Money laundering and the shadow economy in Kazakhstan

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to assess and highlight the approach taken towards the legal control of illicit money laundering taken in the Republic of Kazakhstan, in particular, the role played by an amnesty on the legalisation of illicit funds. This is particularly important as a basis for a wider discussion about the proper limits of the “criminalising” approaches commonly taken in anti-money laundering regulations. Design/methodology/approach The discussion and evaluation in the paper is based upon a conceptual analysis of the money laundering regime in Kazakhstan, in particular, the legal framework and policies of implementation adopted. Findings The paper demonstrates that the problems that are posed by the shadow economy in post-Soviet transition societies can make the blanket criminalisation of money laundering a self-defeating approach, unless accompanied by measures which allow for the achievement of “market-constituting” effects. Research limitations/implications The paper draws on experience and practice in one jurisdiction only (Kazakhstan); it also limits its focus to one particular example of a money laundering amnesty policy. Both of these limitations, therefore, suggest avenues for further comparative research. Originality/value The paper’s conclusions about the interactions between the shadow economies of transitional societies and the global anti-money laundering agenda have wider application in assessments of international law in this area.

Output sustainability to exogenous and endogenous shocks: evidence from emerging economies

This paper studies the impact of exogenous and endogenous shocks (exogenous shock is used interchangeably with external shock; endogenous shock is used interchangeably with domestic shock) on output fluctuations in post-communist countries during the 2000s. The first part presents the analytical framework and formulates a research hypothesis. The second part presents vector autoregressive estimation and analysis model proposed by Pesaran (2004) and Pesaran and Smith (2006) that relates bank real lending, the cyclical component of output and spreads and accounts for cross-sectional dependence (CD) across the countries. Impulse response functions show that exogenous positive shock lead to a drop in output sustainability for 9 over 12 Central Eastern European countries and Russia, when the endogenous shock is mild and ambiguous. Moreover, the effect of exogenous shock is more significant during the crises. Variance decompositions show that exogenous shock in the aftermath of crisis had a substantial impact on economic activity of emerging economies.

Modelling the medieval economy: money, prices and income in England, 1263-1520

This chapter presents a simple econometric model of the medieval English economy, focusing on the relationship between money, prices and incomes. The model is estimated using annual data for the period 1263-1520 obtained from various sources. The start date is determined by the availability of continuous runs of annual data, while the finishing date immediately precedes the take-off of Tudor price inflation. Accounts from the ecclesiastical and monastic estates have survived in great numbers for this period, thereby ensuring that crop yields can be estimated from a regionally representative set of estates.

Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies

Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on the strategic choice of firms' owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment device aiming at gaining competitive advantage in the product market. In a quantity setting duopoly we experimentally test whether firms' owners compensate their managers through contracts combining own profits either with revenues or with relative performance, and the resulting managerial behaviour in the product market. Prominent among our results is that firms' owners choose relative performance over profit revenue contracts more frequently. Further, firms' owners successfully induce a more aggressive behaviour by their managers in the market, by setting incentives which deviate from strict profit maximization.