Spatial economics and ecosystems: the interaction between economics and the natural environment

This collection of original research and review articles and has been designed with the joint aims of inspiring future work and of reminding environmental economists and researchers from other disciplines that looking for similarities and common features in their studies is more important than magnifying their differences. It is also suitable for use as a postgraduate text. The volume reflects the endeavour of mainstream economic thought to include, amongst its chief concerns, the study of all complex interactions between economies and natural space. It also documents efforts made by economists and other scientists to study the complex phenomenon of individual and collective decision making when faced with problems linking economic activity with the environment. Presenting a pluralistic view of approaches and methodologies, rather than an exhaustive list of topics of interest to environmental scientists, the editors have brought together innovative contributions that can be read as self-contained pieces of work.

Market transparency and collusion: on the UK agricultural tractor registration exchange

We review the decision by the European Commission in the case of the UK Agricultural Registration Exchange. We propose a theoretical model, offering a basis for some of the intuitive arguments used by the Commission on the anti-competitive role of information exchange in the case of price and non price collusion. Market transparency on non price data is shown to be a collusion facilitating device which may achieve stability in otherwise unstable cartels.

Regulating vertical relations in the presence of retailer differentiation costs

We discuss public policy towards vertical relations, comparing different types of contracts between a manufacturer and a maximum of two retailers. Together with (potential) price competition between the retailers, we study the role of a (sunk) differentiation cost paid by them in order to relax competition in the retail market and broaden the market potential of the distributed product. This non-price competition element in the downstream market is responsible for our conclusion that, unlike in standard policy guidelines and previous theoretical analysis, restrictions in intra-brand competition may deserve a permissive treatment even in the absence of inter-brand competition, if retailer differentiation is costly.

Endogenous retailer preferences in intermediate good markets

We model strategic interaction in a differentiated input market as a game among two suppliers and n retailers. Each one of the upstream firms chooses the specification of the input which it will offer.Then, retailers choose their type from a continuum of possibilities. The decisions made in these two first stages affect the degree of compatibility between each retailer's ideal input specification and that of the inputs offered by the two upstream firms. In a third stage, upstream firms compete setting input prices. Equilibrium may be of the two-vendor policy or of the technological monopoly type.

Multiproduct activity in an experimental differentiated oligopoly

In a symmetric differentiated experimental oligopoly with multiproduct firms we test the predictive power of the corresponding Bertrand-Nash equilibria. Subjects are not informed on the specification of the underlying demand model. In the presence of intense multiproduct activity, and provided that a parallel pricing rule is imposed to multiproduct firms, strategies tend to confirm the non-cooperative multiproduct solution.

Dominance in the Tetra Pak case: an empirical approach

The 1991 decision of the European Commission on the Tetra Pak case was based on information which seemed to prove the firm's anti-competitive behavior. The Tetra Pak case is investigated here focusing on the meaning of multimarket dominance, using empirical techniques. We find that a more rigorous analysis of the data available would not confirm the Commission's assertions. That is, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the Commission was right to relate Tetra Pak's dominance in the aseptic sector to its market power in the non-aseptic sector. Our results suggest a general framework for the analysis of abusive transfer of market power across vertically or/and horizontally related markets.

Controlling market power of vertically integrated firms in electricity networks: demand response of aggregator agents

This article reports the results of an experiment that examined how demand aggregators can discipline vertically-integrated firms - generator and distributor-retailer holdings-, which have a high share in wholesale electricity market with uniform price double auction (UPDA). We initially develop a treatment where holding members redistribute the profit based on the imposition of supra-competitive prices, in equal proportions (50%-50%). Subsequently, we introduce a vertical disintegration (unbundling) treatment with holding-s information sharing, where profits are distributed according to market outcomes. Finally, a third treatment is performed to introduce two active demand aggregators, with flexible interruptible loads in real time. We found that the introduction of responsive demand aggregators neutralizes the power market and increases market efficiency, even beyond what is achieved through vertical disintegration.

