The Bomb: Nuclear Weapons in their Historical, Strategic and Ethical Context

This book examines to what extent the invention and first use of nuclear weapons was a turning point in the history of warfare and strategy(to what extent was it a mere continuation or perfection of air power strategy? Were the casualty numbers really unprecedented?), the ethics of war (was this form of war against civilians unprecedented?), and it asks whether it was an expression of total war or did it create total war

Denial of change: the 'Military Revolution' as seen by contemporaries

Writers on military matters from the 14th century until the late 18th century either regretted the decadence of their times compared with Antiquity, or they saw no great change in military affairs since Antiquity. Few saw a revolutionary change ushered in by gunpowder, although this number increased since the great "querelle" about the Ancients and the Moderns under Louis XIV. In the early 19th century, the balance tipped, and few would have denied that technology had profoundly changed warfare. All this is a far cry, however, from any contemporary perception of a "Military Revolution" in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Small wars and insurgencies in theory and practice, 1500-1850

In early modern times, warfare in Europe took on many diverse and overlapping forms. Our modern notions of ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ warfare, of ‘major war’ and ‘small war’, have their roots in much greater diversity than such binary notions allow for. While insurgencies go back to time immemorial, they have become conceptually fused with ‘small wars’. This is a term first used to denote special operations, often carried out by military companies formed from special ethnic groups and then recruited into larger armies. In its Spanish form, guerrilla, the term ‘small war’ came to stand for an ideologically-motivated insurgency against the state authorities or occupying forces of another power. There is much overlap between the phenomena of irregular warfare in the sense of special operations alongside regular operations, and irregular warfare of insurgents against the regular forces of a state. This book demonstrates how long the two phenomena were in flux and fed on each other, from the raiding operations of the 16th century to the ‘small wars’ or special operations conducted by special units in the 19th century, which existed alongside and could merge with a popular insurgency. This book is based on a special issue of the journal Small Wars & Insurgencies.

The Spanish Guerrilla 1808-1814 as a model for people’s wars and resistance movements

Transforming the meaning of the term 'guerrilla' which had once meant feud or private warfare, and then irregular war conducted by special forces on behalf of a state or government, the Spanish Guerrilla (part of the Peninsular War) against Napoleon became the model to be emulated by insurgency movements across the world. Even though the term itself continued to be used, even in Spanish, for special operations, in henceforth became imbued with an ideological dimension, which is how it would be used especially in the 20th century.

The history of the practice of strategy from Antiquity to Napoleon

This chapter outlines the history of the practice of strategy, predating the introduction of the term. It homes in on episodes of European history since Antiquity for which historians claim to have found evidence of the practice of strategy, defined by Kimberly Kagan as ‘the setting of a state’s objectives and of priorities among those objectives’ in order to allocate resources and choose the best means. While focusing only on Europe, this chapter covers case studies over nearly 2500 ranging from the wars of Ancient Greece, of the Romans to Medieval warfare (here with a focus on English history), the warfare of Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV of France, Frederick II of Prussia, the French Revolutionaries and Napoleon.

Regina Maris and the command of the sea: the sixteenth century origins of modern maritime strategy

The concept of the command of the sea has its roots in medieval notions of the sovereignty of coastal waters, as claimed by several monarchs and polities of Europe. In the sixteenth century, a surge of intellectual creativity, especially in Elizabethan England, fused this notion with the Thucydidean term ‘thalassocracy’ – the rule of the sea. In the light of the explorations of the oceans, this led to a new conceptualisation of naval warfare, developed in theory and then put into practice. This falsifies the mistaken but widespread assumption that there was no significant writing on naval strategy before the nineteenth century.

Les dangers de la guerre. L'image du guerrier dans le Brut de La3amon

A study of the lexis and imagery of warfare in the early C13 English adaptation of Wace's Roman de Brut by the English poet La3amon. The narrator's stance is analysed the light of the poet's priestly identity, revealing an undercurrent of disapproval of the glorification of the warrior found in La3amon's sources, and moral concern for combatants engaged in 'unjust' wars of conquest.

Civilian casualties – do we really care? The failure of the revolution in military affairs of non-lethal weapons in the U.S., Russia and Israel

Causing civilian casualties during military operations has become a much politicised topic in international relations since the Second World War. Since the last decade of the 20th century, different scholars and political analysts have claimed that human life is valued more and more among the general international community. This argument has led many researchers to assume that democratic culture and traditions, modern ethical and moral issues have created a desire for a world without war or, at least, a demand that contemporary armed conflicts, if unavoidable, at least have to be far less lethal forcing the military to seek new technologies that can minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage. Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) – weapons that are intended to minimise civilian casualties and collateral damage – are based on the technology that, during the 1990s, was expected to revolutionise the conduct of warfare making it significantly less deadly. The rapid rise of interest in NLW, ignited by the American military twenty five years ago, sparked off an entirely new military, as well as an academic, discourse concerning their potential contribution to military success on the 21st century battlefields. It seems, however, that except for this debate, very little has been done within the military forces themselves. This research suggests that the roots of this situation are much deeper than the simple professional misconduct of the military establishment, or the poor political behaviour of political leaders, who had sent them to fight. Following the story of NLW in the U.S., Russia and Israel this research focuses on the political and cultural aspects that have been supposed to force the military organisations of these countries to adopt new technologies and operational and organisational concepts regarding NLW in an attempt to minimise enemy civilian casualties during their military operations. This research finds that while American, Russian and Israeli national characters are, undoubtedly, products of the unique historical experience of each one of these nations, all of three pay very little regard to foreigners’ lives. Moreover, while it is generally argued that the international political pressure is a crucial factor that leads to the significant reduction of harmed civilians and destroyed civilian infrastructure, the findings of this research suggest that the American, Russian and Israeli governments are well prepared and politically equipped to fend off international criticism. As the analyses of the American, Russian and Israeli cases reveal, the political-military leaderships of these countries have very little external or domestic reasons to minimise enemy civilian casualties through fundamental-revolutionary change in their conduct of war. In other words, this research finds that employment of NLW have failed because the political leadership asks the militaries to reduce the enemy civilian casualties to a politically acceptable level, rather than to the technologically possible minimum; as in the socio-cultural-political context of each country, support for the former appears to be significantly higher than for the latter.