Experimental evolution for generalists and specialists reveals multivariate genetic constraints on thermal reaction norms

Theory predicts the emergence of generalists in variable environments and antagonistic pleiotropy to favour specialists in constant environments, but empirical data seldom support such generalist–specialist trade-offs. We selected for generalists and specialists in the dung fly Sepsis punctum (Diptera: Sepsidae) under conditions that we predicted would reveal antagonistic pleiotropy and multivariate trade-offs underlying thermal reaction norms for juvenile development. We performed replicated laboratory evolution using four treatments: adaptation at a hot (31 °C) or a cold (15 °C) temperature, or under regimes fluctuating between these temperatures, either within or between generations. After 20 generations, we assessed parental effects and genetic responses of thermal reaction norms for three correlated life-history traits: size at maturity, juvenile growth rate and juvenile survival. We find evidence for antagonistic pleiotropy for performance at hot and cold temperatures, and a temperature-mediated trade-off between juvenile survival and size at maturity, suggesting that trade-offs associated with environmental tolerance can arise via intensified evolutionary compromises between genetically correlated traits. However, despite this antagonistic pleiotropy, we found no support for the evolution of increased thermal tolerance breadth at the expense of reduced maximal performance, suggesting low genetic variance in the generalist–specialist dimension.

Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies

Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on the strategic choice of firms' owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment device aiming at gaining competitive advantage in the product market. In a quantity setting duopoly we experimentally test whether firms' owners compensate their managers through contracts combining own profits either with revenues or with relative performance, and the resulting managerial behaviour in the product market. Prominent among our results is that firms' owners choose relative performance over profit revenue contracts more frequently. Further, firms' owners successfully induce a more aggressive behaviour by their managers in the market, by setting incentives which deviate from strict profit maximization.

Risk taking of executives under different incentive contracts: experimental evidence

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to counteract excessive risk aversion in agents. In a setting where any kind of risk taking is suboptimal for shareholders, we show that excessive risk taking may occur for one of two reasons: risk preferences or incentives. Even when compensated through restricted company stock, experimental CEOs take large amounts of excessive risk. This contradicts classical financial theory, but can be explained through risk preferences that are not uniform over the probability and outcome spaces, and in particular, risk seeking for small probability gains and large probability losses. Compensation through options further increases risk taking as expected. We show that this effect is driven mainly by the personal asset position of the experimental CEO, thus having deleterious effects on company performance.