A qualified defense of American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan under international humanitarian law

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, international law has had to grapple with the fundamental challenges that large-scale violence carried out by non-State actors poses to the traditional inter- State orientation of international law. Questions related to the “adequacy” and “effectiveness” of international humanitarian law, international human rights law and the law related to the use of force have been particularly pronounced. This paper focuses on the international humanitarian law implications of American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan. A highly-advanced modality of modern warfare, armed drones highlight the possibilities, problems, prospects and pitfalls of high-tech warfare. How is the battlefield to be defined and delineated geographically and temporally? Who can be targeted, and by whom? Ultimately, this paper concludes that American drone attacks in northwest Pakistan are not unlawful as such under international humanitarian law, though, like any tactical decision in the context of asymmetric warfare, they should be continuously and closely monitored according to the dictates of law with sensitivity to facts on the ground.

Military doctrine, command philosophy and the generation of fighting power: genesis and theory

Military doctrine is one of the conceptual components of war. Its raison d’être is that of a force multiplier. It enables a smaller force to take on and defeat a larger force in battle. This article’s departure point is the aphorism of Sir Julian Corbett, who described doctrine as ‘the soul of warfare���. The second dimension to creating a force multiplier effect is forging doctrine with an appropriate command philosophy. The challenge for commanders is how, in unique circumstances, to formulate, disseminate and apply an appropriate doctrine and combine it with a relevant command philosophy. This can only be achieved by policy-makers and senior commanders successfully answering the Clausewitzian question: what kind of conflict are they involved in? Once an answer has been provided, a synthesis of these two factors can be developed and applied. Doctrine has implications for all three levels of war. Tactically, doctrine does two things: first, it helps to create a tempo of operations; second, it develops a transitory quality that will produce operational effect, and ultimately facilitate the pursuit of strategic objectives. Its function is to provide both training and instruction. At the operational level instruction and understanding are critical functions. Third, at the strategic level it provides understanding and direction. Using John Gooch’s six components of doctrine, it will be argued that there is a lacunae in the theory of doctrine as these components can manifest themselves in very different ways at the three levels of war. They can in turn affect the transitory quality of tactical operations. Doctrine is pivotal to success in war. Without doctrine and the appropriate command philosophy military operations cannot be successfully concluded against an active and determined foe.

The Bomb: Nuclear Weapons in their Historical, Strategic and Ethical Context

This book examines to what extent the invention and first use of nuclear weapons was a turning point in the history of warfare and strategy(to what extent was it a mere continuation or perfection of air power strategy? Were the casualty numbers really unprecedented?), the ethics of war (was this form of war against civilians unprecedented?), and it asks whether it was an expression of total war or did it create total war

Denial of change: the 'Military Revolution' as seen by contemporaries

Writers on military matters from the 14th century until the late 18th century either regretted the decadence of their times compared with Antiquity, or they saw no great change in military affairs since Antiquity. Few saw a revolutionary change ushered in by gunpowder, although this number increased since the great "querelle" about the Ancients and the Moderns under Louis XIV. In the early 19th century, the balance tipped, and few would have denied that technology had profoundly changed warfare. All this is a far cry, however, from any contemporary perception of a "Military Revolution" in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Numerical simulation of the Filchner overflow

The plume of Ice Shelf Water (ISW) flowing into the Weddell Sea over the Filchner sill contributes to the formation of Antarctic Bottom Water. The Filchner overflow is simulated using a hydrostatic, primitive equation three-dimensional ocean model with a 0.5–2 Sv ISW influx above the Filchner sill. The best fit to mooring temperature observations is found with influxes of 0.5 and 1 Sv, below a previous estimate of 1.6 ± 0.5 Sv based on sparse mooring velocities. The plume first moves north over the continental shelf, and then turns west, along slope of the continental shelf break where it breaks up into subplumes and domes, some of which then move downslope. Other subplumes run into the eastern submarine ridge and propagate along the ridge downslope in a chaotic manner. The next, western ridge is crossed by the plume through several paths. Despite a number of discrepancies with observational data, the model reproduces many attributes of the flow. In particular, we argue that the temporal variability shown by the observations can largely be attributed to the unstable structure of the flow, where the temperature fluctuations are determined by the motion of the domes past the moorings. Our sensitivity studies show that while thermobaricity plays a role, its effect is small for the flows considered. Smoothing the ridges out demonstrate that their presence strongly affects the plume shape around the ridges. An increase in the bottom drag or viscosity leads to slowing down, and hence thickening and widening of the plume

