protection of the rights of LGB persons under EU law

In the 1980s, in the midst of the AIDS epidemic, many countries introduced lifetime bans on blood donations by men who had sexual relations with men (MSM). These blanket bans have, recently, begun to be challenged and, as a result, many countries have either relaxed them or completely abolished them. The case under examination (Léger ) is another instance of questioning the legality of such a ban. In particular, in this case, the European Court of Justice was called on to rule on whether a measure such as the French lifetime exclusion from blood donation of the MSM population that was at issue before the referring court is contrary to EU law. The Court ruled that although discriminatory on the ground of sexual orientation, such a ban may be justified in certain circumstances, and left it to the national court to make the final decision. This article seeks to analyse the case and to explain why, in the author’s view, the Court can be accused of—once more—not going far enough in the protection of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) rights.