State practice, customary humanitarian law and civilian casualties of armed conflict

The article examines the customary international law credentials of the humanitarian law rules proposed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICR) in 2005. It relies on the BIICL/Chatham House analysis as a ‘constructive comment’ on the methodology of the ICRC study and the rules formed as a result of that methodology with respect to the dead and missing as an aid to determination of their customary law status. It shows that most of the rules studied have a customary international lawpedigree which conforms to the conclusions formed on the rules generally in the Wilmshurst and Breau study. However, the rules with respect to return of personal effects, recording location of graves and notification of relatives of access to gravesites do not seem to have even on a majoritarian/deductive approach enough volume of state practice to establish them as customary with respect to civilians.

Second Strike and you are (finally) out? The Quashing of the Prevention of Infiltration Law (Amendment no. 4)

The blog-post critically analyses the Israeli Supreme Court judgment (HCJ 8425/13 Anon v. Knesset et al) quashing the Prevention of Infiltration Law (Amendment no. 4), offering themes of comparative constitutional interest.

Just another case of treaty interpretation? Reconciling humanitarian law and human rights law in the ICJ

This chapter offers a fresh critique of the approach taken by the International Court of Justice to the relationship between humanitarian law and human rights law. In so doing, it seeks to move beyond the intractable debates that have dominated this area, offering an original account of the relationship that is firmly grounded in general international law concepts of treaty interpretation.

Conflicts of law and the mutual recognition of same-sex unions in the EU

My thesis uses legal arguments to demonstrate a requirement for recognition of same-sex marriages and registered partnerships between EU Member States. I draw on the US experience, where arguments for recognition of marriages void in some states previously arose in relation to interracial marriages. I show how there the issue of recognition today depends on conflicts of law and its interface with US constitutional freedoms against discrimination. I introduce the themes of the importance of domicile, the role of the public policy exception, vested rights, and relevant US constitutional freedoms. Recognition in the EU also depends on managing the tension between private international law and freedoms guaranteed by higher norms, in this case the EU Treaties and the European Convention on Human Rights. I set out the inconsistencies between various private international law systems and the problems this creates. Other difficulties are caused by the use of nationality as a connecting factor to determine personal capacity, and the overuse of the public policy exception. I argue that EU Law can constrain the use of conflicts law or public policy by any Member State where these are used to deny effect to same-sex unions validly formed elsewhere. I address the fact that family law falls only partly within Union competence, that existing EU Directives have had limited success at achieving full equality and that powers to implement new measures have not been used to their full potential. However, Treaty provisions outlawing discrimination on grounds of nationality can be interpreted so as to require recognition in many cases. Treaty citizenship rights can also be interpreted favourably to mandate recognition, once private international law is itself recognised as an obstacle to free movement. Finally, evolving interpretations of the European Convention on Human Rights may also support claims for cross-border recognition of existing relationships.

Remote law-making? American drone strikes and the development of jus ad bellum

There is growing concern amongst international lawyers that the United States’ use of unmanned armed vehicles to conduct lethal targeting operations against non-state actors is setting a dangerous precedent for the future and might lead to an erosion of important rules under international law. Taking seriously these concerns, this article examines in more detail the potential precedent created by the US through its lethal drone strikes and the provided justifications, for the purpose of the development of jus ad bellum. In identifying the claims made by the US under different theories of customary international law as qualified practice or expressions of opinio juris that can lead to an alteration of the law should they be accepted by the international community, this article takes a first step towards a more extensive debate on the potential effects of the US drone strikes on the development of international law.