Whatever works: proportionality as a constitutional doctrine

In The Global Model of Constitutional Rights Kai Möller claims that the proportionality test is underlain by an expansive moral right to autonomy. This putative right protects everything that advances one’s self-conception. It may of course be limited when balanced against other considerations such as the rights of others. But it always creates a duty on the state to justify the limitation. Möller further contends that the practice of proportionality can best be understood as protecting the right to autonomy. This review article summarizes the main tenets of Möller’s theory and criticizes them on two counts. First, it disputes the existence of a general right to autonomy; such a right places an unacceptably heavy burden on others. Second, it argues that we do not need to invoke a right to autonomy to explain and justify the main features of the practice of proportionality. Like other constitutional doctrines, proportionality is defensible, if it is grounded in pragmatic –mainly epistemic and institutional- considerations about how to increase overall rights compliance. These considerations are independent of any substantive theory of rights.

After the referendum: options for a constitutional convention

Whatever the result of Scotland’s independence referendum, careful constitutional thinking will be needed. If Scots vote Yes, Scotland will need a new constitution and the rest of the UK will have to rethink its governing structures. Even in the event of a No vote, everyone agrees that the shape of the Union will need to change over the coming years. This paper examines how such constitution-making should take place. It sets out the options, gathers evidence from around the world on how those options might work, and weighs the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative. It concludes that constitutional proposals in the UK should best be developed by a convention comprising a mixture of ordinary members of the public and politicians; these proposals should be put to a referendum. This approach, the paper argues, offers the best route to high-quality debate, stronger democratic engagement, and, ultimately, deeper legitimacy for our governing structures.

Second Strike and you are (finally) out? The Quashing of the Prevention of Infiltration Law (Amendment no. 4)

The blog-post critically analyses the Israeli Supreme Court judgment (HCJ 8425/13 Anon v. Knesset et al) quashing the Prevention of Infiltration Law (Amendment no. 4), offering themes of comparative constitutional interest.

Playing Kant at the Court of King Arthur

This article contrasts the sense in which those whom Bernard Williams called ‘political realists’ and John Rawls are committed to the idea that political philosophy has to be distinctively political. Distinguishing the realist critique of political moralism from debates over ideal and non-ideal theory, it is argued that Rawls is more realist than many realists realise, and that realists can learn more about how to make a distinctively political vision of how our life together should be organised from his theorising, although it also points to a worrying tendency among Rawlsians to reach for inappropriately moralised arguments. G. A. Cohen’s advocacy of socialism and the second season of HBO’s The Wire are used as examples to illustrate these points.

Economic evidence in regulatory disputes: revisiting the court-regulatory agency relationship in the US and the UK

This article examines the issue of the appropriate scope of review of economic evidence enshrined in the discretionary assessments of utility regulators in the US and the UK. It advances a balance of institutional competencies approach to the question of the degree of deference owed to the regulatory agency’s economic assessments. In doing so, it revisits the doctrinal positions advanced in the US and UK for the substantive review of administrative discretion, so as to become attuned to the challenges posed by economic evidence. Drawing on insights from political science and economics, the suggested approach illuminates the institutional disadvantages of the courts that may warrant a high degree of deference. At the same time, however, it remains sensitive to the polycentric elements of regulatory disputes as well as to a number of institutional realties that may attenuate the weight of such comparative institutional disadvantages.