Can British multinational enterprises finance economic development in South East Asia?

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to shed new light on the debate about the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) and public policy in fostering economic development. Specifically, can the capital inflow of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and the ability of the subsidiaries to raise funds locally help promote development? This paper addresses this issue by examining the capital structure and financing sources of foreign subsidiaries of MNEs. Design/methodology/approach – This paper integrates the capital structure theories in finance with internalization theory in international business. It uses an original primary dataset collected by a survey of 101 foreign subsidiaries of British MNEs in six emerging economies in the ASEAN region. Findings – There are three significant findings. First, these subsidiaries rely heavily on internal funds generated within the MNEs and less on external debts raised in the host countries. Second, the foreign subsidiary's capital structure is influenced by the home country of origin of the parent firm and the parent firm's financing sources. Third, these subsidiaries have used the financial resources to develop business networks with local small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which contribute to economic development of the host countries. Originality/value – This paper examines the internal capital market within the MNE. It provides theoretical and empirical support for the capital structure theory of the hierarchy financing approach and also for internalization theory by addressing FDI inflows by MNEs and the raising of funds locally. These findings have important implications for public policy, namely the facilitation of MNE entry to encourage economic development.

Asymmetric information, credit market condition, and entrepreneurial finance

The issue of imperfect information plays a much more important role in financing “informationally opaque” small businesses than in financing large companies.1 This chapter examines the asymmetric information issue in entrepreneurial finance from two perspectives: the effects of relationship lending and the impacts of credit market concentration on entrepreneurial financial behavior. These two perspectives are strongly linked to each other via the asymmetric information issue in entrepreneurial finance. Existing literature has recognized the important role played by relationship lending in alleviating the problem of asymmetric information. However, mixed empirical results have been reported. For example, it has been found that the development of relationship lending can improve the availability of finance for small businesses borrowers (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) and reduce the costs of finance (Berger and Udell, 1995). Meanwhile, with monopoly power, banks may extract rents, in terms of charging higher-than-market interest rates, from small businesscustomers who have very concentrated banking relationships (Ongena and Smith, 2001). In addition, both favorable and unfavorable effects of credit market concentration on financing small businesses have been acknowledged. Small business borrowers may have to pay a higher-than-market price on loans (Degryse and Ongena, 2005) and are more likely to be financially constrained (Cetorelli, 2004) than in competitive markets. On the other hand, empirical studies have shown that market concentration create a strong motive for lenders to invest in private information from small business customers, and therefore a concentrated market is more efficient in terms of private information acquisition (Han et al., 2009b). The objective of this chapter is to investigate, by reviewing existing literature, the role played by relationship lending and the effects of market concentration on financing entrepreneurial businesses that are supposed to be informationally opaque. In the first section we review literature on the important role played by asymmetric information in entrepreneurial finance from two perspectives: asymmetric information and relationship lending, and the theoretical modeling of asymmetric information. Then we examine the relationship between capital market conditions and entrepreneurial finance and attempt to answer two questions: Why is the capital market condition important for entrepreneurial finance? and What are the effects of capital market conditions on entrepreneurial financial behavior in terms of discouraged borrowers, cash holding, and the availability and costs of finance?

The Role of Collateral in Entrepreneurial Finance

Previous research has suggested collateral has the role of sorting entrepreneurs either by observed risk or by private information. In order to test these roles, this paper develops a model which incorporates a signalling process (sorting by observed risk) into the design of an incentivecompatible menu of loan contracts which works as a self-selection mechanism (sorting by private information). It then tests this Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model, using the 1998 US Survey of Small Business Finances. It reports for the first time that: high type entrepreneurs are more likely to pledge collateral and pay a lower interest rate; and entrepreneurs who transfer good signals enjoy better contracts than those transferring bad signals. These findings suggest that the Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model sheds more light on entrepreneurial debt finance than either the sorting-by-observed-risk or the sorting-by-private information paradigms on their own.

Essays on robust portfolio selection and pension finance

This thesis examines three different, but related problems in the broad area of portfolio management for long-term institutional investors, and focuses mainly on the case of pension funds. The first idea (Chapter 3) is the application of a novel numerical technique – robust optimization – to a real-world pension scheme (the Universities Superannuation Scheme, USS) for first time. The corresponding empirical results are supported by many robustness checks and several benchmarks such as the Bayes-Stein and Black-Litterman models that are also applied for first time in a pension ALM framework, the Sharpe and Tint model and the actual USS asset allocations. The second idea presented in Chapter 4 is the investigation of whether the selection of the portfolio construction strategy matters in the SRI industry, an issue of great importance for long term investors. This study applies a variety of optimal and naïve portfolio diversification techniques to the same SRI-screened universe, and gives some answers to the question of which portfolio strategies tend to create superior SRI portfolios. Finally, the third idea (Chapter 5) compares the performance of a real-world pension scheme (USS) before and after the recent major changes in the pension rules under different dynamic asset allocation strategies and the fixed-mix portfolio approach and quantifies the redistributive effects between various stakeholders. Although this study deals with a specific pension scheme, the methodology can be applied by other major pension schemes in countries such as the UK and USA that have changed their rules.