A bank lending channel or a credit supply shock?

Shifts in credit supply could have a bearing on house prices e.g. through financial innovations and changes in regulation independently of the existence of a bank lending channel of monetary policy. This paper assesses the responses of US house prices to an exogenous credit supply shock and compares them with the effects from variations in credit supply associated with a bank lending channel. The contribution of the study is twofold. First, innovations in credit supply are identified using a mortgage mix variable, thereby accounting for the market-based financial intermediaries. As a robustness check a survey variable of bank lending standards for mortgage loans is also used. Second, the policy-induced credit supply effect on house prices is disentangled and compared with the effect from an exogenous credit supply shock. It is shown that in the first 3 years credit supply shocks affect house prices exogenously rather than through the bank lending channel. Monetary policy has still a large impact on house prices, even when the bank lending channel is ‘turned off’.

Accounting for complex investment transactions

This case study exposes students to complex investment transactions. You must document the following: (1) apply the appropriate accounting literature along with its provisions and justify the order of its application; (2) identify and interpret key facts to classify the given investments and relations; (3) discuss the choice of key assumptions that are central to the analysis; (4) interpret the nature of all investment relations with Holdings; discuss all Owner level and below relations; (5) discuss how accounting for varied levels of influence impact the items reported on/off the face of investors’ financial statements; (6) from DT’s perspective, discuss the potential positives and negatives of its arrangement with Owner with respect to Holdings; and (7) after analyzing additional facts, discuss the nature of the relations of Simon and Herb III with Owner.

Accounting quality, information risk and implied volatility around earnings announcements

We examine the impact of accounting quality, used as a proxy for information risk, on the behavior of equity implied volatility around quarterly earnings announcements. Using US data during 1996–2010, we observe that lower (higher) accounting quality significantly relates to higher (lower) levels of implied volatility (IV) around announcements. Worse accounting quality is further associated with a significant increase in IV before announcements, and is found to relate to a larger resolution in IV after the announcement has taken place. We interpret our findings as indicative of information risk having a significant impact on implied volatility behavior around earnings announcements.

The effect of financial leverage on real and accrual-based earnings management

Past research has documented a substitution effect between real earnings management (RM) and accrual-based earnings management (AM), depending on relative costs. This study contributes to this research by examining whether levels of (and changes in) financial leverage have an impact on this empirically documented trade-off. We hypothesise that in the presence of high leverage, firms that engage in earnings manipulation tactics will exhibit a preference for RM due to a lower possibility—and subsequent costs—of getting caught. We show that leverage levels and increases positively and significantly affect upward RM, with no significant effect on income-increasing AM, while our findings point towards a complementarity effect between unexpected levels of RM and AM for firms with very high leverage levels and changes. This is interpreted as an indication that high leverage could attract heavy outsider scrutiny, making it necessary for firms to use both forms of earnings management in order to achieve earnings targets. Furthermore, we document that equity investors exhibit a significantly stronger penalising reaction to AM vs. RM, indicating that leverage-induced RM is not as easily detectable by market participants as debt-induced AM, despite the fact that the former could imply deviation from optimal business practices.