Improving the spatial distribution of modeled Arctic sea ice thickness

The spatial distribution of ice thickness/draft in the Arctic Ocean is examined using a sea ice model. A comparison of model predictions with submarine observations of sea ice draft made during cruises between 1987 and 1997 reveals that the model has the same deficiencies found in previous studies, namely ice that is too thick in the Beaufort Sea and too thin near the North Pole. We find that increasing the large scale shear strength of the sea ice leads to substantial improvements in the model's spatial distribution of sea ice thickness, and simultaneously improves the agreement between modeled and ERS-derived 1993–2001 mean winter ice thickness.

Small wars and insurgencies in theory and practice, 1500-1850

In early modern times, warfare in Europe took on many diverse and overlapping forms. Our modern notions of ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ warfare, of ‘major war’ and ‘small war’, have their roots in much greater diversity than such binary notions allow for. While insurgencies go back to time immemorial, they have become conceptually fused with ‘small wars’. This is a term first used to denote special operations, often carried out by military companies formed from special ethnic groups and then recruited into larger armies. In its Spanish form, guerrilla, the term ‘small war’ came to stand for an ideologically-motivated insurgency against the state authorities or occupying forces of another power. There is much overlap between the phenomena of irregular warfare in the sense of special operations alongside regular operations, and irregular warfare of insurgents against the regular forces of a state. This book demonstrates how long the two phenomena were in flux and fed on each other, from the raiding operations of the 16th century to the ‘small wars’ or special operations conducted by special units in the 19th century, which existed alongside and could merge with a popular insurgency. This book is based on a special issue of the journal Small Wars & Insurgencies.

The Spanish Guerrilla 1808-1814 as a model for people’s wars and resistance movements

Transforming the meaning of the term 'guerrilla' which had once meant feud or private warfare, and then irregular war conducted by special forces on behalf of a state or government, the Spanish Guerrilla (part of the Peninsular War) against Napoleon became the model to be emulated by insurgency movements across the world. Even though the term itself continued to be used, even in Spanish, for special operations, in henceforth became imbued with an ideological dimension, which is how it would be used especially in the 20th century.

The history of the practice of strategy from Antiquity to Napoleon

This chapter outlines the history of the practice of strategy, predating the introduction of the term. It homes in on episodes of European history since Antiquity for which historians claim to have found evidence of the practice of strategy, defined by Kimberly Kagan as ‘the setting of a state’s objectives and of priorities among those objectives’ in order to allocate resources and choose the best means. While focusing only on Europe, this chapter covers case studies over nearly 2500 ranging from the wars of Ancient Greece, of the Romans to Medieval warfare (here with a focus on English history), the warfare of Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, Frederick II of Prussia, the French Revolutionaries and Napoleon.

