Truth in complex adaptive systems models should be based on truth by constructive verification

It is argued that the truth status of emergent properties of complex adaptive systems models should be based on an epistemology of proof by constructive verification and therefore on the ontological axioms of a non-realist logical system such as constructivism or intuitionism. ‘Emergent’ properties of complex adaptive systems (CAS) models create particular epistemological and ontological challenges. These challenges bear directly on current debates in the philosophy of mathematics and in theoretical computer science. CAS research, with its emphasis on computer simulation, is heavily reliant on models which explore the entailments of Formal Axiomatic Systems (FAS). The incompleteness results of Gödel, the incomputability results of Turing, and the Algorithmic Information Theory results of Chaitin, undermine a realist (platonic) truth model of emergent properties. These same findings support the hegemony of epistemology over ontology and point to alternative truth models such as intuitionism, constructivism and quasi-empiricism.

Models, mathematics and meaning in interdisciplinary research

Interdisciplinary research presents particular challenges for unambiguous communication. Frequently, the meanings of words differ markedly between disciplines, leading to apparent consensus masking fundamental misunderstandings. Researchers can agree on the need for models, but conceive of models fundamentally differently. While mathematics is frequently seen as an elitist language reinforcing disciplinary distinctions, both mathematics and modelling can also offer scope to bridge disciplinary epistemological divisions and create common ground on which very different disciplines can meet. This paper reflects on the role and scope for mathematics and modelling to present a common epistemological space in interdisciplinary research spanning the social, natural and engineering sciences.

The philosophy of W. Ross Ashby and its relationship to 'The Matrix'

Ashby was a keen observer of the world around him, as per his technological and psychiatrical developments. Over the years, he drew numerous philosophical conclusions on the nature of human intelligence and the operation of the brain, on artificial intelligence and the thinking ability of computers and even on science in general. In this paper, the quite profound philosophy espoused by Ashby is considered as a whole, in particular in terms of its relationship with the world as it stands now and even in terms of scientific predictions of where things might lead. A meaningful comparison is made between Ashby's comments and the science fiction concept of 'The Matrix' and serious consideration is given as to how much Ashby's ideas lay open the possibility of the matrix becoming a real world eventuality.

Reading Derrida on mathematics

This article engages with the claims of Anne Brubaker that “[n]ow that the dust has settled after the so-called ‘Science Wars’ […] it is an opportune time to reassess the ways in which poststructural theory both argues persuasively for mathematics as a culturally embedded practice – a method as opposed to a metaphysics – and, at the same time, reinscribes realist notions of mathematics as a noise-free description of a mind independent reality.” Through a close re-reading of Jacques Derrida’s work I argue, in alliance with Vicki Kirby’s critique of the work of Brian Rotman, not only that Brubaker misunderstands Derrida’s “writing” but also that her argument constitutes a typical instance of much wider misreadings of Derrida and “poststructuralism” across a range of disciplines in terms of the ways in which her text re-institutes the very stabilities it itself attributes to Derrida’s texts.