Proposed best practice for statisticians in the reporting and publication of pharmaceutical industry-sponsored clinical trials

In this paper we set out what we consider to be a set of best practices for statisticians in the reporting of pharmaceutical industry-sponsored clinical trials. We make eight recommendations covering: author responsibilities and recognition; publication timing; conflicts of interest; freedom to act; full author access to data; trial registration and independent review. These recommendations are made in the context of the prominent role played by statisticians in the design, conduct, analysis and reporting of pharmaceutical sponsored trials and the perception of the reporting of these trials in the wider community.

The potential for bias in reporting of industry-sponsored clinical trials

Concerns about potentially misleading reporting of pharmaceutical industry research have surfaced many times. The potential for duality (and thereby conflict) of interest is only too clear when you consider the sums of money required for the discovery, development and commercialization of new medicines. As the ability of major, mid-size and small pharmaceutical companies to innovate has waned, as evidenced by the seemingly relentless decline in the numbers of new medicines approved by Food and Drug Administration and European Medicines Agency year-on-year, not only has the cost per new approved medicine risen: so too has the public and media concern about the extent to which the pharmaceutical industry is open and honest about the efficacy, safety and quality of the drugs we manufacture and sell. In 2005 an Editorial in Journal of the American Medical Association made clear that, so great was their concern about misleading reporting of industry-sponsored studies, henceforth no article would be published that was not also guaranteed by independent statistical analysis. We examine the precursors to this Editorial, as well as its immediate and lasting effects for statisticians, for the manner in which statistical analysis is carried out, and for the industry more generally.

Haldane's Mackindergarten: a radical experiment in British military education

This article critically evaluates a course that was conceived and run at the LSE by Sir Halford Mackinder for officers of the Britsh Army between 1907 and 1932.There is an examination of the nature of the syllabus,the aims and objectives of this course.An explanation is also given as to why the army cut it seven years before the outbreak of the Second World War.

Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare’. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.