Means, motive and opportunity? Disentangling client influence on performance measurement appraisals

This paper investigates the extent to which clients were able to influence performance measurement appraisals during the downturn in commercial property markets that began in the UK during the second half of 2007. The sharp change in market sentiment produced speculation that different client categories were attempting to influence their appraisers in different ways. In particular, it was recognised that the requirement for open-ended funds to meet redemptions gave them strong incentives to ensure that their asset values were marked down to market. Using data supplied by Investment Property Databank, we demonstrate that, indeed, unlisted open ended funds experienced sharper drops in capital values than other fund types in the second half of 2007, after the market turning point. These differences are statistically significant and cannot simply be explained by differences in portfolio composition. Client influence on appraisal forms one possible explanation of the results observed: the different pressures on fund managers resulting in different appraisal outcomes.

Real estate investment in global financial centers: risk, return and contagion

Global financial activity is heavily concentrated in a small number of world cities –international financial centers. The office markets in those cities receive significant flows of investment capital. The growing specialization of activity in IFCs and innovations in real estate investment vehicles lock developer, occupier, investment, and finance markets together, creating common patterns of movement and transmitting shocks from one office market throughout the system. International real estate investment strategies that fail to recognize this common source of volatility and risk may fail to deliver the diversification benefits sought.

Principal-agent issues in asset acquisition: UK institutions and their investment agents

This paper explores principal‐agent issues in the stock selection processes of institutional property investors. Drawing upon an interview survey of fund managers and acquisition professionals, it focuses on the relationships between principals and external agents as they engage in property transactions. The research investigated the extent to which the presence of outcome‐based remuneration structures could lead to biased advice, overbidding and/or poor asset selection. It is concluded that institutional property buyers are aware of incentives for opportunistic behaviour by external agents, often have sufficient expertise to robustly evaluate agents’ advice and that these incentives are counter‐balanced by a number of important controls on potential opportunistic behaviour. There are strong counter‐incentives in the need for the agents to establish personal relationships and trust between themselves and institutional buyers, to generate repeat and related business and to preserve or generate a good reputation in the market.