Impact of the Arctic Ocean Atlantic water layer on Siberian shelf hydrography

This paper examines the role of the Arctic Ocean Atlantic water (AW) in modifying the Laptev Sea shelf bottom hydrography on the basis of historical records from 1932 to 2008, field observations carried out in April–May 2008, and 2002–2009 cross‐slope measurements. A climatology of bottom hydrography demonstrates warming that extends offshore from the 30–50 m depth contour. Bottom layer temperature‐time series constructed from historical records links the Laptev Sea outer shelf to the AW boundary current transporting warm and saline water from the North Atlantic. The AW warming of the mid‐1990s and the mid‐2000s is consistent with outer shelf bottom temperature variability. For April–May 2008 we observed on‐shelf near‐bottom warm and saline water intrusions up to the 20 m isobath. These intrusions are typically about 0.2°C warmer and 1–1.5 practical salinity units saltier than ambient water. The 2002–2009 cross‐slope observations are suggestive for the continental slope upward heat flux from the AW to the overlying low‐halocline water (LHW). The lateral on‐shelf wind‐driven transport of the LHW then results in the bottom layer thermohaline anomalies recorded over the Laptev Sea shelf. We also found that polynya‐induced vertical mixing may act as a drainage of the bottom layer, permitting a relatively small portion of the AW heat to be directly released to the atmosphere. Finally, we see no significant warming (up until now) over the Laptev Sea shelf deeper than 10–15 m in the historical record. Future climate change, however, may bring more intrusions of Atlantic‐modified waters with potentially warmer temperature onto the shelf, which could have a critical impact on the stability of offshore submarine permafrost.

Regina Maris and the command of the sea: the sixteenth century origins of modern maritime strategy

The concept of the command of the sea has its roots in medieval notions of the sovereignty of coastal waters, as claimed by several monarchs and polities of Europe. In the sixteenth century, a surge of intellectual creativity, especially in Elizabethan England, fused this notion with the Thucydidean term ‘thalassocracy’ – the rule of the sea. In the light of the explorations of the oceans, this led to a new conceptualisation of naval warfare, developed in theory and then put into practice. This falsifies the mistaken but widespread assumption that there was no significant writing on naval strategy before the nineteenth century.

Les dangers de la guerre. L'image du guerrier dans le Brut de La3amon

A study of the lexis and imagery of warfare in the early C13 English adaptation of Wace's Roman de Brut by the English poet La3amon. The narrator's stance is analysed the light of the poet's priestly identity, revealing an undercurrent of disapproval of the glorification of the warrior found in La3amon's sources, and moral concern for combatants engaged in 'unjust' wars of conquest.

Civilian casualties – do we really care? The failure of the revolution in military affairs of non-lethal weapons in the U.S., Russia and Israel

Causing civilian casualties during military operations has become a much politicised topic in international relations since the Second World War. Since the last decade of the 20th century, different scholars and political analysts have claimed that human life is valued more and more among the general international community. This argument has led many researchers to assume that democratic culture and traditions, modern ethical and moral issues have created a desire for a world without war or, at least, a demand that contemporary armed conflicts, if unavoidable, at least have to be far less lethal forcing the military to seek new technologies that can minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage. Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) – weapons that are intended to minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage – are based on the technology that, during the 1990s, was expected to revolutionise the conduct of warfare making it significantly less deadly. The rapid rise of interest in NLW, ignited by the American military twenty five years ago, sparked off an entirely new military, as well as an academic, discourse concerning their potential contribution to military success on the 21st century battlefields. It seems, however, that except for this debate, very little has been done within the military forces themselves. This research suggests that the roots of this situation are much deeper than the simple professional misconduct of the military establishment, or the poor political behaviour of political leaders, who had sent them to fight. Following the story of NLW in the U.S., Russia and Israel this research focuses on the political and cultural aspects that have been supposed to force the military organisations of these countries to adopt new technologies and operational and organisational concepts regarding NLW in an attempt to minimise enemy civilian casualties during their military operations. This research finds that while American, Russian and Israeli national characters are, undoubtedly, products of the unique historical experience of each one of these nations, all of three pay very little regard to foreigners’ lives. Moreover, while it is generally argued that the international political pressure is a crucial factor that leads to the significant reduction of harmed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure, the findings of this research suggest that the American, Russian and Israeli governments are well prepared and politically equipped to fend off international criticism. As the analyses of the American, Russian and Israeli cases reveal, the political-military leaderships of these countries have very little external or domestic reasons to minimise enemy civilian casualties through fundamental-revolutionary change in their conduct of war. In other words, this research finds that employment of NLW have failed because the political leadership asks the militaries to reduce the enemy civilian casualties to a politically acceptable level, rather than to the technologically possible minimum; as in the socio-cultural-political context of each country, support for the former appears to be significantly higher than for the latter.