Translation practices in political institutions: a comparison of national, supranational, and non-governmental organisations

This paper explores the settings and practices of translation at three types of political institutions, i.e. national, supranational, and non-governmental organisations. The three institutions are the translation service of the German Foreign Office, the translation department of the European Central Bank, and translation provision by the non-governmental organisation Amnesty International. The three case studies describe the specific translation practices in place at these institutions and illustrate some characteristic translation strategies. In this way, we reflect on how different translation practices can impact on translation agency and how these practices in turn are influenced by the type of institution and its organisational structure. The article also aims to explore to which extent the characteristics of collectivity, anonymity and standardisation, and of institutional translation as self-translation are applicable to the institutions under discussion.

A matter of choice: strategy and discretion in the shadow of World War Two

American policy-makers are predisposed towards the idea of a necessary war of survival, fought with little room for choice. This reflects a dominant memory of World War II that teaches Americans that they live in a dangerously small world that imposes conflict. Critics argue that the ‘choice versus necessity’ schema is ahistorical and mischievous. This article offers supporting fire to those critiques. America’s war against the Axis (1941–45) is a crucial case through which to test the ‘small world’ view. Arguments for war in 1941 pose overblown scenarios of the rise of a Eurasian super-threat. In 1941 conflict was discretionary and not strictly necessary in the interests of national security. The argument for intervention is a closer call that often assumed. This has implications for America’s choices today.

MI(R,)G(R) and British Covert Operations, 1939-42

The Military Intelligence (Research) Department of the British War Office was tasked in 1940 with encouraging and supporting armed resistance in occupied Europe and the Axis-controlled Middle East. The major contention of this paper is that, in doing so, MI(R) performed a key role in British strategy in 1940-42 and in the development of what are now known as covert operations. MI(R) developed an organic, but coherent doctrine for such activity which was influential upon the Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its own sub-branch, G(R), which applied this doctrine in practice in East Africa and the Middle East in 1940-41. It was also here that a number of key figures in the development of covert operations and special forces first cut their teeth, the most notable being Major Generals Colin Gubbins and Orde Wingate.