The biosurfactant viscosin produced by Pseudomonas fluorescens SBW25 aids spreading motility and plant growth promotion

Food security depends on enhancing production and reducing loss to pests and pathogens. A promising alternative to agrochemicals is the use of plant growth-promoting rhizobacteria (PGPR), which are commonly associated with many, if not all, plant species. However, exploiting the benefits of PGPRs requires knowledge of bacterial function and an in-depth understanding of plant-bacteria associations. Motility is important for colonization efficiency and microbial fitness in the plant environment, but the mechanisms employed by bacteria on and around plants are not well understood. We describe and investigate an atypical mode of motility in Pseudomonas fluorescens SBW25 that was revealed only after flagellum production was eliminated by deletion of the master regulator fleQ. Our results suggest that this ‘spidery spreading’ is a type of surface motility. Transposon mutagenesis of SBW25ΔfleQ (SBW25Q) produced mutants, defective in viscosin production, and surface spreading was also abolished. Genetic analysis indicated growth-dependency, production of viscosin, and several potential regulatory and secretory systems involved in the spidery spreading phenotype. Moreover, viscosin both increases efficiency of surface spreading over the plant root and protects germinating seedlings in soil infected with the plant pathogen Pythium. Thus, viscosin could be a useful target for biotechnological development of plant growth promotion agents.

Tripodal molecules for the promotion of phosphoester hydrolysis

A series of low molecular weight tripodal amide/histidine-containing compounds (1–2) have been synthesised and shown to increase the rate of bis-(p-nitrophenyl) phosphate (BNPP) and soman (GD) breakdown in buffered aqueous solution.

Railway promotion in Victorian Britain: engineering triumph or waste of capital?

A key issue in UK railway history is whether the railway system was an efficient response to the traffic requirements of the economy. The UK railway system was constructed entirely by private enterprise with minimal state subsidies. This chapter considers whether the railway system was 'over-built' because the government ignored the advice of the Railway Committee of the Board of Trade. The chapter suggests that the system was over-built by about 35 per cent. The causes of this over-building are investigated and are found to be mainly social and political failures arising from distrust between MPs and civil servants and public pressure on local MPs to ensure that their constituencies were well served by railways.