Negotiating the British landscape

According to many accounts, a key paradigm for understanding art in Post WWII Britain is one of Englishness versus internationalism or abstraction versus realism . These terms have a rich inflection of meanings that have been subject to interrogation over the last few decades. Anwar Shemza came to Britain and practiced his art at a time when these competing claims were at their height. In a postcolonial reading entitled “Black Diaspora Artists in Britain: Three ‘Moments’ in Post-War Britain” Stuart Hall recently used David Scott’s framework of a ‘problem space’, that is discursively defined through questions, tensions and conjunctures, that couched the entry of what he describes as first waive British commonwealth artists into critical visibility in Britain. This can be characterized in part by the reviews of WG Archer and GM Butcher, both supporters of Shemza and prominent critics of the period. Hall includes Shemza in this framework that defines the work and his aspirations as constituted through the tensions of what was perceived to be anti-colonialist aims of modernism through universalism and the ‘nativist’ current in anti-colonial nationalism . This text will focus particularly on the problematic of Landscape as a ‘problem space’ of vernacular and modernism, over here and over there. The aim is not to define Shemza within the tradition of English landscape nor to exclude him but to position him within a discursive field of landscape and modernism in mid twentieth Century art.

Finality revived: powers and intentionality

Proponents of physical intentionality argue that the classic hallmarks of intentionality highlighted by Brentano are also found in purely physical powers. Critics worry that this idea is metaphysically obscure at best, and at worst leads to panpsychism or animism. I examine the debate in detail, finding both confusion and illumination in the physical intentionalist thesis. Analysing a number of the canonical features of intentionality, I show that they all point to one overarching phenomenon of which both the mental and the physical are kinds, namely finality. This is the finality of ‘final causes’, the long-discarded idea of universal action for an end to which recent proponents of physical intentionality are in fact pointing whether or not they realise it. I explain finality in terms of the concept of specific indifference, arguing that in the case of the mental, specific indifference is realised by the process of abstraction, which has no correlate in the case of physical powers. This analysis, I conclude, reveals both the strength and weakness of rational creatures such as us, as well as demystifying (albeit only partly) the way in which powers work.