Managing a duopolistic water market with confirmed proposals. An experiment

We report results from experimental water markets in which owners of two different sources of water supply water to households and farmers. The final water quality consumed by each type of consumer is determined through mixing of qualities from two different resources. We compare the standard duopolistic market structure with an alternative market clearing mechanism inspired by games with confirmed strategies (which have been shown to yield collusive outcomes). As in the static case, complex dynamic markets operating under a confirmed proposals protocol yield less efficient outcomes because coordination among independent suppliers has the usual effects of restricting output and increasing prices to the users. Our results suggest that, when market mechanisms are used to allocate water to its users, the rule of thumb used by competition authorities can also serve as a guide towards water market regulation.

Multiproduct activity and competition policy: The Tetra Pak case

We propose the Tetra Pak case as a real-world example to study the implications of multiproduct activity for European Competition Policy. Tetra Pak, a monopolist in aseptic carton packaging of liquid food, competes with Elopak in the nonaseptic sector. The EC Commission used the effect of Tetra Pak's dominance in the aseptic sector on its rival's performance as an evidence of the former's anticompetitive behavior. With linear demand and cost functions and interdependent demands, the Commission's position can be supported. However, a more general model suggests that the Commission's conclusions cannot be supported as the unique outcome of the analysis of the information available.

Identified consumers: an experiment on the informativeness of cross-demand price effects

Often, firms have no information on the specification of the true demand model they are faced with. It is, however, a well established fact that trial-and-error algorithms may be used by them in order to learn how to make optimal decisions. Using experimental methods, we identify a property of the information on past actions which helps the seller of two asymmetric demand substitutes to reach the optimal prices more precisely and faster. The property concerns the possibility of disaggregating changes in each product’s demand into client exit/entry and shift from one product to the other.

An experiment on subjective game valuations

We report experimental results on a prisoners' dilemma implemented in a way which allows us to elicit incentive−compatible valuations of the game. We test the hypothesis that players' valuations coincide with their Nash equilibrium earnings. Our results offer significantly less support for this hypothesis than for the prediction of Dominant Strategy (DS) play.

Actitud frente al Riesgo y Comparación Social: un Estudio Experimental

En el presente artículo, se investiga la relación existente entre las actitudes frente al riesgo mostradas por los individuos en la toma de decisiones económicas y los procesos psicológicos descritos por la teoría de la comparación social. Para ello, se implementa un experimento en el que los sujetos deben realizar una tarea de elección de loterías bajo distintas condiciones, que difieren entre sí en formación social disponible. Confirmando las predicciones de la teoría de la comparación social, los resultados obtenidos indican que la información acerca de las actitudes frente al riesgo mostradas por los demás puede desempeñar un importante papel en la determinación de las actitudes frente al riesgo individuales. Palabras clave: decisión bajo riesgo, actitud frente al riesgo mostradas por los demás puede desempeñar un importante papel en la determinación de las actitudes frente al riesgo individuales.

Adaptive behavior by single-product and multiproduct price setting firms in experimental markets

We focus on the learning dynamics in multiproduct price-setting markets, where firms use past strategies and performance to adapt to the corresponding equilibrium.

Studying economics reduces overexploitation in a common resource experiment

This paper studies the economic behavior of agents, who make decisions regarding the sustainability of Common-Pool Resources (CPR). For this purpose, economic experiments are applied to simulate the yield of a CPR, taking into account the influence of economics training on the learning process of individuals, regarding their decisions for sustainability. Based on a non-cooperative game with simultaneous choices, the results of experiments show that after several rounds the existence of economics knowledge reflects a better learning process for making decisions regarding sustainability of CPR.

On the evolution of monopoly pricing in Internet-assisted search markets

This study examines the evolution of prices in markets with Internet price-comparison search engines. The empirical study analyzes laboratory data of prices available to informed consumers, for two industry sizes and two conditions on the sample (complete and incomplete). Distributions are typically bimodal. One of the two modes of distribution, corresponding to monopoly pricing, tends to attract such pricing strategies increasingly over time. The second one, corresponding to interior pricing, follows a decreasing trend. Monopoly pricing can serve as a means of insurance against more competitive (but riskier) behavior. In fact, experimental subjects who initially earn low profits due to interior pricing are more likely to switch to monopoly pricing than subjects who experience good returns from the start.